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Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to examine the political and administrative organisations of al-Andalus 
during the period of the Almohads. It employs close analysis of the sources in order to 
explore how the Almohad government system worked and to identify the extent of the 
development and the efficiency of its structures during the period. Each chapter focuses 
on a specific part of this system. Chapter I examines the founding of the political organs 
established by the founder of the Almohad movement, Ibn Tūmart, and the reforms 
made by his successor, the founder of the empire, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. Chapter II discusses 
the administrative political system of al-Andalus, especially the administrative divisions 
of the provinces, and the political structure of the government, represented by the 
governors and the kuṭṭāb. Chapter III examines the financial institutions and its 
structures, such as the ʿāmil, the mushrif, and the ṣāḥib al-aʿmāl, in addition to the 
Almohad sikka and its development. Chapter IV, the final chapter, studies the judicial 
system and highlights its religious functions. 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Simon Barton for 
his continuous support, patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance 
helped me throughout the research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined 
having a better supervisor and mentor for my Ph.D study. 
 
I would like also to thank all my friends and colleagues for their support and for 
providing me with copies of several sources that have helped me to complete this thesis. 
I greatly value their friendship and I deeply appreciate their belief in me. 
 
My deepest thanks, however, must go to my family. None of this would have been 
possible without their love and patience. My immediate family, to whom this 
dissertation is dedicated, has been a constant source of love, concern, support and 
strength all these years. I would like to express my heart-felt gratitude to them. 
 
iv 
 
 
Table of Contents 
	
Abstract ................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................. iii 
 
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 
The Almohad Movement ..................................................................................... 1 
Literature review ............................................................................................... 14 
Research Project ................................................................................................ 26 
Thesis structure and Methodology ................................................................... 27 
 
1....................................................................................................................................... 47 
The Foundations of the Almohad Political Organisation .................................. 47 
1. The hierarchy of Ibn Tūmart................................................................................... 47 
1.1 The Hierarchy and the Almohad Chronicles ................................................................ 48 
1.2 The Almohad Pyramid and the Beginning of the Movement ...................................... 52 
1.3 The Almohad Advisory Councils ................................................................................... 56 
1.3.1 Council of Ten ............................................................................................................ 56 
1.3.2 Council of Fifty .......................................................................................................... 59 
1.3.3 The Sabʿa and the Sabʿīn ........................................................................................... 62 
1.4 The Propagandists of the Almohads .............................................................................. 64 
1.4.1 The Ṭalaba: The ‘Learned’ ........................................................................................ 64 
1.4.2 The Ḥuffāẓ: The “Guardians” ..................................................................................... 67 
1.5 The Mass of the Population or Al-Kāffah ....................................................................... 71 
1.6 Borrowed Model or Original Innovation? .................................................................... 71 
2. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s Political Reform ........................................................................ 74 
2.1 The Almohad Council of Sheikh-s .................................................................................. 75 
2.2 The Ṭalaba (the Students) ............................................................................................... 79 
2.3 The Ḥuffāẓ ........................................................................................................................ 81 
v 
 
2.4 The Ḥaḍar Ṭalaba ............................................................................................................ 84 
2.5 The Position of Non-Almohads ....................................................................................... 87 
2.6 Education at that Time ................................................................................................... 88 
2.7 Consultative Councils ...................................................................................................... 90 
2.7.1 The Arab and Andalusi Sheikh-s ................................................................................ 90 
2.7.2 The Sayyid-s, or the Almohad Princes ....................................................................... 92 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 95 
 
2....................................................................................................................................... 97 
The Political-Administrative Organisation of al-Andalus ................................ 97 
1. Provincial divisions ................................................................................................... 98 
2. Government structures ........................................................................................... 103 
2.1 The Wālī (governor) ...................................................................................................... 103 
2.2 The Vizier ........................................................................................................................ 114 
2.3 The Kātib ......................................................................................................................... 118 
3. Al-barīd (Postal Service) ......................................................................................... 121 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 123 
 
3..................................................................................................................................... 124 
The Financial Administrative System .................................................................. 124 
1. Finance Officers ...................................................................................................... 125 
1.1 Ṣāḥib Ashghāl al-Barrayn .............................................................................................. 125 
1.2 Ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl or Ṣāḥib al-Ashghāl al-makhzaniyya .................................................. 126 
1.3 Al- mushrif ...................................................................................................................... 128 
1.4 Kuttāb al-Makhzan (The Secretaries of Finance) ........................................................ 131 
1.5 Other Financial Officers ............................................................................................... 132 
2. Revenue and Expenditure of the State .................................................................. 134 
2.1 The State Revenue ......................................................................................................... 134 
2.1.1 Ghanāʾim or Booty .................................................................................................. 134 
2.1.2 Zakāt ......................................................................................................................... 136 
2.1.3 The Fifth: Metals (Akhmās al-Ma'ādin) ................................................................... 137 
2.1.4 The Kharāj or Land Tax .......................................................................................... 138 
2.1.5 Confiscation (Al-Muṣādarah) .................................................................................. 140 
vi 
 
2.1.6 Investments .............................................................................................................. 140 
2.1.7 Other Taxes .............................................................................................................. 141 
2.2 The State’s Expenditure ................................................................................................ 145 
2.2.1 Military Expenditure ................................................................................................ 145 
2.2.2 Salaries and Rewards (hibāt) ................................................................................... 147 
2.2.3 Construction Projects ............................................................................................... 149 
3. Al-Sikkah or Almohad Coinage ............................................................................. 152 
3.1 The Almohad Dinar ....................................................................................................... 155 
3.2 Silver Coins .................................................................................................................... 162 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 163 
 
4..................................................................................................................................... 164 
Judicial and Religious Institutions under the Almohads ................................ 164 
1. Judicial Institutions ................................................................................................ 165 
1.1 Qāḍī al-Jamāʿa ............................................................................................................... 165 
1.2 Provincial Judges ........................................................................................................... 168 
1.3 The Subordinate Judges ................................................................................................ 175 
1.4 The ḥisba ......................................................................................................................... 177 
1.5 The Shurṭa or Almohad Police ..................................................................................... 181 
2. Religious authorities ............................................................................................... 184 
2.1 Imām or Ṣahib al-Ṣalāt .................................................................................................. 184 
2.2 The Preacher or al-Khaṭīb ............................................................................................. 185 
2.3 Al-Muʾadhdhin or Muezzin ........................................................................................... 186 
3. The Mālikī School and the Almohad Reform Project .......................................... 187 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 193 
 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 195 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 197 
vii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The Almohad Ruling Dynasty ......................................................................... 13 
Figure 2: The Almohad official Letters .......................................................................... 30 
Figure 3: The Almohad letters, Lévi-Provençal's Collection ......................................... 30 
Figure 4: The Almohad letters, ʿAzzāwī's Collection ..................................................... 32 
Figure 5: The lists of the Almohad hierarchy ................................................................. 51 
Figure 6: The Provinces of al-Andalus during the Almohad Era ................................. 100 
Figure 7: Dinar, minted in Jaén ................................................................................... 155 
Figure 8: 1/2 Dinar minted in Córdoba ....................................................................... 156 
Figure 9: 1/2 Dinar minted in Fes ................................................................................ 158 
Figure 10: 1/2 Dinar minted in Seville ......................................................................... 159 
Figure 11: Dinar minted during the period of Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr ............................... 160 
Figure 12: Dinar minted during the period of Muḥammad al-Nāṣir ........................... 161 
Figure 13: Dinar minted during the period of Abū al-ʿUlā Idrīs b. Yaʿqūb ................ 161 
Figure 14: Two Dirhams minted during the period of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī ............ 162 
Figure 16: Majlis al-ʿAshara or The Council of Ten ................................................... 211 
Figure 16: The Almohad governors of the Andalusi Provinces ................................... 212 
 1 
Introduction 
The Almohad Movement 
The Almohad dynasty, a Muslim Berber confederation, began in the Atlas Mountains in 
the 12th century, spreading to include all of the Almoravids’ lands.1 The Almohads 
ruled most of North Africa, as far as Libya, and al-Andalus. Their name is taken from 
the Arabic, al-Muwaḥḥidūn, ‘The Unitarians’, those who profess the absolute unity of 
God. 
Muḥammad b. Tūmart, a member of the Maṣmūda, an Atlas Mountain Berber 
tribe, was the Almohads’ founder. Born between 1078 and 1081 in Ijīllīz, a village in 
Sūs, a region separating the western High Atlas from the Anti-Atlas to the south. We 
know nothing of his early life until 1106, when he travelled to al-Andalus to pursue his 
education. He then went to the Muslim East to further his studies, staying for up to ten 
years.2 According to pious legend, Ibn Tūmart met the scholar al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) 
in Baghdad and was with him when news arrived that the Almoravids had openly 
burned al-Ghazālī’s books as heresy, including his recent work IḥyāẰ ʿUlūm al-Dīn 
(The Revival of the Religious Sciences). Hearing this, al-Ghazālī is said to have turned 
to Ibn Tūmart, charging him to overthrow the Almoravids and establish a new 
government. Yet, even if we cannot prove such a meeting took place, it is clear that Ibn 
Tūmart was greatly influenced by al-Ghazālī’s doctrinal views which, almost uniquely 
among contemporary jurists’ thought, authorised the Islamic community to take arms 
against wrongful governments. 
Ibn Tūmart returned from his voyage to the East at the end of 1117, considering 
himself a religious reformer. Acting as a censor of public morality as commanding right 
                                                   
 
1 The Almoravids, a Berber dynasty, formed an empire in the 11th century that conquered north-western 
Africa and Muslim Spain. See V. Lagardere, Les Almoravides jusqu’au régne de Yūsuf b. Tashfin (1039-
1106) (Paris, 1989); J. Bosch Vilá, Les Almorávides, ed. E. Molina López (Madrid, 1990); F. Codera y 
Zaidín, Decadencia y desaparición de los Almorávides en España (Zaragoza, 1899); R. A. Messier, 
Almoravids and the Meanings of Jihad (Praeger, 2010). 
2 For Ibn Tūmart’s early life and journey, see E. Lévi-Provençal (ed), Documents inédits d'histoire 
almohade (Paris, 1928), pp.31-36; A. Huici Miranda, Historia Politíca del Imperio Almohade, (Marroquí, 
1956), vol. 1, pp. 23-65. Arabic trans. A. ʾAkmīr (Casablanca, 2004), pp. 29-41; W. al-Sharif, The 
Dearest Quest: A Biography of Ibn Tumart (Tranent, 2010); A. J. Fromherz, The Almohads, the rise of an 
Islamic Empire, (London, 2011), pp. 19-85. 
 2 
and forbidding wrong3, Ibn Tūmart preached in every town he visited, condemning 
gaudy clothing, drinking, singing, street contact between the sexes and general moral 
decadence. In Marrakesh, tensions finally came to a head when he began rebuking the 
Almoravids and accusing them of corruption, heresy and anthropomorphism. Faced 
with the problems provoked by Ibn Tūmart, the Emir ʿAlī b. Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn (1106-
1143) and the jurists called him for a debate. After the debate, the jurists came to the 
conclusion that Ibn Tūmart’s views were too radical and thus he should be put to death, 
but the Emir was satisfied with him being expelled from the city. His intransigence 
made him a number of enemies and he therefore sought refuge in his native village, 
Ijīllīz. The Mountains became a centre for his doctrine and he soon managed to attract 
some neighbouring tribes, including the region’s most important and powerful one, the 
Hintāta.4  
In 1121, Ibn Tūmart, after a long sermon, declared himself Mahdī (the Islamic 
belief was that God would send the Mahdī to fill the earth with justice and equity as it is 
with tyranny and oppression).5 In his sermon, he proclaimed an armed rebellion against 
the Almoravids, whom he considered guilty of leaving the true religion.6 
After several battles with Almoravid troops, probably in 1124, Tūmart moved his 
operations centre to Tīnmal, a small village at the High Atlas’ heart.7 The Almohads’ 
fight against the Almoravids was generally successful, as their military tactics were 
often defensive. They used the mountains as a shield, waiting for the right moment to 
pounce on Almoravid troops. In May 1130, at the first attempt to attack them in the 
open plain of al-Buḥaīra, they suffered serious defeat, resulting in the deaths of many 
Almohads, which had a negative impact on Ibn Tūmart, who shortly died.8  
                                                   
 
3 The expression ‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’ is a Koranic obligation that fell to everyone. 
It is considered a positive role in helping others to take the straight path and to abstain from reprehensible 
acts. Prophetic tradition summarised the idea behind this obligation: ‘Whoever sees a wrong, says the 
Prophet, and is able to put it right with his hand (by action), let him do so; if he can't, then with his 
tongue (by speaking out); if he can't then with his heart (by feeling that it is wrong), and that is the 
weakest of faith’. Sūra, 3: 104; M. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought 
(Cambridge, 2000), p. 33. 
4 It is clear that Ibn Tūmart took advantage of the lack of political harmony between the Atlas tribes and 
the Almoravids to increase the number of his followers. Al-Najjār thus shows that increased taxes and 
levies imposed on the tribes provided fertile material for Ibn Tūmart to expand the circle of rebellion 
against Almoravid authority and to attract more support for his movement. He always emphasised that it 
arose for the elimination of injustice and poverty: ʿI ʿU Mūsā, al-Nashāṭ al-iqtiṣādī fī al-Maghrib al-
Islāmī (Cairo, 1983), p. 154; ʿA. al-Najjār, al-Mahdī b. Tūmart (Ciaro, 1983), pp. 119-121. 
5 Al-Ḥulal al-Bi-l, ed. A. Zamāma, S. Zakkār (Casablanca, 1979), pp. 107-109. 
6 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān li-tartīb mā-salafa min akhbār al-zamān, ed. M. A. Makkī (Beirut, 1990), 
pp. 81-83. 
7 H. Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus (London, 1996), p. 200. 
8 Al-Ḥulal al-Bi-l, pp. 114-117. 
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After Ibn Tūmart’s death, the Almohads’ leadership went to his faithful man ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin b. ʿAlī, whom Ibn Tūmart met at Melilla when he returned from the East.9 The 
new leader spent ten years or so in the mountains, where he could rally his men again 
and restore Almohad dominion over the mountain tribes, who left the Almohad doctrine 
after the al-Buḥaīra defeat.10 In spring, 1141, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin decided to leave Tīnmal 
and to launch campaigns against the Almoravids, which lasted seven years, ending with 
the fall of Marrakech. The Almohads’ victory near Oran gave them more confidence 
and the motivation to invade Almoravid cities, particularly after the death of Tāshfīn b. 
ʿAlī, the Almoravids’ ruler (1143-1145), and of his great soldier, Reverter. 11  The 
Almohads invaded Oran, Tlemcen, and Fez in 1145, and then Marrakech in 1147, after 
long, hard sieges.12 
The Almohads’ success was not only a result of the enthusiasm generated by Ibn 
Tūmart among his followers, but was also due to the Almoravids themselves. They were 
preoccupied with the situation in al-Andalus, which was engulfed in turmoil, partly due 
to the Christian armies’ movements and their assault on Almoravid lands. 
After Marrakech’s fall and the end of Almoravid rule, the Almohads could expand their 
authority to Al-Andalus and Ifriqiya. In al-Andalus, the Almoravid rule’s weakness 
gave the Christian forces a chance to march on Islamic territories.13 Concern about the 
increasing risk of Christian power, with widespread chaos, drove a number of Andalusi 
rulers to abandon their loyalty to Almoravid rule and look for a new leader. One 
survived by entering into a relationship with the Christians; Muḥammad b. Saʿd b. 
Mardanīsh (the leader of Valencia and Murcia) declared himself independent, putting 
his trust in alliance with Castile. 14  The others thus declared their loyalty to the 
                                                   
 
9 R. le Tourneau, The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries 
(Princeton, 1969), pp. 15-20. 
10 Huici Miranda, Historia Política, pp. 97-113. 
11 Reverter was Gelabert Udalard of the Viscomital house of Barcelona’s son. This became a leading 
family in late 10th century Catalan aristocracy, and suffered a precipitous decline in fortunes in the 12th: 
see S. B. Bensch, Barcelona and its Rulers 1096-1291 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 128-35. See further I. 
Frank, ‘Reverter, vicomte de Barcelone (vers 1130-1145)’, Boletín de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras 
de Barcelona, 26 (1954-56), pp. 195-204; S. Sobrequés Vidal, Els Barons de Catalunya (Barcelona, 
1957), .pp. 31-2 ; Huici Miranda, Historia política, vol. 1, pp. 117-20, 123-6, 128-9, 131-2; F. Clément, 
‘Reverter et son fils, deux officiers: Catalans au service des sultans de Marrakech’, Medieval Encounters, 
9 (2003), pp. 79-106. 
12 Huici, Miranda, Historia Politica, pp. 123-136; Tourneau, the Almohad Movement, pp. 52-53. 
13 In 1147, Alfonso VII (King of Leon and Castile) seized Almería, Ubeda and Baeza. Lisbon was taken 
by Alfonso Henriques of Portugal. Tortosa, Fraga, Lleida and Mequinenza by Ramon Berenguer IV 
[Count of Barcelona] in 1149: Kennedy, Muslim Spain, p. 202. 
14 See Ibn al-Athīr, Al- Kāmil fī’l-Taʾrīkh, ed. K. M. Shīḥā (Beirut, 2002), pp. 347-348, 357; Pierre 
Guichard, Les Musulmans de Valence (XI-XIII siècles) (Damascus, 1990-91), vol. 1,  pp. 116-124 ; J. M. 
Lacarra, ‘El rey Lobo de Murcia y el señorío de Albarracín’, Estudios dedicados a Menéndez Pidal, 3 
(Madrid, 1952), 271-284; J. J. Rodríguez Lorente, Numismática de la Murcia musulmana  (Madrid, 
 4 
Almohads, inviting them to al-Andalus to oppose Christian advances. The Almohads 
responded to their request and, between 1146 and 1150, the various al-Andalus 
principalities, except Valencia and Murcia, were gradually brought under Almohad 
control.15 
For a few years after 1152, the Almohads turned their attention to Ifriqiya, 
where they did not hold sway. Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin probably thought his occupation 
of al-Andalus depended on his position in al-Maghrib, and he could not enter a long 
struggle in al-Andalus before ensuring he was completely safe in Morocco. The 
Almohads launched a campaign against the Ḥammādid kingdom of Bougie and 
Constantine (modern Algiers), which were subdued without difficulty. Arab tribes, 
notably the Banū Hilāl and the Banū Riyāḥ, were then subjugated and brought west, in 
order to settle in the Moroccan plains and to participate in the jihād against Christians in 
al-Andalus.16  
Three years later, the Almohads took their next move, to conquer the eastern 
Maghrib, where Normans from Sicily had established garrisons in most major coastal 
cities. They went first to Tunis, which surrendered with little resistance. Then they lay 
siege to Mahdia. The Norman garrison held for almost six months until submitting in 
January 1160.17 Gabes, Gafsa, Sfax and Tripoli soon fell in turn and then recognised the 
Almohads’ authority.18 When the Caliph’s campaigns succeeded, spreading Almohad 
power as far as Tripoli, he returned to al-Maghrib to reconsider al-Andalus. From 1162 
he made preparations for major campaigns there. In May 1163, before the plans could 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
1984); M. De Epalza y M. J. Rubiera, ‘La sofra (sujra) en el Sharq al-Andalus antes de la conquista 
catalano-aragonesa’, ShA, 3 (1986), pp. 33-38 ; Hanna E. Kassis, ‘The coinage of Muhammad Ibn Saʿd 
(ibn Mardanīsh) of Mursiya: an attempt at Iberian Islamic autonomy’, in Problems of Medieval Coinage 
in the Iberian area, eds. M. Gomes Marques and D. M. Metcalf (Santarem, 1988), pp. 209-229; M. A. 
Abū al-Faḍil, Sharq al-Andalus fī al-ʿAṣar al-Islāmī (Alexandria, 1996), pp. 99-102. 
15 Kennedy, Muslim Spain, pp. 202-203. 
16 Documents inedits, pp. 57-59, 62-66; Kennedy, Muslim Spain, p. 205. On the role of the Arabs in the 
Almohad army, see V. Aguilar Sebastián, ‘Instituciones militares. El ejército’, in El retroceso territorial 
de al-Andalus. Almoravides y Almohades. Siglos XI al XIII, Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, ed. M J. 
Viguera Molíns (Madrid, 1997), pp. 192-208; V V. Aguilar, ‘Política de ʿAbd al-Muʾmin con los árabes 
de Ifriqiya’, actas del ll Coloquio Hispano-Marroquí de Ciencias Históricas 'Historia, Ciencia y 
Sociedad', Granada, 6-10 noviembre de 1989 (Madrid, 1992), 17-30. However, there may be another 
reason. The chronicler, Ibn al-Athīr says ʿAbd al-Muʾmin gained great benefit from Arab tribes, using 
them to give his family absolute power among the Almohads. Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, vol. 9, p. 551; Al-
Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-irab fī funūn al-adab, ed. A. Tarḥīnī (Beirut, 2004), vol. 24, p. 169. 
17 Tourneau, The Almohad Movement, pp.56-57; H. E. J. Cowdrey, ‘The Mahdia Campaign of 1087’, 
English Historical Review, 92 (1977), pp. 1-29. 
18 J.Ki-Zerbo, D.T. Niane (eds), General History of Africa (IV Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth 
Century) (Paris, 1997), p. 17. 
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come to fruition, Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin died. His body was taken to Tīnmal and 
buried beside the Mahdī’s tomb, a tradition that Almohad Caliphs continued.19 
Serious political unrest in the Almohad Empire followed Caliph ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin’s death. Muḥammad, who was chosen to succeed his father, was deposed by 
two of his brothers, Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar, who seems to have been Vizier under ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin, and Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf of Seville. A decision was taken with the Almohad 
elders’ consensus, to appoint Yūsuf as the new Caliph. Whatever the reason for this, 
three other brothers objected: Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh of Bougie, Abūʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī 
of Fez, who died in summer, 1163, and Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān of Córdoba. It seems this 
argument had also spread to tribal combatants, assembled by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin for his al-
Andalus campaign. Abū ʿUmar Hintātī, a powerful man in the empire, was thus obliged 
to write an official letter asking the Almohads to accept the new Caliph. The new 
Caliph dealt with this by sending letters and deputations to his brothers in order to end 
the disagreement, which lasted nearly two years and ended in 1165.20 
Despite such difficult times, the Almohads continued military operations in al-Andalus. 
Their first project was to eliminate Ibn Mardanīsh and take control of eastern Andalus. 
In 1165, an Almohad and Arab force, led by two of the Caliph’s brothers, was sent to 
Córdoba, which was suffering from repeated raids. The Almohads captured Andújar, a 
constant threat to Córdoba. They then went east, where they defeated Ibn Mardanīsh at 
the battle of Faḥṣ al-Jullāb near Murcia.21 Though Ibn Mardanīsh was determined to 
resist the Almohads, many of his men abandoned him and accepted the Almohads’ 
authority. In July, 1169, his right-hand man, Ibn Hamushk, went to the Almohads in 
Córdoba, declaring his loyalty to them.22 This alliance encouraged the Almohads to 
increase the pressure on Ibn Mardanīsh and the attacks on his territories. Pressure 
continued, and cities fell one after the other, but Ibn Mardanīsh resisted until he died in 
March, 1172, leaving his successors with little choice but to surrender Murcia to the 
Almohads.23 
Ibn Mardanīsh was the first serious challenge to the Almohads in al-Andalus, 
but he was not alone. While the Almohads dealt with the recalcitrant Ibn Mardanīsh, 
Portuguese guerrilla leader, Giraldo Sempavor, challenged their power in the west. 
From 1165-1186 he made a series of successful raids, resulting in Trujillo’s, Évora’s, 
                                                   
 
19 Ibid., p. 189. 
20 Ibid., pp. 209-213. 
21 Kennedy, Muslim Spain, pp. 218-219. 
22 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, Al-Mann bi-l-Imāma, ed. A. al-Tāzī (Beirut, 1964), pp. 302-308. 
23 M. A. Abū al-Faḍil, Sharq al-Andalus, pp. 130-138. 
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Cáceres’, Montanchez, Serpa’s, and Jurumena’s capture, but his most audacious attack 
was against Badajoz, which probably fell after a long siege, in May, 1169. Fortunately 
for the Almohads, Fernando II of Leon, who had recently made an alliance with Caliph 
Yūsuf, helped the Almohad garrison enter the city. The Portuguese were defeated and 
Badajoz returned to Almohad control.24 In these circumstances, Caliph Yūsuf had to 
launch two major campaigns in al-Andalus: The first, in 1171, lasted almost five years, 
during which he constructed a series of great buildings in Seville, where he established 
himself. He also launched an expedition against the Christians, but with little success, 
and his attempts to capture Huete ended in abject failure.25 
Not until 1184 did the Caliph finally arrive in Seville for his second campaign. 
He went northwards to besiege Santarém, which was being defended by Afonso I of 
Portugal. On hearing of Abū Yūsuf's attack, Ferdinand II of León marched his troops to 
Santarém, supporting his father in law, Afonso I. This caused confusion in the 
Almohads’ camp with disastrous results. The Almohads were defeated and the Caliph 
wounded, dying a few days later.26 In considering the Almohads’ military operations, 
led by Caliph Yūsuf, we see that the Caliph did not have his father’s military talents to 
qualify him to lead a large army. Despite mobilising massive military preparations for 
both his first and second expeditions, the Caliph showed a lack of confidence and an 
inability to make good decisions at critical moments. This does not mean that the fault 
lay with him alone; it also seems the army lacked military skills, particularly in siege 
operations, which was evident during the Huete siege. 
The Almohads’ leadership passed to Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb and his first move was 
to return to Marrakesh, securing his authority there. After that, at the first serious 
challenge he faced fierce opposition from the Banū Ghānīya, a branch of the Almoravid 
dynasty, who had taken refuge in the Balearics after Almoravid rule declined. It seems 
they were on good terms with the Almohads when Caliph Yūsuf became master of 
western al-Andalus; and they gave him some of their spoils, taken in Mediterranean 
warfare. On the Caliph's death, their new chief, ʿAlī, thought he could restore North 
African Almoravid rule. He mounted a large expedition against Bougie in November, 
                                                   
 
24 D. Lopes, ‘O Cid português: Geraldo Sempavor’, Revista Portuguesa de Historia, 1 (1940), pp. 93-
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1184, capturing it without difficulty. He soon occupied Algiers, Miliana, Ashīr, and the 
Qalʿa of Banū Ḥammād, and then besieged Constantine. In 1185, the Caliph’s reaction 
was rapid. An army, helped by a naval squadron, recovered the cities and the Almoravid 
leader had to flee eastwards.27 The risk from Ibn Ghānīya continued as he soon made an 
alliance with the Lamtūna and Massūfa Berbers, launching a guerrilla war, enabling him 
to control all of Ifriqiya except Tunisia and Mahdia. The Caliph thus decided to lead a 
great eastward expedition. This was the new Caliph’s first campaign and gave him a 
good opportunity to show his strength and his ability to lead the Almohads. With an 
army of 20,000 horsemen, there was no chance for Ibn Ghānīya and his allies to stand 
for long. In September 1187, the Banū Ghānīya were defeated and all of south Ifriqiya 
soon returned to Almohad domination.28 
When the Caliph succeeded and suppressed the rebellion, he returned to 
Marrakesh, reaching it in March 1188. He could now turn to the Iberian Peninsula. The 
Caliph’s more than five-year absence, during his campaign against North African 
rebels, gave Christians a great opportunity for more expansion in al-Andalus. In 1189, 
King Sancho I of Portugal, with Northern European crusaders’ aid, conquered Silves 
after three months’ resistance. King Alfonso VIII simultaneously plundered the Seville 
region and attacked Reina, Alcala de Guadaira and Castillo de Salir. The al-Andalus 
governors asked for help.29 Not until April 1190, did the Caliph finally cross to al-
Andalus with the objective of attacking the Portuguese. His campaign was almost 
successful and ended in retaking Silves in July 1191, and then concluding an armistice 
with the Christian kingdoms.30 The Caliph still had to return to al-Andalus in 1195 to 
attack Alfonso VIII of Castile, who had resumed his military operations in Seville’s 
territory after the truce expired. The battle was on 18th July on open plains near Alarcos 
Castle, and Alfonso VIII was badly defeated. The rest of his army fled to Toledo. 
Alarcos Castle, and all nearby castles, surrendered with no serious resistance. After this 
victory, the Almohads retreated to Seville, where they celebrated, and the Caliph was 
given the title of Al-Manṣūr billāh (Victor though God’s will).  
For two years from spring, 1196, the Almohads waged a devastating campaign 
in Castile as far as Madrid. However, these raids did not lead to any Almohad territorial 
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gains, even though they obtained a 10 year long truce with Castile.31 After almost three 
years in al-Andalus, the Caliph finally decided to return to Marrakesh in April, 1198. In 
poor health, his last year was devoted to pious works, such as building a magnificent 
hospital, the distribution of alms, and actions against Jews.32 He died in January 1199. 
His son, Muḥammad al-Nāṣir succeeded him without opposition from the Almohad 
elders. The new Caliph enjoyed relative stability in al-Andalus, and this was due to his 
father's successful campaign against Christians and the truce he had signed with them. 
In Ifriqiya the situation was quite different. The Banū Ghānīya’s new rebellion enabled 
Yaḥyā b. Ghānīya, to control almost the whole of Ifriqiya, including Tunis, by 1202. 
The Banū Ghānīya were always a source of concern to the Almohads as they took 
control of Africa, and it was time for the new Caliph to face them with a new strategy. 
Three major steps were taken so as to regain North Africa. He sent an expedition in 
September, 1203, to take Majorca to deprive the Banū Ghānīya of their Balearics’ 
refuge, which was used as a military base against the Almohads. When the Almohads 
succeeded in their mission, the Caliph then gathered his troops and, in February, 1205, 
he marched towards the east to fight Ibn Ghānīya and regain control of Ifriqiya and 
Tunisia. Mahdia surrendered and Yaḥyā Ibn Ghānīya was defeated in October, 1205, 
then fleeing to the desert. Finally, before the Caliph returned to Marrakesh in 1207, he 
introduced a major administrative distribution in the empire by which Ifriqiya became a 
semi-independent province under Hafsid ʿAbd al-Wāḥid’s chairmanship, giving him 
extended powers to protect the region from any dangers.33 
When the Caliph succeeded in his campaign against Ibn Ghānīya, a new threat 
arose in the west. The Christians were strong enough to break the truce with the 
Almohads and resumed their attack on Muslim territory. The Jaén and Baeza areas were 
attacked by Alfonso VIII of Castile in 1209, while, Peter II, King of Aragon, raided the 
Valencia region.34 Caliph al-Nāṣir was thus obliged to gather his army and cross to al-
Andalus, reaching Seville in June, 1211. The Almohads attacked, taking the fortress of 
Salvatierra, used as a base for raids on Islamic regions. The next year, a large number of 
Christians from all the Iberian kingdoms gathered under Alfonso VIII’s leadership to 
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wage an aggressive campaign against the Almohads. At the battle of Las Navas de 
Tolosa, on 16th July, 1212, the Almohads suffered a heavy defeat and many were said to 
have been killed during the battle or while escaping when the Caliph fled to Jaén.35 
This was the first major victory for the Christians over Spanish and African 
Muslims, but the Christians were unable to derive much advantage from this success. 
Lack of supplies and the spread of plague forced Alfonso VIII to withdraw, satisfied 
with what he had obtained in booty and prisoners. For the Almohads, however, the 
defeat was sufficiently strong that they would launch no other campaigns to seek 
revenge, and even attempts by the governors of Jaén, Granada and Córdoba to raid 
Christian fortresses, including Baños de la Encina, failed. However, although the defeat 
may have affected the Almohads’ morales and given the Christians more confidence in 
their own strength, this should not be deemedthe main cause for the collapse of their 
power, it simply showed the Almohad government’s vulnerability and Caliph al-Nāṣir 
and his successor’s inability to restore the empire’s authority. 
Soon after the defeat, Caliph al-Nāṣir returned to Marrakesh, remaining for more 
than a year until his death on 25th December, 1213. He was succeeded by his son, Yūsuf 
al-Mustanṣir, who was no more than sixteen, and who probably knew nothing about the 
responsibility that was entrusted to him. He thus fell immediately under the Almohad 
elders’ influence. Some chroniclers agree that his reign was peaceful36; probably a 
peace born of weakness. 
In Spain, the Christian kingdoms were engaged in their own internal affairs. 
Pedro II of Aragon, who had joined forces with the Christians at Las Navas, was killed 
in 1213 and was succeeded by his son James I (1213-76), who engaged in establishing 
his own authority. In Castile, King Alfonso VIII died in 1214, to be succeeded by his 
eleven-year-old son, Enrique I (1214-1217), under his older sister Berenguela’s 
guardianship. Enrique I died suddenly three years later and his nephew, Fernando III, 
proclaimed King of Castile. This persuaded the Aragonese and Castilians to agree a 
truce with the Almohads. There were military operations, without any serious problems, 
only on the Portuguese front. The only military success came when Alcacer de Sal was 
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captured in 1217, with external assistance from a fleet of German crusaders en route to 
the Holy Land.37 
In the Maghrib, the Almohad Empire’s weaknesses began to show. The Berber 
pastoral tribe, the Banū Marīn, living in the Sijilamāsa region, left their territory to settle 
in the plains between Taza and Fez.38 They seem never to have been under Almohad 
authority and only cooperated with the Almohads when Caliph al-Manṣūr brought a 
campaign against the Christians. However, the Banū Marin’s incursion into Moroccan 
territory did not face serious reactions from the Almohads, whose authority was 
gradually limited to the cities.39 
Caliph al-Mustanṣir died suddenly in January 1224, and evident cracks in the 
empire quickly appeared. Seven successors had ruled the Almohads up to the empire’s 
end in 1270, each devoting attention to establishing his authority in Marrakesh, and they 
had engaged in plots against rebels or rivals in the ruling family. Unfortunately for the 
Almohads, no Caliph could restore the empire’s power and the country was soon 
divided into independent cities. Tunisian governors refused to acknowledge 
Marrakesh’s authority and founded the Hafsid dynasty. In Tlemcen, a Zanata leader 
declared independence, giving allegiance to the Banū Hafsi. The Banū Marīn wrested 
control of all of north Morocco and were able to capture Marrakesh in 1269. In 1270, 
they killed the last Almohad survivors at Tīnmal.40 
In al-Andalus, the situation was worse. The Caliphs’ absence and their 
preoccupation with internal conflicts caused political unrest throughout al-Andalus, 
opening the door to aspirants who wanted to achieve their own power. One such was 
Muḥammad b. Hūd, who rebelled against the Almohads in 1228. Gradually, his 
authority was accepted in all of al-Andalus, except Valencia, but his attempt to confront 
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the dangers from the Christians resulted in a severe defeat in 1230 and his authority was 
undermined, since the Christians were able to take Badajoz and the rest of 
Extremadura.41 
The country’s segmentation and the weakness of the governors of al-Andalus’ 
offered a good opportunity for the Christian kingdoms to start invading on all fronts. 
The first victim was Majorca, occupied by James I of Aragon in December, 1230, and 
by 1282 the other Balearic Islands had been captured and the entire Muslim population 
sold as slaves.42 In 1238, Valencia surrendered after a long siege. 
The same pattern was repeated elsewhere, and cities fell one by one. Alfonso IX of 
Leon conquered Cáceres (1227), Mérida (1230), and Badajoz (1230), while Córdoba 
(1236), Jaén (1246), and Seville (1248) were taken by Fernando III of Castile. Soon, the 
rest of Spanish Islam was reduced to the Kingdom of Granada, whose rulers had to pay 
tribute to Castile.43 
It is surprising that the Almohad Empire fell so rapidly. This question has 
interested many historians and researchers who have tried to find the reasons behind this 
collapse. Some historians e.g., W. Montgomery Watt44 and Derek Lomax45, believe that 
the religious factor, was the main element in the Almohad movement’s success, and 
also the main reason for the empire’s fall. Le Tourneau46 argues that the main reason for 
the Almohads’ decline was the system of the Caliphate, established by the first Caliph, 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, when he formally put his family in control of the empire. Of course, 
many other reasons are suggested for this collapse, e.g., the economic crises which the 
population of al-Andalus and al-Maghrib suffered due to a lack of supplies and high 
living costs, the result of many wars and repeated raids on Islamic territories. There was 
also the split between the Almohads and the loss of the empire's power, the result of the 
conflict between the governors. The Christians, were, however, in a better position. 
Their states were becoming well organised and had great leaders, such as James I of 
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Aragon and Fernando III of Castile. There was also the Papacy’s encouragement for the 
Christian forces to regain control of the Spanish peninsula. Although all these reasons 
seem logical, they do not explain how this collapse happened so quickly, or why the 
Almohad government was unable to resolve these problems as they had on other 
occasions. The Almohads had experienced military and economic setbacks after the 
empire’s creation, but they overcame them successfully with time. The Caliphate’s 
system, in contrast, cannot be considered to be the major cause of what happened. In 
fact, the most successful states in the Islamic world were those that used the Caliphate’s 
system as their form of government. These included the Umayyad and Abbasid 
Caliphates, and even when these states were weak and less effective, their collapses 
happened gradually and for obvious reasons. The Almohad political system and its 
administrative structures seem to have worked well over the first four Caliphs’ reigns. 
Even when the Almohads’ power went to a young man, less than eighteen years old, 
there were no signs of weakness or any serious problems in the empire’s framework. 
Division among the royal family, after Caliph Yūsuf II’s death in 1224, helped to 
destroy the Almohads’ unity, though it was not a cause of weakness as much as a result 
of it. The various rivals took advantage of existing circumstances to try to establish their 
own power, yet we cannot ignore or deny the impact of any of the factors mentioned 
above on the Almohads, and they may all have helped in the empire’s collapse and the 
Almohad dynasty’s end. 
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Figure 1: The Almohad Ruling Dynasty 
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Literature review	
The Almohads have been the subject of a wide range of studies in recent years, yet the 
present state of knowledge about their political system is far from complete. Most 
studies related to the Almohad Empire concern its political history or the doctrine of its 
founder, Ibn Tūmart. Our knowledge of the development and growth of government in 
al-Andalus and al-Maghrib during this period is thus quite limited. The reason for the 
lack of research is mainly because most of our documents and accounts have been lost 
or damaged, and the rest of the information is scattered among a wide range of sources.  
 The first modern study of the history of the Almohads came from the German 
scholar Joseph Aschbach in 1883-87.47 This study was written as a sequel to his first 
book, which dealt with the history of the Umayyads in Spain. It consists of two 
volumes: the first on the history of the Taifa era, the Almoravids and the Christian 
kingdoms, while the second is devoted to the history of the Almohads, with a chapter on 
the political systems of the Almoravids and the Almohads, in addition to a biography of 
prominent figures in science, literature and theology. However, the book has some 
historical errors, which are mostly due to the lack of sources that were available when 
the author was alive. Additionally, Aschbach’s accounts of the political system of the 
Almohads is very brief. Another brief study, although not of the same value, was 
published by René Millet in 1923.48 A few years later, in 1928, the well-known scholar 
Evariste Lévi-Provençal presented an article on the founder of the Almohads, Ibn 
Tūmart, and his successor ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.49  Then, in 1932, came a study by Henri 
Basset and Henri Terrasse, Sanctuaires et forteresses almohades.50 This work belongs 
more to the field of archaeology than to history, since it focuses on a description of 
mosques and forts in Morocco, such as the Almohad fortress of Tīnmal, which the 
authors studied in great detail. 
 No major study appeared until the middle of the twentieth century. In 1946, the 
Arabic scholar, Muḥammad Rashīd Mulīn, published a new study in Arabic about the 
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era of the Almohad Caliph, Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr.51 This was followed by another study on 
science and culture during the Almohad period by Muḥammad al-Manūnī in 1950.52 
Both are superficial studies and free of critical analysis. They also did not exploit new 
information that has been revealed by recently discovered sources, such as Al-Mann bi-
l-Imāma of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt. Another study on the era of Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr, this time 
in French, was published in 1952 by the Egyptian researcher Saʿd Zaghlūl ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd.53 The author showed good research skills in his analysis of historical texts and 
presents a clear picture of political events during the period. Nevertheless, he did not 
benefit from the more recent discovery of historical sources, such as a new version of 
the manuscript of al-Bayān al-Maghrib, which deals specifically with the Almohad 
period.  
In 1955, Leopoldo Torres Balbás published a study on the art of the Almoravid 
and Almohad period. 54  This was followed three years later by Medieval Muslim 
Governments in Barbary until the Sixth Century of the Hijra which was published by 
the scholar J. F. P. Hopkins in 1958.55 His book describes institutional organisations and 
administrative practices in North Africa from the beginning of Islamic rule until the 
time of the Almohads. However, Hopkins tried to cover the political organisation of an 
area that had successively been ruled by a number of dynasties for over four centuries, 
and his study was therefore brief and sometimes gave generalised results. The author 
combed a wide range of published and manuscript sources relating to the history of 
North Africa. Nonetheless, it is almost impossible during this long period to trace in 
detail the organisation used under each dynasty, and Hopkins confines himself to giving 
scattered indications about a subject that requires careful and more specialised study. 
At around the same time, the great Spanish scholar Ambrosio Huici Miranda 
presented one of the greatest works ever written on the history of the Almohads. His 
book Historia política del imperio almohade56, was not designed to deal with economic 
or cultural issues (unless incidentally), or with philosophy or religion, except with 
regard to essential information about Ibn Tūmart’s religious ideas. The author’s main 
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objective was to establish a strict chronology of political and military events during the 
Almohads’ rule by collecting and sifting the contradictory reports furnished by 
historians. 
Huici Miranda published two other books dealing with the political history of al-
Andalus during the same period. The first, Las grandes batallas de la Reconquista 
durante las invasions africanas57, was published in 1956 and describes six major battles 
in detail: Zalaca (1086), Aledo (1088), Uclés (1108), Alarcos (1195), Las Navas de 
Tolosa (1212), and El Salado (1340). The second book, Historia musulmana de 
Valencia y su region : novedades y rectificaciones58, published in 1969, contains three 
volumes on the history of Eastern al-Andalus, particularly the Valencia region, from the 
Muslim conquest until the end of Islamic rule and the fall of Valencia into the hand of  
James I of Aragon in 1238. The section dealing with the Almohad period is in the third 
volume, in which specific themes are studied in great detail, e.g., the reign of 
Muḥammad b. Saʿd b. Mardanīsh, of Valencia and Murcia, and his conflict with the 
Almohads; Valencia’s entry into the rule of the Almohads; the last Almohad governor 
Ibū Zayd; the rebellion of Ibn Hūd at Levante, and the end of Almohad domination.  
Huici Miranda's writing was followed by the work of the Egyptian author 
Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ʿInān, entitled The Era of the Almoravids and Almohads in the 
Maghrib and al-Andalus. 59  This book was written to complete the author’s 
encyclopaedia of the history of Muslims in al-Andalus, which was begun in 1942. The 
encyclopaedia has six volumes and the history of the Almohads covers part of volume 
IV and all of volume V.  His work is truly one of the greatest works on the history of 
Islamic rule in al-Andalus, and the part on the Almohad era demonstrates a deep 
knowledge and the ability to draw a clear picture of the history of this period. However, 
the potentially negative side of this study is that the author relied heavily, if not entirely, 
on Arabic primary sources, without mentioning the earlier studies which were familiar 
to him, such as the work of Huici Miranda, or the study by Joseph Aschbach, which was 
translated into Arabic by ʿInān himself some time previously. He also gives more 
attention to political events, while the cultural aspects are confined to one chapter at the 
end of the book.  
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The fall of the Almohads was William Montgomery Watt’s subject in his article 
The Decline of the Almohads: Reflections on the Viability of Religious Movements, 
published in1964.60 Watt argued that the failure of the Almohads to keep their empire 
together was mainly due to the failure of the politico-social system, established by Ibn 
Tūmart to create a cohesive community in which people had the same interests and 
goals. Watt tried to understand the reason for the Almohads’ collapse by comparing the 
movement of the Prophet Muḥammad and the movement of Ibn Tūmart. However, he 
was not very successful, because these movements have very different natures in terms 
of their factors, causes and objectives.   
Another study, published by the Moroccan author ʿAbd Allāh ʿAlī ʿAllām in 
196861, was about the era of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and the progress of the Almohad 
conquest of North Africa and al-Andalus. It was called al-Dawlah al-Muwaḥḥidiyya fī 
al-Maghrib fī ʿAhad ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī. The author describes the first phases of the 
Almohad movement and his characterisation of the political situation of al-Andalus 
during the late Almoravid period is the book’s most successful section. However, his 
analysis is superficial and occasionally misleading. For example, his view of the factors 
that led to the fall of the Almoravids is, in fact, a reflection of the Almohad view, which 
can be found in the works of al-Baydhaq or Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, who were both basically 
sympathetic to the Almohad idea. Furthermore, his bibliography is limited and does not 
contain some of the major studies, such as the work of Huici Miranda. In the following 
year, an excellant study was presented by ʿIzz al-Dīn Mūsā, Tanẓīmāt al-Muwaḥḥidīn 
wa-nuẓmuhum fī al-Maghrīb. 62   It examines the Almohad imperial administrative 
system using the entirety of the sources that are available in the time. The author’s 
summary and organisation is superior to those of his predecessors, adopting a thematic 
outline and building tables that are based on referenced data. However, the problem of 
discrimination between the centre and the periphery, which is essential to understand 
this medieval empire, is not his principal focus. The author is, in some cases, confused 
about the administrative systems of the provinces and the centre, and, in other cases, he 
jumps to conclusions that are based on non-analysed individual data – for example, on 
the status of individuals and their offices. 
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In the same year, 1969, the first full account of the Almohads in English was 
written by Professor Roger Le Tourneau.63 His book, The Almohad Movement in North 
Africa and the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, contains revised versions of three 
lectures delivered at Princeton University in I959. The first, ‘The Birth of a Movement’, 
deals primarily with the biography of Ibn Tūmart, the Almohads’ founding figure. The 
second, entitled ‘Building an Empire’, is concerned with the Almohad Empire’s rise 
from the time of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin until the death of Caliph al-Nāṣir, in 1213. The last 
chapter, ‘Decay and Collapse’, briefly describes the fall of the empire, and ends with a 
discussion and analysis of the causes of the empire's rapid disintegration. As Le 
Tourneau has pointed out, the book, which he called “a series of reflections on the 
Almohads”, was written to deal with two questions: How did the Almohads succeed in 
uniting North Africa and al-Andalus? And:  Why did they fail to maintain this unity? 
Apart from what he regarded to be less important factors, such as the vastness of the 
empire, attacks by Spanish Christians, and resistance to assimilation by the Arab tribes, 
Le Tourneau considered ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to be primarily responsible for the decline, 
since he ‘destroyed the essential nature of the Almohad movement’, as the rulers were 
chosen by blood ties, rather than by religious qualifications. The same issue was of 
interest to the Libyan scholar, Marājiʿ al-Ghannāy, who published two books on the 
subject: the first, in 1970, under the title Qiyām dawlat al-Muwaḥḥidīn64, and the 
second, a less useful work, is entitled, Suqūṭ dawlat al-Muwaḥḥidīn 65 , and was 
published in 1982. In his works, al-Ghannāy argues that the rise and fall of the 
Almohads was mainly due to the competitive nature of the Berber tribes, who were 
trying to gain their own authority, and their inability to accept the concept of a one-state 
system. He also points out the racial prejudice among the populations of al-Andalus and 
al-Maghrib, and its impact on the strength of the empire.  
 Few studies were published during the 1970s and the larger body of studies has 
dealt either the thought and the doctrine of Ibn Tūmart (for example, the works of Sʿad 
Zaghlūl ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd66, Rachid Bourouiba67, and Dominique Urvoy68), or they dealt 
with topics of art and culture (for instance, Ḥikmat Awsī’s work “al-Adab al-Andalūsī fi 
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ʿAṣr al-Muwaḥḥidīn”69, and Juan Vernet’s study La cultura hispanoarabe en oriente y 
occidente).70 However, since the early eighties, there has been an increase in the number 
of studies dealing with various topics that are related to the Almohad period. Among 
them is a work by Ḥasan ʿAlī Ḥasan, Al-Ḥaḍara al-Islāmiyya fī al-Maghrib wa-l-
Andalus, which first appeared in 1980. This book presents itself as the first serious 
attempt to study the civilisation of the Almoravids and the Almohads. However, the 
treatment is mostly superficial and involves only the most obvious events. 
A number of researchers have attempted to write biographies of the early 
Almohad caliphs; examples include Ṭālib Hāshmī, whose book, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-
Manṣūr, was published in 198271; and Ibrāhīm ʿAlī Ḥasan, who devoted the third book 
of his series, which was about important figures in the history of Morocco, to writing a 
biography of the first Caliph, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī al-Kūmī.72 Some researchers have 
also chosen to address particular aspects of the Almohad period. Hanna Kassis 
published an article entitled Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ’s Rebellion against the Almohads in Sabtah.73 
Through the examination of newly discovered rare Dinār, struck in 1147, Kassis 
provided new information about the nature of the relationship between Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ (the 
qādī and leader of Ceuta) and the Almohads. José Marinho, for his part, examined the 
financial situation of Ibn Qaṣī, who was leader of Silves, during the early Almohad 
period.74 Another article, published by F. Montequin, refers to the art and architecture in 
al-Andalus and al-Maghrib during the era of the Almoravids and Almohads.75  
Ibn Tūmart and the doctrine of the Almohads have always been a topic of 
discussion. In 1983 and 1984, Tunisian scholar ʿAbd al-Majīd al-Najjār published two 
important books on this subject. The first was his doctoral thesis Al-Mahdī b. Tūmart: 
ḥayātuhu wa-ārāʾuhu wa-thawratuhu al-fikriyya wa-l-ijtimāʿiyya wa-atharuhu fī al-
Maghrib76, while the second, Tajribat al-Iṣlāḥ fī Ḥarakat al-Mahdī b. Tūmart”77, was 
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more specialised. Al-Najjār was a scholar who was interested in Islamic religious 
movements, which gave him the confidence to present a detailed biography of Ibn 
Tūmart, his political-religious doctrine and how it influenced the Berber community in 
al-Maghrib. Other useful studies include those by Ismail, A consideration of Muslim 
texts concerning the Mahdī Ibn Tūmart in light of discourse theory, 78  and Ben-
Ḥammadi’s La Rencontre entre le 'Faqih du Sus' et le 'Flambeau des Almohades': Note 
a propos de la relation d'al-Baydaq.79 Ismail’s work describes the life of Ibn Tūmart 
and the term ‘the Mahdī’ through examination of contemporary texts, while Amor 
discusses the meeting between Ibn Tūmart and his successor, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī, 
through al-Baydhaq’s book. There are also articles by Cornell 80  and Lomax 81  that 
discuss the religious and moral reform of Ibn Tūmart as being one of the main factors in 
the success of the Almohad movement, as well as a factor in its weakness and collapse. 
Al-Andalus in the era of the Almohads is a theme that has attracted many 
historians. Among them is ʿAṣmat Dandash, whose book, al-Andalus fī nihāyat al-
Murābiṭīn wa-mustahal al-Muwaḥḥidīn82, was published in 1988. The book has four 
chapters dealing with themes relating to the culture of al-Andalus during the period 
from 1116 to 1151 (the second Taifa period). Based on extensive study of primary 
sources, Dandash has provided a clear description of different political, economic and 
social activities. However, as the title of her book suggests, she was much more 
concerned with the history of the Almoravids, and therefore the information given about 
the Almohads is brief and only covers a short period in their rule. 
In 1992, Salma Jayyusi edited a major work dealing with various aspects of the 
culture and society of Muslim Spain. The book was produced by 42 international 
scholars, who are considered specialists in the fields on which they have written. The 
book, which was entitled The Legacy of Muslim Spain83, includes 49 articles, and it is 
divided into nine major themes and deals with history, language and literature, music, 
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art and architecture, social history and lifestyle, economic history, philosophy, religious 
studies, science, technology and agriculture. With a wide range of articles and extensive 
bibliography, this book is an excellent reference work for those interested in Muslim 
Spain’s great legacy and its influence on medieval Christendom. However, other than 
an article written by Madeleine Fletcher under the title ‘Al-Andalus and North Africa in 
the Almohad Ideology’84, there is little information about the Almohad era, and what 
there is often relates to areas of art, culture and lifestyle. Furthermore, Fletcher’s article 
focuses on the work of Ibn Tūmart, Aʿazzu mā-yuṭlab, and the doctrine of the 
Almohads, in order to understand their influence on the communities of al-Maghrib and 
al-Andalus. It does not, therefore, provide any useful information with regard to 
Almohad political and administrative structures.   
A further study on the history of al-Andalus is that of Moḥammad Aḥmad Abū al-
Faḍl, Sharq al-Andalus fī al-ʿAṣr al-Islāmī (1121-1287), published in 1996.85 This study 
deals with the political and cultural history of Eastern al-Andalus from the late 
Almoravid era until the fall of the Almohads and the end of the last Muslim ruler in the 
East of al-Andalus. In general, the author presents a rich study of the history of Western 
al-Andalus and gives a clear picture of a period of volatile and complex political events. 
He also addresses topics related to society, economy and cultural life, as well as art and 
architecture.  
Another valuable study is the work of Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and 
Portugal: A political history of al-Andalus, published in 1996.86 It is the first English 
book to provide an outline of the whole history of Islamic rule in the Iberian Peninsula. 
As is clear from the title, this is a book on the political history of al-Andalus from the 
arrival of the Muslims in 711 until the fall of Granada, the last Muslim kingdom, in 
1492. There is, therefore, nothing much here about social and economic life, or about 
art and architecture. It is much concerned with how the rulers controlled, or failed to 
control, their communities. With regard to the Almohads, Kennedy presents two 
chapters that provide useful insights into the military organisation and gives an 
excellent overview of the rise and the fall of the empire. 
                                                   
 
84 M. Fletcher, ‘al-Andalus and North Africa in the Almohad ideology’, in S. Jayyusi (ed.), Legacy of 
Muslim Spain (Leiden, 1992), pp. 235-258. 
85 M. A. Abū al-Faḍl, Sharq al-Andalus fī al-ʿaṣr al-Islāmī (515-686H/1121-1287): dirāsah fī al-tārīkh 
al-siyāsī wa-al-ḥaḍārī (Alexandria, 1996). 
86 Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal. 
 22 
In a 1997 study, concerning the period of Berber rule in al-Andalus, which formed 
part VIII of the magnificent Spanish Historia de España (El retroceso territorial de al-
Andalus: Almoravides y Almohades) 87 , was presented by a group of Spanish 
researchers. The study is a rich collection of articles divided into eight chapters, which 
deal with political history, governmental institutions, economy, society, religion, 
intellectual life, and artistic developments. In relation to the Almohad political system, 
the study includes four articles, presented together under the title ‘Las instituciones’. 
The first of these articles, ‘Instituciones Políticas’, is by Rafaela Castrillo Marquez, and 
she describes the changes that occurred in the form of the Almohad political regime by 
the caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, through which the authority was entirely transferred to his 
family. Luis Molina Martínez provides valuable information about political figures and 
the prominent families whose members enjoyed a leading position in the Almohad 
government as viziers or secretaries, with particular reference to the reign of ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin. Finally, a study on the judiciary during the Almoravid and Almohad periods is 
given by Fernando Rodriguez titled ‘Instituciones judiciales: cadíes y otras 
magistraturas’. Although the part on the Almohads is relatively brief, the article 
provides valuable information about the judge and his political and social status in al-
Andalus during the reign of the Berber Dynasties.88 
A new collection of biographies was published in Spanish by Maria Luisa Avila 
and Maribel Fierro in 2000, and it was entitled Biografias Almohades.89 The work 
formed volumes nine and ten of the series ‘Estudios onomásticos-biográficos de al-
Andalus’, which first appeared in 1988. With 16 articles written by members of various 
research teams, the book contains biographical dictionaries of numerous Andalusian 
figures and families during the Almohad era. Two years later, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-
Sāmarrāʾī published a study on the civilisation of al-Andalus and al-Maghrib. The book 
has three chapters, the first gives a brief discussion of the concept of Islamic civilisation 
in contemporary literature; the second presents a historical outline of al-Andalus and 
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North Africa during the Almoravid and Almohad eras; and the final chapter deals with 
themes of social and economic life, literature, science and architecture.90 
There are also some studies that have dealt with more defined topics, and among 
these is the work of Robert Ignatius Burns: ‘Almohad Prince and Mudejar Convert: 
New Documentation on Abū Zayd’, which was published in 1997.91 Through the study 
of new documents selected from the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Burns highlights 
the life and works of Abū Zayd, who was the last ruler of Almohad Valencia in Spain, 
and who later converted to Christianity before dying in 1269. Another article is that of 
Maribel Fierro, ‘Alfonso X "The Wise": The Last Almohad Caliph?’92 In this article, the 
author discusses the intellectual influences of Islam on Christian culture through 
studying the Almohad political and cultural project to find parallels with Alfonso X of 
Castile’s political and cultural project. The same author has also published two further 
articles; the first of which is called: ‘Spiritual Alienation and political Activism: The 
ġurabāʾ in al-Andalus during the Sixth/Twelfth Century’.93 This study discusses the 
extent to which Almohad ideology was a new concept in the Muslim West and whether 
it was part of a deeper and more extended belief among different groups and 
individuals. Fierro’s other article, Algunas reflexiones sobre el poder itinerante 
Almohade 94 , deals with the military regimes of the Almohads. This subject also 
interested Fāyiza Kallās, in his article ‘al-Jaysh ʿinda al-Muwaḥḥidīn’, published in 
1988.95 Both articles describe the organisation of the army and the techniques of their 
movement, in addition to their weapons, military spending and supply routes. 
Between 2000 and 2002, three conferences were held, at the Casa de Velázquez in 
Madrid, under the title Los Almohades: Problemas y Perspectivas, and the 38 articles 
that resulted were edited by Maribel Fierro, Patrice Cressier, and Luis Molina in 2005.96 
This book is divided into three chapters that deal with (1) archaeology, epigraphy, 
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architecture etc., (2) political and military organisation, and (3) doctrine, intellectual 
activity and religious practices. Among a wide range of articles that are of relevance to 
this thesis, mention should be made of Manuela Marín’s ‘El califa almohade: una 
presencia activa y benéfica’ (pp. 451-476), in which the author describes the strong 
reactions of the caliphs to the bad behaviour of management towards the citizens. 
Another contribution, ‘La chancellerie Almohade’ (pp. 477-503), comes from Hicham 
Al-`Allaoui, and Pascal Buresi. In this article, the authors argue that although advisory 
boards had been introduced into the Almohad government from the beginning of the 
movement, important decisions, particularly those regarding declarations of war or 
peace, were still mostly issued by the caliph himself. The authors believe that autonomy 
in a country that was spread over such a large area created obvious problems. The 
judicial system is the subject of El-Mostafa Benouis’s article, ‘L'organisation du gadá' 
sous les Almohades’ (pp. 505-524). Here, he discusses the authority of Qāḍī and how it 
was influenced by Almohad domestic policy and by the other ranks of the Almohad 
hierarchy, the ṭalaba and the ḥuffāẓ. The ṭalaba are studied by Émile Fricaud in ‘La 
place des talaba dans la société almohade Muʾminide’ (pp. 525-545), in which he seeks 
to analyse the function of the ṭalaba in the Almohad government in order to understand 
how this institution has played a major role in the political events of the region, 
particularly during the establishment of the empire. 
Among other articles, Jean-Pierre Molénat contributes ‘L'organisation militaire 
des Almohades’ (pp. 547-565), in which he describes the dimensions of the Almohad 
army and their movement strategy. In a similar vein, Christophe Picard in ‘La politique 
navale des premiers califes almohades un systéme de gouvemement et de souveraineté’ 
(pp. 567-584), analyses naval policy during the Almohad golden ages. 
 Almohad tax and currency are discussed by Rejae Mesmoudi and Pierre Guichard 
in ‘Biens sultaniens, fiscalité et monnaie á l’époque almohade’ (pp. 585-615). Vincent 
Lagardère, in ‘Le gihād almohade: théorie et pratique’ (pp. 617-631), comes to the 
conclusion that the concept of gihād underwent a modification with the Almohads; from 
being a religious duty against non-Muslims, it was extended to include Muslims who 
refused to accept the Almohad doctrine. Another valuable study is that of Halima 
Ferhat, ‘Lignages et individus dans le systéme de pouvoir almohade’ (pp. 685-704). 
Ferhat analyses the variable policies used by the Almohad caliphs to maintain their 
power, or to undermine the ability of their opponents. Finally, María Jesús Viguera, in 
‘Las reacciones de los andalusíes ante los almohades’ (pp. 705-735), attempts to solve 
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the mystery of the rapid collapse of Almohad authority through the study of the nature 
of relations between Berbers and Andalusians. She believes that one of the main reasons 
for this collapse was the resurgence of Andalusian nationalism, which rejected the 
hegemony of the Berbers, alongside the growing dissatisfaction of the Mālikī ʿulamāʾ at 
the Almohad rituals and orthodoxies which were imposed upon them. 
Amongst the most significant work of recent years is a study by Allen J. 
Fromherz, The Almohads: the Rise of an Islamic Empire, which was a Ph.D. thesis that 
was presented at the University of St. Andrews in 2006, and, more recently, published 
as a book.97 It has four chapters: the first describes the rise of the Almohads in the life 
of Ibn Tūmart, the second explains the process that was used by Ibn Tūmart and the 
Almohads to create a hierarchy of Berber Atlas tribes and, the third deals with Ibn 
Tūmart’s doctrine and his book ʾAzzu mā-Yuṭlab. The final chapter analyses the 
methodology and the theory of Ibn Tūmart. The author’s object was to understand how 
a group of tribes succeeded in ruling North Africa and al-Andalus, but his main concern 
was Ibn Tūmart, and the way in which he succeeded in establishing his reform 
movement and attracting supporters. 
Finally, another excellent study was published very recently by Buresi: Governing 
the Empire: Provincial Administration in the Almohad Caliphate.98 The book offers a 
translation and comprehensive study of an Arabic manuscript from the Ḥasaniyya 
Library, Rabat, and it contains 77 letters about the taqādīm (appointment) of provincial 
officials that were previously published by Aḥmad ʿAzzawī. The letters of appointment 
are from the period of weakening caliphal power and reduced imperial territory. As the 
author states, the aim of his study is “to articulate the technical approach of the texts and 
the political language structures that were in use at the time”. The importance of the 
study is that it deals with the period from the late Almohad era, from which extant 
sources and documents are few. However, there are many aspects that have not been 
spotlighted, because the manuscript deals with narrow and very specific political 
structures that cannot provide a complete reflection of the politically complex period. In 
fact, only 25% of the 77 letters in the taqādīm can be dated. More than 85% have no 
names, including the names of the sender, recipient, places, and destinations. In these 
circumstances, the manuscript and the information that could be derived from it has lost 
                                                   
 
97 Fromherz, The Almohads. 
98 P. Buresi, Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in the Almohad Caliphate (1224-1269) 
(Leiden, 2013). 
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much of its value, and thus analyses and conclusions were either overly general or 
significantly limited. 
Collectively, these works represent an important contribution to knowledge. 
However, many aspects of the Almohad government and its administrative practices 
remain insufficiently studied, particularly regarding al-Andalus. This thesis seeks to fill 
that gap.  
Research Project 
The principal aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive study of the political and 
administrative institutions of al-Andalus under the Almohads (1147-1228), with the 
intention of understanding how a group of different tribes, with no experience of 
political activity, was able to constitute an effective government which came to lead a 
vast, sprawling empire. The progress started when Ibn Tūmart instituted a strict 
hierarchy, or a political-social system, through which he succeeded in transforming the 
tribes of the Atlas Mountains from being a series of conflicting communities into being 
a strong confederation. This system formed the basis for the caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in 
the formation of political, administrative and military frameworks which soon took their 
way to all regions of al-Andalus and were superimposed over the structures of pre-
existing governmental institutions of the provinces. The shape of this system is 
relatively clear. However, our information about the changes and the developments that 
occurred in relation to these institutions is obscure. The way in which they worked, their 
effectiveness, activities and roles are often complex and unclear. 
These are the main research questions that are addressed by the present study: 
• What political and administrative structures did the Almohads establish in al-
Andalus? 
• Did the administrative systems differ greatly from earlier peninsular practice? 
• Who were the administrators? What can we discover about the careers of such 
functionaries? 
• To what extent were administrative functions carried out by North African 
appointees, or by peninsular supporters of the Almohads? 
• How were the systems of government structured and operated? How effective were 
they? 
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• How were they affected by the erosion of Almohad power? 
• Can the Almohad documents shed new light on the collapse of the empire?  
• What was the impact of Almohad ideology on the status of the Mālikī School? Did 
the fuqahāʾ maintain the same status they enjoyed during the Almoravid era? 
 
Thesis structure and Methodology 
This thesis presents a study of the political and administrative structures of the 
Almohad government in al-Andalus during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It will 
do this by examining the information which can be collected from a variety of materials, 
including historical and geographical sources, biographical dictionaries, and Almohad 
documents. The value of these materials is very uneven, depending on the sources from 
which they were drawn and the subject being considered. Some of the information 
relating to specific issues is very limited, which means that answers are not easily 
forthcoming and a certain amount of speculation and discussion is necessary. In rare 
cases, in order to fill a gap or clarify a procedure, the study will resort to parallel 
examples from regional governments outside of al-Andalus, such as the province of 
Tunis or Fez, taking into account the similarity of their administrative and political 
organisations. Also, by virtue of the centralisation of ِAlmohad caliphate, the political 
and administrative relationship between the governments of al-Andalus and central 
authority of Marrakesh will be highlighted where appropriate. It is hoped that the 
present study will leave the historian with a far greater understanding of the 
governments of al-Andalus and their development under the rule of the Almohads. With 
this aim in mind, the thesis will be divided into four chapters, each tackling a major 
aspect of the Almohad government’s administrative system.  
The first chapter will address the foundation of Almohad political organisation. In 
order to provide a complete understanding of this field, this chapter is divided into two 
sections: the first examines the the Almohad hierarchy and the primitive political 
organisation of Ibn Tūmart. Although the establishment of this organisation took place 
in al-Maghrib, outside the scope of the study, the political structures which emanated 
from it have found their place in the future state and formed a key element in its 
political, administrative institutions. Therefore, study of this hierarchical structure is 
necessary in order to understand the nature of its formation, its development and its 
functions within the Almohad government, especially in al-Andalus. I will try to 
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ascertain the causes that led to the establishment of the Almohad pyramid, thereby 
indicating the political objectives which Ibn Tūmart wished to gain by its use. Then I 
will examine its ranks, in an attempt to eliminate the confusion among the primary 
sources about their order and the identity of those belonging to them. I will also analyse 
the objectives of each rank, including the function of the advisory councils, which were 
held regularly to discuss matters that required urgent action. The second part of this 
chapter will scrutinise the reform introduced by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to the Tūmart 
hierarchy during the transition process of the Almohads, from being a simple movement 
to becoming a great empire.  
Chapter Two focuses on the political administrative apparatus of the empire, with 
particular reference to al-Andalus. The aim is to examine its structures, the ways in 
which the system worked, and the extent to which this system was influenced by the 
Almohad organisation, or by earlier peninsular practice.  
The financial organisation of al-Andalus will be the subject under study in the 
third chapter. Here we will examine the mechanisms of that organisation by shedding 
light on its administrative structures, their activities and the duties of officials and then 
we will look at the nature of the relationship of this institution with local authorities on 
the one hand and with the central sovereignty of Marrakesh on the other. The second 
part of the chapter will address the revenue of state treasury and its expenditure in order 
to identify the extent of their development, and the effectiveness of state policy in 
dealing with financial challenges, particularly with regard to tax matters. To 
complement the picture, the last part of the chapter will be devoted to the study of 
coinage and the stages of its development.  
Chapter Four will address the judicial organisation and its offices, such as Qāḍī, 
the ḥisba, and the shurṭa. It will also highlight religious functions, namely the Imāma, 
Khaṭīb and muʾdhdhin and finally analyse the attempts of the sovereign to reform 
judicial law by adopting a regenerative project against the Mālikī School.  In this thesis 
I have not undertaken an analysis of military organisation under the Almohads, because 
this has already been studied in depth by a number of authors.99 
                                                   
 
99 V. Aguilar Sebastián, ‘Instituciones militares. El ejército’, pp. 192-208; another article by the same 
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A M. ʿAbbāsī, Tārīkh al-baḥriyya al-Islāmiyya fī al-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus (Beirut, 1969). 
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Sources 
 
This research is based on a range of primary sources that can be divided into five main 
types: official documents, the work of Ibn Tūmart, chronicles, dictionaries of 
biographies, and geographical sources.  It should be noted that this study does not deal 
with Christian sources of the period, such as the anonymous Chronica Adefonsi 
Imperatoris, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada’s De rebus Hispaniae or the Chronica latina 
regum Castellae attributed to Bishop Juan of Osma, because they refer only to Almohad 
military operations and have nothing significant to tell us about the Andalusian 
Government and its administrative and political institutions.100 
1- Official Documents 
Two sets of documents belonging to the Almohad government have been discovered 
and published. Both are collections of official letters sent from the Almohad caliphs to 
governments in the states of the empire, and from the administrators to the caliphs. It 
also includes some correspondence between the Almohad government and neighbouring 
countries. These letters were written on different occasions and for a variety of reasons, 
but they were also used as a propaganda tool for the Almohad doctrine. Nevertheless, 
they reveal numerous details about the administrative and financial systems of the 
Almohad government, as well as their military progress. They also give us an overview 
of the nature of the work in these institutions, and the stages in their change. 
So far, some 241 Almohad letters have been recovered. They were written by a 
range of qāḍī-s and caliphs. Perhaps the reason behind the large number of letters was 
due to different factors, such as the vast size of the empire, the massive increase in the 
revenue gathered, and the multiplicity of their military operations and the Caliphs’ 
attempts to spread their ideology and to protect their status. On the other hand, by 
examining the dates on which the letters were issued, we can clearly identify a 
significant gap between the number of letters issued during the reigns of the first five 
caliphs and the number of those issued in the empire’s second period. This could be a 
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sign of collapse within the organs of the government as a result of poor communication 
between them, which could ultimately have led to the fall of the empire. 
 
Figure 2: The Almohad official Letters 
 
The first set of these documents is contained in a manuscript found in the library of El 
Escorial and published by the French scholar, Lévi Provençal, in 1941 101.  These 
documents consist of 37 official letters, including a letter added from the encyclopaedia 
of Aḥmad al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿsha. These letters were issued by the first four 
Caliphs: 23 of them by Caliph ʿAbd al-muʾmin, three by Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, 
nine by Caliph al-Manṣūr, and two letters by Caliph al-Nāṣir. 
 
Figure 3: The Almohad letters, Lévi-Provençal's Collection 
NO Date of issue From To 
1 - 
The Caliph 
ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
The government and citizens of Ceuta. 
2 - The judge Abū al-Gāssim Muḥammad b. al-Ḥāj. 
3 18/08/1148 Residents of a town called Tāsghrit in Morocco. 
4 27/08/1148 The Almoravid governor Yaḥyā b. Ghania. 
5 - The government of Ceuta. 
6 11/06/1149 The Sheikh-s of Córdoba. 
7 27/08/1152 Residents of Constantine. 
8 10/11/1152 The government of Tlemcen. 
9 26/06/1153 Sheikh Abū Muḥammad Wasnār and the residents of 
Marrakesh. 
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10 08/09/1153 Ibn Mardanīsh of Valencia and Murcia. 
11 - Anonymous 
12 - The government of Tlemcen. 
13 - The government of Ceuta and Tangier. 
14 05/05/1156 The government of Ceuta. 
15 26/07/1156 The government of Ceuta. 
16 09/1157 The government of Béjaïa. 
17 13/11/1157 Anonymous 
18 11/08/1158 The government of al-Andalus. 
19 03/12/1159 The government of Córdoba. 
20 - The government and the residents of Córdoba. 
21 03/05/1160 The government and the residents of Fez. 
22 - Anonymous 
23 01/04/1161 The government of Béjaïa. 
24 - The Caliph 
Abū Yaʿqūb 
Yūsuf 
Sayyid Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān and Sheikh Abū Saʿīd 
Yakhluf b. al-Ḥassan. 
25 29/05/1169 Ibn Mardanīsh of Valencia and Murcia. 
26 04/03/1181 The government and residents of Córdoba. 
27 16/08/1184 
The Caliph 
Yaʿqūb  
al-Manṣūr 
The government and residents of Granada. 
28 01/1185 The government and residents of Seville. 
29 06/07/1185 The government and residents of Seville. 
30 23/10/1187 The government and residents of Marrakesh. 
31 05/11/1187 The government and residents of Tunis. 
32 14/01/1188 The government and residents of Marrakesh. 
33 09/05/1188 The government and residents of Marrakesh. 
34 31/07/1190 The government and residents of Ceuta. 
35 05/11/1195 The government and residents of Fez. 
36 - 
The Caliph 
al-Nāṣir 
Anonymous 
37 - Anonymous 
 
The second collection of documents is Aḥmad ʿAzzāwī’s study, which was 
presented as a thesis at the University of Rabat in 1985. His thesis was published in two 
volumes: the first published in 1995102 contains a collection of Almohad documents, 
while the second volume was published in 2001103, and it includes a study of the corpus. 
The letters are presented in five chapters that cover political issues derived from the 
Almohad letters, such as: domestic events in Morocco during the twelfth century; the 
relations between the Almohads and the North African states; the political conflict 
between the Almohads and the Christian kingdoms in al-Andalus; and, finally, the last 
chapter deals with some of the cultural aspects that are selected from these letters.  
 
                                                   
 
102 Rasāʾil Muwaḥḥidiyya, majmūʿah jadīdah, ed. A. ʿAzzāwī (Rabat, 1995), vol. 1. 
103 ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil Muwaḥḥidiyya (Rabat, 2001), vol. 2. 
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No  Period of issue 
1-2 2 Ibn Tūmart (1121-1130) 
3-11 9 The Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin (1130-1163) 
12-34 23 The Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf (1163-1184) 
35-44 10 The Caliph Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (1184-1199) 
45-68 24 The Caliph Muḥammad al-Nāṣir (1199-1213) 
69-107 39 The Caliph Yūsuf II (al-Mustanṣir) (1213-1224) 
108 1 The Caliph ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Yūsuf (al-Makhlūʿ) (1224- 8 months) 
109-113 5 The Caliph ʿAbd  Allāh al-ʿĀdil (1224-1227) 
114-121 8 The Caliph Abūʾl-ʿUlā Idrīs al-Maʾmūn  (1227-1232) 
122-125 4 The Caliph ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Rashīd (1232-1242) 
126 1 The Caliph Abūʾl-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Saʿīd (1242-1248) 
127-131 5 The Caliphs ʿUmar al-Murtaḍā (1284-1266) & Abū Dabbūs Idrīs al-Wāthiq (1266-1269) 
132-204 73 Letters considered to have been written between 1224 and 1266 
  
ʿAzzāwī’s documents have been gathered from both published and manuscript 
sources. The corpus is comprised of 131 letters, presented in chronological order, plus 
an additional 73 letters concerning the announcement of the appointment of certain 
judges (qāḍī) and governors (wālī) that are added at the end of his volume. However, 
the value of these documents is that they deal with a historical period that was not 
covered by Lévi Provençal’s documents. These letters were mostly issued after the rule 
of Caliph al-Nāṣir, and they continue until the end of the Almohads’ rule in al-Andalus. 
 
2- The work of Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130) 
The Almohad state began as a religious movement, led by Muḥammad b. Tūmart who 
laid the religious and political foundations of the empire that was later formed. It is thus 
necessary, firstly, to consider the work of Ibn Tūmart in order to understand his 
religious and political views, and to assess the extent to which they influenced the 
political system of the Almohads. 
The work of Ibn Tūmart, which is called aʿAzzu mā-yuṭlab104, is a collection of 
articles and commentaries that were written on different religious subjects and 
                                                   
 
104 Ibn Tūmart, Aʿazzu mā-Yuṭlab, ed. A. Abū al-ʿAzim (Rabat, 1997). 
Figure 4: The Almohad letters, ʿAzzāwī's Collection 
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transmitted orally by his followers. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, a writer from the thirteenth century, 
mentioned this book and provided a list of the topics dealt with in it: 
‘It is a book written on parchment, which contains the knowledge of God, the 
High, and the science of the truth of fate, destiny, faith, Islam, the divine 
attributes, which is necessary, what is impossible and what is contingent with 
regard to God, the High, and faith in what the Prophet told, in the things that he 
recounted by virtue of God's teaching to him of His unseen. The book also 
contains perceptions of the principles of the religion and the recognition of the 
Mahdī; that he is the Imam, and the necessity of the imamate and what is owed to 
him (the Mahdī) of discipline and honour, and that emigration [hegira] to him is a 
duty. Neither family nor children nor property is to prevent anyone among the 
Muslims from it, and anyone who hears of him is obligated to emigrate to him. 
There is no kind of valid excuse for not emigrating. The man who doesn't say 
"may God pray for him", and who doesn't obey him, is an unbeliever’105. 
The first copy of the manuscript was found at the National Library in Paris and the 
Arabic text was edited by J. D. Luciani in 1903, with the title Le Livre de Mohammed 
Ibn Toumert. More recently, another copy was discovered at al-Khizānah al-ʿĀmah in 
Rabat, and this was published by ʿAbd al-Ghanī Abū al-ʿAzzim in 1997. However, it 
should be noted that these manuscripts are dated (579/1183) and (595/1199), 
respectively. This indicates the possibility that some of the text could have been 
modified to support either the reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin (1130-1163), or that of Abū 
Yaʿqūb Yūsuf (1163-1184). 
3- Historical Narratives 
The history of the Almohads was recorded in a number of chronicles that are of varying 
importance. Some were written by people who were close to the regime, and they 
provide a window onto the history of the Almohads, for instance, al-Baydhaq, Ibn Ṣāḥib 
al-Ṣalāt, al-Marrākushī and Ibn al-Qaṭṭān. Others were written by chroniclers who were 
interested in the history of al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, and that provided more than a 
passing reference to the Almohad movement. They also contain valuable information, 
collected from Almohad accounts that have not survived.  
Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī b. Tūmart106 
The Memoirs of al-Baydhaq form possibly the most important source in relation to the 
life of Ibn Tūmart and the birth of the Almohad Movement. We know nothing about the 
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life of al-Baydhaq and the available information about him comes from his work. 
Unfortunately, the only surviving manuscript of the work, found at the Escorial Library 
in Spain, is incomplete107. However, it seems clear that he was living in Tunis when he 
first met Ibn Tūmart, immediately after his return from the East. Al-Baydhaq was one of 
Ibn Tūmart’s first followers and served him from the beginning. He also held a 
prominent position among ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s companions, during his reign. His work 
thus gives a first-hand account of the initial events in the Almohad Empire. Most of the 
historical writing of the Almohads, with the exception of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt’s account, 
was written a long time after the event took place. By contrast, Al-Baydhaq was 
involved in the events that he describes, and he offered an insider’s view of the rise of 
the Almohad Empire. The French historian Lévi-Provençal remarked, on the value of 
Al-Baydhaq's work: 
‘One need not have much exposure to the works of Maghribi historians to 
perceive at first glance that the work of al-Baydhaq is something completely 
different. It is not a chronicle in the ordinary sense, a relating of events that 
follows the classic Arab, historical model, but it is a veritable "memoire": the 
account of a man who played an active role in the events that he described, and 
who appeared, in every sense, to be one of the Almohads "of the first hour", who 
passed their lives under the reign of the Mahdī and `Abd al-Muʾmin’.108  
Al-Baydhaq’s manuscript provides a wealth of unique information about the early 
stages of the movement, and of the political development of the Almohad Empire until 
the end of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s reign. Yet, since Al-Baydhaq was a loyal and steadfast 
follower of the Almohads, his work constitutes a great challenge and must be carefully 
considered. 
Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt (c. 1198), Al-Mann bi-l-Imāma109 
Little is known about the Andalusi historian, secretary (kātib) and poet Ibn Ṣāḥib al-
Ṣalāt and most of the information about his life comes from his own work, al-Mann bi-
l-Imāma. He was born in Beja in the Portuguese province of Algarve. It may be deduced 
from his work that he was a resident in Seville during the time of the Almohads and 
accepted their rule from the moment of their conquest of al-Andalus, specifically from 
the fall of Carmona in 1161. A few months later, he was among the kuttāb, mushrifūn 
                                                   
 
107 Lévi-Provençal noted that the manuscript had lost its beginning and that no title was mentioned. The 
manuscript starts from the return of Ibn Tūmart to his home from Tunisia in 1117, and ends at the 
beginning of Caliph Yūsuf’s regime in 1163, although he was alive during the regime of Caliph Yaʿqūb 
al-Manṣūr. 
108E. Lévi-Provençal, Documents Inédits, p. IX. 
109 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, al-Mann bi-l-Imāma, ed. A. al-Tāzī (Beirut, 1964); Spanish trans, A. Huici Miranda 
(Valencia, 1969). 
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(financial officers) and leading citizens of Seville who were recruited to work in 
Córdoba, which had been chosen as the new capital of the Almohads in al-Andalus. Ibn 
Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt probably remained in Córdoba until 1165, when he accompanied the 
sayyid Abū Saʿīd, governor of Córdoba, to Gibraltar and then to Marrakesh to meet his 
brother the Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf. In Marrakech, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt was instructed 
in the Almohad forms of Islam, including Ibn Tūmart's ʿAzzu mā yuṭlab, from the 
Seville faqīh Abū al-Ḥassan ʿAlī b. al-Ishbīlī and Abū ʿAbd al-Allāh b. ʿAmīra. In 
1166, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt worked for the shiekh Abī ʿAbd al-Allāh Muḥammad, who had 
been appointed wālī of Seville and Granada respectively. Over time, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt 
seems to have gained a good reputation among the Almohads, and thus during his visit 
to Marrakech in November 1170 he was honored by the caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf and 
was the only one among the ṭalaba who was granted an iqṭāʿ (tax farming rights), along 
with fixed salary. Since than, he became a prominent figure, close to the caliph's retinue 
and accompanied him on his travels throughout al-Andalus and al-Maghreb. This 
special status enabled Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt to offer an insider’s view of the Almohad 
government and the movement between the cities of al-Maghreb and al-Andalus made 
him an eyewitness to many of the historical events and provided him with valuable 
material on the Almohads and their political and social traditions.  
The sources do not provide us with the date of the Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt's death. 
Some researchers, such as Michele Amari, Carl Brockelmann and É. Lévi Provençal 
claimed that he died in 1182.110  However, in his biography of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, 
MuḥammadʿInān argued against this claim, indicating that he died sometimes after 
1208,111 taking into account that the last event recorded by Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt was the 
completion of the minaret of the great mosque of Seville (the 'Giralda') which took 
place in 1198, during the era of Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr. 
Like the work of Al-Baydhaq, most of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt’s chronicle has been 
lost. The book consists of three parts, only the second of which is survived. The first 
deals with the events of the beginning of the ِAlmohad movement to the caliphate of 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin (d. 1163); the second, which preserved in the Bodleian Library in 
Oxford, deals with the period from 1155 and 1182; and the third probably went up to 
the caliphate of Abū Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (1184-99). Although the surviving fragment 
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covers a relatively short historical period, it is considered one of the most important 
sources for the history of the Almohads and even if the rest of the book did not reach us, 
it was partly preserved by later historians, such as Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Ibn ʿIdhārī al-
Marrākushī, Ibn al-Khaṭīb and Ibn al-Abbār, who used it as a principal source for many 
of the events they record. Overall, the work contains valuable details about the political 
development of the Almohads, especially with regard to issues such as the 
administrative system, military operations, and the financial systems of government. 
Moreover, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt was an eyewitness to many historical events, and this 
helped him to draw a clear picture of the political situation in al-Andalus during the 
mid-twelfth century. He also provided valuable and unique information with regard to 
the social and cultural life of al-Andalus, as well as a description of some of the 
architectural works undertaken by the Almohads. 
 
Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (13th century), Nuẓm al-jumān li-tartīb mā-salafa min akhbār al-
zamān 
Only a small fragment has survived from Ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s book, which he planned as a 
history of al-Maghrib and al-Andalus. It deals with a short historical period, no more 
than thirty-three years (from 1106 to 1138). The editor, Muḥammad al-Makki, claimed 
that the book contains seven parts, and what has been found is merely a fragment from 
part six, in which the author began to write the history of the Almohads.112 
Ibn al-Qaṭṭān seems to have been a distinguished figure within the Almohad 
government during the era of Caliph al-Murtaḍā (1284-1266). By the end of his life, he 
was qāḍī of Sijilmasa, but there is no indication about when he died.  
However, his book, Nuẓm al-Jumān (String of Pearls), is one of the main sources 
of information about the rise of the Almohads until 1138, that is, during the era of Ibn 
Tūmart and his successor ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. Even though the section in which Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān dealt with the history of his time - which would certainly have been particularly 
useful - has been lost, the value of the part that has been discovered is that its events are 
drawn from eyewitness accounts that are no longer available. A great amount of detail 
about the birth of the Almohads, and the stages in their struggle against the Almoravids 
provided. The book also affords a remarkable, unique description of the Almohad 
hierarchy, as well as useful documents, such as an official letter that was sent by ʿAbd 
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al-Muʾmin to the provinces of the Empire in 1147, which explains the main rules of the 
empire that the regional governments had to follow.  
 
ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī (c. 1270), al-Muʿjib fī talkhīṣ akhbār al-Maghrib113 
Another chronicler of the Almohads was ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī. He was born in 
Morocco in 1185, at the beginning of the reign of the third Almohad Caliph, Yaʿqūb al-
Manṣūr. From his early life, he was interested in learning from various branches of 
science, including literature, at great schools in both Fez and Marrakech. At twenty-
three years of age, he travelled to al-Andalus, where he stayed almost nine years 
studying under well-known learned men, before he returned to Marrakech. In 1217, al-
Marrākushī left for Egypt, and then, in 1221, he made his journey to Mecca, where he 
probably began to write his chronicle, al-Muʿjib, which he completed in 1224.  
The book intended to highlight the history of al-Maghrib and al-Andalus from the 
Muslim conquest to the author’s time, 1224, yet it became a detailed history of the 
Almohads, from the age of Ibn Tūmart until the reign of Yūsuf II, the fifth Almohad 
Caliph. The book is therefore considered one of the most important sources in regard to 
the dynasty.114 Despite the fact that al-Marrākushī wrote his narrative in the Islamic 
East, far from the events he described, and with no material except his memory, his 
account of the events is generally clear and appears to be accurate. In fact, this absence 
might have been the key factor that helped him to write his account objectively, without 
fear of resentment on the part of his compatriots, or of any influence that might be 
imposed upon him. Despite some mistakes, relating mostly to the dates of historical 
events, al-Marrākushī was very keen not to record anything in his book except what he 
believed to be the truth: 
‘I have put down nothing but what I have found true, borrowing it from books or 
having heard it from trust-worthy persons, or having seen it myself: with the firm 
purpose of telling the truth and of being just, as it has been my utmost care not to 
conceal a single good quality, -which the persons I have spoken of possessed, nor 
to bestow upon them the slightest encomium they did not deserve’.115 
During his study, travelling between the al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, al-Marrākushī was 
in close contact with the highest officers of the state. He also developed a good 
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relationship with Prince Yaḥyā, the son of Caliph Yūsuf I. 116  It is therefore not 
surprising that most of his information describes political events or deals with subjects 
that are related to the political system and the Almohads’ government. For example, he 
frequently mentioned political institutions and their structures in the era of each Caliph, 
such as Wazīr (vizier), Kātib (Secretary), Qāḍī (Judge) and Wālī (Province Governor). 
He also gave details about the Almohad hierarchy, including a description of the 
Almohad tribes. 
Anonymous, Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya fī dhikr al-Akhbār al-Marrakishiyya117 
There is no reference to the name of the author in the text, and we know almost nothing 
about him, but the author says that he completed his writing in 1381. However, we may 
deduce from his work that he was living in the emirate of Granada in the reign of 
Muḥammad V (1354-1359, 1362-1391), the eighth sultan of the Nasrids (Banūʾl-
Aḥmar).  
The book covers the history of the Maghrib and al-Andalus from the construction 
of Marrakech until the author's time (1070-1381). Although the title of the book gives 
the impression that it deals specifically with the history of Marrakech, the greater part of 
its information is concerned, in some detail, with the military conflicts and political 
changes in Morocco and al-Andalus. The information relating to Marrakech itself is less 
valuable if compared to what was written in geographical sources. Even though the 
information in this book was often brief, the author was more specific when he 
described the age of the Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. He also provided us with valuable 
information about the political and administrative systems of the Almohads, and his 
book is the only source that refers to the Almohad army’s military strategies. 
Ibn ʿIdhārī al-Marrākushī (c. 1312), Al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-
l-Maghrib 
As regards the general sources of the history of the al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, the 
work of Ibn ʿIdhārī is by far the most important. The author, who was alive in the late 
13th and early 14th Century, wrote his book to highlight the history of al-Maghrib and al-
Andalus from the Muslim conquest until the fall of Marrakesh to the Marinid dynasty in 
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1269. Ibn ʿIdhārī can be considered a compiler, rather than a researcher, as he writes in 
the introduction to his chronicle that: 
‘I have collected in this book notices and anecdotes taken from the histories and 
accounts, which I have reunited and have chosen points of interest, uniting what 
is old with what is new’.118  
 
He also names some of his sources, most of which are no longer extant. A few examples 
are: al-Muqtabis, al-Dhakhīra of Ibn Bassām, Akhbār al-Dawla al-ʿĀmiriyya of Ibn 
Ḥayyān, Al-Mann bi-l-Imāma of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, Nuẓm al-Jumān of Ibn al-Qaṭṭān.  
 Ibn ʿIdhārī divided his book into three parts: the final part, in which the history of 
the Almoravids and the Almohads are related, has been published as fragments by a 
number of scholars. This part, covering the whole Almohad period, was published by 
Huici Miranda in 1960, and later reissued by Iḥsān ʿAbbās.119 In 1985, another version 
of the manuscript, which contained some important additions, was discovered and 
published by a number of Moroccan scholars with emendations and an extended 
index.120 
In spite of a few contradictions and some obvious exaggerations, the work of Ibn 
ʿIdhārī provides a wealth of unique information, and is the first full account of the 
history of the Almohads. The book contains valuable detail about the early stage of the 
Almohads’ development in al-Andalus in terms of its political and economic aspects. 
The complex political atmosphere, which coincided with the entry of the Almohads into 
al-Andalus, as well as the military conflicts between the Almohads and their opponents, 
such as Ibn Mardanīsh or the Christians, are reported in detail. The times during which 
the Almohads suffered as a result of political and economic crises, and conflict with the 
rivals of the ruling family to gain power over the Almohads, are also described, and the 
author, who was alive during this period, was likely to have been an eyewitness to some 
of these events, since he died a long time afterwards. As regards the political system of 
the Almohad government, the book contains documents and valuable information on 
topics such as the nature of the work in political institutions, political and administrative 
reforms, the judicial system, and diplomatic and economic relations. 
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Ibn Abī Zarʿ (14th century), al-Anīs al-muṭrib bi-rawḍ al-qirṭās fī akhbār mulūk al-
Maghrib wa-tārīkh madīnat Fās121 
This work is usually known by its short title: ‘Rawḍ al-qirṭās’, meaning the Garden of 
Pages. There is uncertainty about the author’s name. This is given in some manuscripts 
as Abī Zarʿ of Fez, and in other versions as Ṣaliḥ Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm of Granada. 
However, the consensus among modern scholars is that the original author is Abī Zarʿ, 
but the manuscripts that we have are merely of a summary of his book, which was made 
by ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm.122  
The Rawḍ al-qirṭās covered the history of al-Maghrib from 788 until 1326 - more 
than five centuries during which Morocco saw a succession of five dynasties: the 
Idrisids (987-1070), the Maghrawa (986-1070), the Almoravids (1040–1147), the 
Almohads, and the Marinids (1215–1465). Unlike Ibn ʿIdhārī, the work of Abī Zarʿ has 
been described by modern historians as being one of the least trustworthy sources, 
especially in regard to the history of the Almoravids and the Almohads.123 It is replete 
with inconsistencies, legends and unlikely accounts. For example, Abī Zarʿ, whose book 
was written in the first part of the 14th Century, a long time after the events took place, 
gave information about Ibn Tūmart and the early Almohad movement that is slightly 
different from that in other sources, which deal with the same period. He also made 
numerous mistakes in relation to dates and geographical information. Even allowing for 
all of these faults, the rawḍ al-qirṭās still holds some valuable and unique information 
relating to particular themes, such as the social and economic life during the period of 
the Almohads; the economic system and the Almohads’ reforms, the sources of revenue 
and the government’s expenses. 
 
Al-Zarkashī (d. 1482), Tārīkh al-dawlatayn al-Muwaḥḥidiyya wa-al-Ḥafṣiyya124 
The only information available about the author is what may be drawn from his work, 
and this information is also insufficient to provide the elements of his biography. Al-
Zarkashī was a Tunisian writer of the late fifteenth century whose interest was in 
writing down the history of his region during the Middle Ages. He seems to have 
worked within the government of Tunis, or to have had a good relationship with its 
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members, and this notion is based on the valuable information recorded. His chronicle, 
found and published in Tunis in 1872, deals specifically with the history of the 
Almohads and the Hafsids (1229-1574) from the early 12th Century to 1477. However, 
the fact that the author was one of the Hafsids’ followers, and was an eyewitness to 
many of their events, makes the section which deals with the Almohads less useful if 
compared to that of the Hafsids, which he describes in full detail. Nevertheless, the 
valuable information relating to the Hafsid state, particularly with regard to its political 
system, the authority of governors and administrative functions, may be a good 
reflection of that of the Almohads, as a logical result of the close historical and political 
connections between the two states. At first, the Hafsids were deputy governors of the 
Almohads in their province of Tunis, and when the collapse took place, they split with 
the Almohads and proclaimed themselves independent. The Almohad legacy thus 
impinged strongly on Hafsid society, and their political regime was formed principally 
from prominent figures from the Almohad tribes, who also provided the great military 
leaders.  
Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), Kitāb al-ʿIbār125 
Ibn Khaldūn is universally well known, and needs no more than a brief reference. He is 
considered to be the founder of Sociology and the Sciences of History. His masterpiece, 
which is known by its short title “al-ʿIbār”, is one of the greatest works in the field of 
the philosophy of history and sociology. Al-ʿIbār can be divided into three parts: the 
first is the introduction - “al-Muqaddima”126, which is considered the most significant 
part and was presented as a separate book during the lifetime of Ibn Khaldūn. The 
second is the universal history, and the third part is the history of al-Maghrib. The part 
dealing with al-Maghrib has special value due to the author's personal experience in the 
area. However, the contribution of Ibn Khaldūn’s book is surprisingly limited. Ibn 
Khaldūn’s main attention focused on the factors that contribute to the development and 
fall of human civilisation. His preoccupation was therefore always with mainstream 
historical events, and he pays little attention to the small details which the present study 
requires. The part that deals with the history of al-Maghrib is disappointing. With the 
exception of the information provided about the Almohad tribes, there is little to 
distinguish it from other Almohad sources. The Muqaddima is more useful as it pays 
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particular attention to the Almohad political structure, but even here, some of the 
information and the results put forward by Ibn Khaldūn are misleading, and they are 
different from what has been recorded by other sources that were closer to the 
Almohads’ time. 
Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233), Al-Kāmil fī’l-Ta’rīkh127 
Ibn al-Athīr’s main work, Al-Kāmil fī’l-Ta’rīkh (The perfection in history), is 
indispensable to any researcher interested in Islamic history. Regarding the Almohads, 
it is the first work written in the East that recorded the history of the Almohads by 
making careful and proficient use of a wide range of Western sources. The author is 
remarkable for the clarity of his style, the explanations he makes, and the extent of his 
documentation. Nonetheless, being a general history, from the creation of the world 
until 1231, it focuses on essential information and does not go into detail. 
Some chronicles, to a greater or lesser degree, deal with the Almohads, but, 
nonetheless, they do not contain as much valuable information as has been mentioned 
above. Among these works are: Aʿmāl al-Aʿlām128 and Raqm al-Hulal129 by Ibn al-
Khaṭīb (d. 1374); al-Muʾnis fī akhbār Ifrīqiya wa-Tunis130 by Ibn Abī Dinār (d. 1698), 
and al-Dhakhīra al-Sunniyya by Ibn Abī Zarʿ.131 
4- Biographical dictionaries 
Bio-bibliographic dictionaries, which particularly flourished in al-Andalus, reintroduce 
Islamic literature and provide biographies of the best-known characters in the fields of 
literature, science and religion. Writing biographies of these leading lights was, for 
those writers, the best way to save their cultural heritage and to pass it on to future 
generations. There are a number of works about the Almohad period that provide us 
with useful details about prominent figures in society, or about members of the 
Almohad government. They also contain valuable information regarding political, 
economic and social development in al-Andalus and al-Maghrib. 
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Ibn al-Abbār (d. 1260) 
Ibn al-Abbār was a well-known poet, diplomat, and scholar, and was perhaps the most 
famous man of letters produced by the city of Valencia during Muslim rule. He was 
born in the province of Valencia in 1189, and he completed his education under well-
known teachers. He began his official career as a writer for the governors of Valencia, 
until the end of Almohad rule in al-Andalus. After the fall of Valencia to the Christians, 
he travelled through Morocco to Tunisia, where he probably completed his excellent 
work. In 1260, Ibn al-Abbār was executed by the Hafsid ruler as a result of his writings. 
His body and his books were burnt.  
His books deal with the arts, literature and history. There are two particularly 
well-known works, the al-Ḥalla al-Siyarāʾ132, which contains biographies of Sayyid-s 
(title given to the sons and descendants of the caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin) and governors 
who had skills in writing poetry and who wrote down some of their works. It also 
included some of the historical events that took place in al-Andalus. A new set of 
biographies was presented in the author's second book, al-Takmila li-Kitāb Al-Ṣila.133 
These related to scholars and writers who were notincluded in the work of Ibn Faraḍi 
and Ibn Bashkuwāl. Al-Takmila remains a valuable source for understanding the culture 
of al-Andalus, and it provides a brief but clear description of some of the political and 
social events that took place during the author’s lifetime.  
Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 1303), Ṣilat al-Ṣila134 
The Moroccan author Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik was born in Marrakesh in 1245. He received 
his general education from different schools in al-Andalus and al-Maghrib before 
returning to Marrakesh, where he spent most of his life.  We do not know much about 
the author’s job, nor whether he held an official position in the government, although 
there are signs that he was engaged in the judiciary. His book is one of the largest, and 
perhaps the most reliable, collections of biographies, and was written in the Muslim 
West. The author not only presented a huge biography that covered the 12th and 13th 
Centuries, but he also corrected the mistakes found in the work of Ibn al-Faraḍi and of 
subsequent authors, and he added information that was not included in their works. The 
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book also contains valuable historical information that highlights various aspects of the 
scientific and social life in the period indicated. 
Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī (d. 1286), al-Mughrib fī ḥulā al-Maghrib 
The Andalusian, Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī, was a geographer, a historian, and the most 
important collector of poetry from al-Andalus in the 12th and 13th Centuries. He was 
born near Granada, in 1213, into a well-to-do family, and he lived his early life studying 
in Granada and Seville. During his twenties, he crossed to the Maghrib and made a 
journey to the East, where he lived in Egypt. He also travelled to Syria and Iraq, before 
returning to the West and spending his final years in Tunis, where he died in 1286. 
Some great works were written by Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī, and they are mostly 
related to poetic literature. However, he is perhaps best known for completing the Kitāb 
al-Mughrib fī ḥulā al-Maghrib, the largest part of whose material was compiled by 
members of his family over several generations. The book is a wealth of biographical 
details, as well as being an anthology of letters from the 12th and 13th Century Islamic 
West. It contains fifteen chapters, but, unfortunately, part of the manuscript has been 
lost. The fragments relating to al-Andalus were published as a separate book in two 
volumes, by Shawqī Ḍayf, in 1953-55. In each volume, the biographies and letters are 
divided up according to city and status.135 
Al-Maqqarī (d. 1631), Nafḥ al-Ṭīb136 
The 17th century Maghribi scholar and writer, al-Maqqarī, was an historian who was 
interested in the glorious past of Islamic culture in al-Andalus, and his book, Nafḥ al-
Ṭīb, was a great reflection of his main sphere of interest.137 In this book, al-Maqqarī 
introduces the reader to many aspects of Andalusian history and culture. He presented 
many details about geography, politics, and the scholarly achievements of the 
Andalusians, in addition to an extensive compilation of biographies, poems, epistles and 
citations, based mostly on many earlier sources that are now lost. The book consists of 
two parts: the first concerns the history of al-Andalus from the Muslim conquest until 
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the fall of Granada in 1492. The second contains a biography of al-Maqqarī's great 
politician and scholar, Ibn al-Khaṭīb, and is an anthology of his poetry and other works. 
5- Geographical Sources 
Geographical works are a different kind of research tool and they cannot be disregarded. 
Besides dealing with geographical sources, they contain specific details and information 
concerning society, politics and economics, which are often hard to find in other works. 
Muḥammad al-Idrīsī (c. 1164), Nuzhat al-mushtāq138 
Al-Idrīsī is, by common consent, the major geographical writer in Arabic of the Middle 
Ages. He was born in Muslim Spain at the beginning of the twelfth century, and he 
eventually settled at the court of the Norman King of Sicily, Roger II. Al-Idrīsī's best-
known work is entitled Kitāb Nuzhat al-Mushtāq fī’khtirāq al-Āfāq, but it is better 
known as the Book of Roger, on whose orders the work was produced, and to whom it 
was dedicated. The book was soon translated into Latin and remained popular both in 
the East and the West, for several centuries. The section that addresses al-Andalus is a 
rich source of geographical data, as well as of social and economic information, 
observed by the author himself during his travels to many cities, or quoted from other 
geographical references. However, as a book written in 1154, at the beginning of the 
Almohad dynasty, it does not contain much information that is of relevance to the 
present study, and if we exclude the information about the Arab tribes and their giving 
of allegiance to the Almohads, there is little to which we can refer that remains. 
Al-Ḥimyarī (d. 1402), al-Rawḍ al-Miʿṭār139 
The fifteenth-Century writer, Al-Ḥimyarī, is well-known for his work al-Miʿṭar, which 
is regarded as being the most informative geographical work during the era of the 
Almohads. It contains an impressive collection of information, in which the author has 
succeeded in providing geographical material with regard to cities and towns, together 
with their important historical events, based on a wide range of sources now lost.  With 
regard to the Almohad system, the book gives a great deal of information about the 
Sheikh-s and their positions at the time of the Almohad decline. Furthermore, it is the 
                                                   
 
138 Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat al-Mushtāq fī’khtirāq al-Āfāq, 2 vols (Beirut, 1989). 
139 Al-Ḥimyarī, Ṣifat Jazīrat al-Andalus, muntakhibah min Kitāb Al-Rawḍ al-Miʿṭār fī Khabar al-Aqṭār, 
ed. E. Lévi-Provençal (Beirut, 1988). 
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only source that describes the Almohads’ fleets, especially in regard to the numbers of 
ships and their equipment. 
Anonymous, al-Istibṣār fī ʿajāib al-amṣār140 
In 1852, an incomplete manuscript of al-Istibṣār, about North Africa, was published by 
Alfred Von Kremer, with the title ‘Description de I'Afrique par un géographe arabe 
anonyme du sixième siècle de l'hégire’. After a half century, in 1900, the French 
scholar, E. Fagnan, published a French translation of the same sections, based on three 
manuscripts. Later, the complete Arabic text was published for the first time by Saʿd 
Zaghlūl in 1958. The author’s name is not given in the text. However, it has been 
indicated that he held an official position in the Almohad government during the reign 
of the Caliph Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr, and this is based on internal documents that are 
provided in his account. The book offers valuable geographical and historical details 
about Moroccan cities, such as Marrakech, Fez and Meknes. He also describes some of 
the public works undertaken by the Almohad caliphs. 
 
Through careful analysis of these documentary and narrative source materials, it is 
possible for the researcher to build up a relatively detailed knowledge of the Almohad 
government and institutions. Before examining the mechanics of the Almohad 
government in detail, however, it is important to survey the foundations of that system, 
which were laid in the Maghrib at the beginning of the period that is being studied. 
                                                   
 
140 Anonymous, al-Istibṣār fī ʿajāib al-amṣār, ed. S. Zaghlūl (Casablanca, 1984). 
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1 
The Foundations of the Almohad Political 
Organisation 
1. The hierarchy of Ibn Tūmart 
The Almohads began their movement by establishing a strict hierarchy (known as the 
ṭabaqāt) into which they were divided. It was an elaborate organisation that covered all 
the tribal communities that joined their movement; it established the basis of the empire 
and set up the political and military institutions of the government. The rough outlines 
of the hierarchy are fairly clear. The levels of the Almohad pyramidal structure were 
arranged according to importance and loyalty. The most loyal members of the 
Almohads were placed in the upper echelons of power, the Ten, the Fifty and the 
Seventy, forming the advisors and political councils of the empire. The rest, including 
the Ṭalaba, the tribes, and the Ghuzāt “Champions”, were divided in descending order 
and according to specific military and social functions.  
The first serious study of this subject was by J. Hopkins in Medieval Muslim 
Government in Barbary.1 Yet other than providing a comprehensive description of the 
Almohad hierarchy, Hopkins did not define the reasons for the establishment of the 
Ṭabaqāt. Nor does he refer to the fact that the Almohads used a pyramidal hierarchy, 
rather than a simple confederation. Another study was published by ʿIzz al-Dīn Mūsā, 
and he focused on the political and intellectual branches, which were adopted by the 
Almohads in the creation of their organisations.2 Mūsā believes that knowledge of the 
political and religious culture acquired by Ibn Tūmart during his trip to Egypt and the 
Islamic East was the main factor that influenced him in the establishment of the 
hierarchy. However, some statements from Mūsā are controversial, since they have no 
historical or documentary evidence to support them. For example, he states that Ibn 
Tūmart consciously copied from the Fatimid political organisations in forming the 
                                                   
 
1 J. Hopkins, Medieval Muslim Government in Barbary (London, 1958). 
2 ʿI ʿU. Mūsā, ‘al-Tanẓīmāt al-ḥizbiyya ʿInda al-Muwaḥḥidīn fī al-Maghrib’, Majalat al-Abḥāth, 23 
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social-political system or hierarchy in the reign of Ibn Tūmart’, memoire of the Research Department of 
the Tokyo Bunko, 48 (1990), pp. 81-101. 
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hierarchy, although there are no signs of any similarities between the two systems that 
are referred to in this statement.  Even the notion of the Mahdīsm that was adopted by 
Ibn Tūmart cannot be considered a Fatimid invention as it was a common Islamic 
concept that was used by several individuals at different times and in various regions of 
the Islamic world. Recent studies have shed some light on the Almohad hierarchy.3 The 
most recent study is that of Allen Fromherz: The Almohads, the rise of an Islamic 
Empire.4 Rather than describing the main elements of the hierarchy in detail, Fromherz 
was the first to describe the Almohad tribes, who were themselves ranked and 
integrated into the hierarchy. He also tried to identify the reasons for the successful 
creation of the hierarchy and viewed the economic situation of the Almohad tribes as 
one of the main factors that Ibn Tūmart was able to exploit in order to encourage the 
tribes to join his movement, and this accelerated their involvement in the organisation. 
However, there are still many questions that remain unanswered. Amongst these is the 
question of the process by which Ibn Tūmart was able to transform a fragmented tribal 
society into a structured hierarchical system that played an important role in history. 
The first part of this chapter will discuss these issues in detail and will seek answers in 
the light of information gleaned from our documents. This is important for our broader 
understanding of the administrative structure that the Almohads implemented in al-
Andalus. 
1.1 The Hierarchy and the Almohad Chronicles 
Information about the basic materials of the Almohad pyramid are contained in two 
main sources. The most valuable details are those in the Kitāb al-Ansāb, written by an 
anonymous author.5 This work contains a long, and perhaps the most complete, list of 
the Almohad structural hierarchy, as well as a complete list of the members of the Ten 
and the Fifty, and detail about their relationship with Ibn Tūmart, the Mahdī of the 
Almohads, who was the founder of the hierarchy. The tribes and clans were mentioned 
in detail and they are ranked according to their order. It should be noted that the original 
version of the Kitāb al-Ansāb has been lost and what we have is an outline that was 
                                                   
 
3 See: María Jesús Viguera Molíns, ‘Historia Política’ in R. Menéndez Pidal, Historia de España, vol. 7, 
p. 79 ; A. Dhina, Les états de l'Occident musulman au XIII, XIV et XV, institutions gouvernementales et 
administratives (Algiers, 1989). 
4 Fromherz, The Almohads. 
5 ‘Kitāb al-Ansāb fī maʿrifat al-Aṣḥāb’, in Documents Inedits d’histoire almohade, edited by E. Levi-
Provençal (Paris, 1928); new edition edited by ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Manṣūr (Rabat, 1971). 
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produced by the author himself.6 The author did not refer to the purpose behind this 
project, but it may have been used as a guide to the higher echelons of the Almohads 
and their relationship to Ibn Tūmart. However, based on the internal information and 
precise details that are not mentioned by other sources, the author seems to have been 
familiar with the Almohad regime and, indeed, he may have been part of it. Perhaps this 
was what prompted the Moroccan editor, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Manṣūr, to state that the 
author of the Kitāb al-Ansāb is al-Baydhaq, who wrote a biography of Ibn Tūmart and 
was one of his close companions and advisers.7 His account was a window onto the life 
of Ibn Tūmart and the development of the Almohad state, yet it is almost devoid of 
references to the Almohad hierarchy, of which he was himself a member, or its 
categories. The book is full of lists of names and the genealogies of those who engaged 
in the hierarchy, to the point where it is difficult to analyse the style of the author and to 
identify the similarities between the Kitāb al-Ansāb and al-Baydhaq’s account. 8 
However, there is one reference in the text to indicate that the author's name is Abū 
Bakr,9 though it does not mention the name of the family, and this is the first name of 
our author, al-Baydhaq. Perhaps al-Baydhaq wrote his first book on the biography of 
Ibn Tūmart and decided to follow this with another that describes the Almohad pyramid 
and political institutions, and this is the one which we have here. 
The Kitāb Nuẓm al-Jumān, by Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (d.1231), is another important source 
for information about the Almohad hierarchy and the development of the Almohad 
state. It provides a list of fourteen levels of Almohad society, which were ranked in a 
different order from those in the list in the Kitāb al-Ansāb. It also contains an 
incomplete list of the high-ranking members of the Almohad hierarchy. One should not 
forget, however, that the book was written a long time after the hierarchy was 
established, and most of the data that related to this subject were quoted from lost 
sources, such as Al-Mughrib fī akhbār wa-maḥāsin ahl al-Maghrib of al-Yassaʿ b. 
ʿIsā,10 and the first part of Al-Mann bi-l-Imāma by Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt. It is therefore 
                                                   
 
6 Kitāb al-Ansāb, pp. 23, 36, 40, 43, 60. 
7 See the introduction of the editor, pp. 5-7.  
8  For more on the Kitāb al-Ansāb as a primary source, see Lévi-Provençal's introduction to the 
Documents Inedits. 
9 As written in the text, after the author listed the companions of Mahdī in Egypt ‘Abū Bakr’s side:  I have 
listed the group who had accompanied the Mahdī in this region, although I have not included all of them, 
to show how he was well known in the East and the West, and that who had not obtained his company 
would have lost the success, and his misery drives him to be loser and disbeliever’. Kitāb al-Ansāb, pp. 
29-30. 
10 Al-Yassaʿ was one of the Andalusian twelfth-century writers. He was born in Jaén and began his career 
as a Kātib (Secretary) to some princes in the eastern cities of al-Andalus. In 1164, he moved to Egypt, 
where he stayed until his death in 1180. Al-Yassaʿ wrote a book on the history of al-Maghrib, called al-
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possible that the text could have been corrupted. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān was a loyal follower of 
the Mahdī's doctrine, as well as being a member of the Almohad government during the 
reign of Caliph al-Murtaḍā. His father was also a distinguished head of the Almohad 
School at Marrakech, the first of the ṭullāb, the scholarly class.11 Hence, there is the 
possibility that he might have modified the contents of the book for his own benefit.  
There are other accounts that have provided more than passing references to the 
Almohad hierarchy and its categories. Al-Marrākushī, the author of the Muʿjib fī 
Talkhīṣ Akhbār al-Maghrib, had been in the Islamic East since 1217, and he wrote his 
account there, nearly 100 years after the system had been inaugurated. He, nevertheless, 
had first-hand knowledge of the Almohad regime, and his book contains some valuable 
details about the Councils of Ten and Fifty and their relationships to Ibn Tūmart. Like 
al-Marrākushī, the Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, which was written in 1381, describes the form 
of the hierarchy and lists the members of the Council of the Ten, which is significantly 
different from the lists in the sources mentioned above.12 
These are the most important sources that cover several aspects of the rise of the 
Almohads and the socio-political organisation of the embryonic government. However, 
much information is still missing, thus making a definitive conclusion elusive. In 
addition, the accounts of the mediaeval historians who dealt with the Almohad 
hierarchy omitted valuable details concerning some of its elements, their objectives and 
how they worked, while other details were either brief or confusing. It could be argued 
that this confusion is a result of three main factors: 
1- The acute shortage of historical material regarding the political institutions of 
Islamic countries, including a lack of documentary sources. This is partly due to the 
predilections of medieval writers, who were interested in military and political 
events, rather than wanting to contribute to the study of the management and 
executive formations of governments. In these circumstances, modern researchers 
may resort to providing a general statement, and sometimes even to speculating, in 
order to remedy these matters and fill the gaps. 
2- Given the nature of the sources that are available to us in studying the hierarchy, we 
can be sure that the information on the early Almohad organisations comes from a 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Muʿrib fī akhbār wa-maḥāsin ahl al-Maghrib, and this was presented to the Sultan of Egypt, Saladin. 
Unfortunately, his work has not reached us, and what we know about it is what was later quoted by 
historians, such as al-Maqqarī (Nafḥ al-Ṭīb), Ibn al-Qaṭṭān (Nuẓm al-Jumān), and the anonymous writer 
of (al-Ḥulal al-Bi-l). See: Á. González Palencia, Historia de la literatura arábigo-española, Arabic trans, 
ed. H. Muʾnis (Cairo, 1955), p. 242. 
11 See introduction to Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān by Dr. A. al-Makkī, pp. 7-56. 
12 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, p. 109. 
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varied authorship. Some accounts were written from memory by persons who were 
far from the events they were describing. Al-Yassaʿ was one such. Other accounts 
were written many years after the hierarchy was established. This points to these 
specific sources: Kitāb al-Ansāb, Nuẓm al-Jumān and al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya. In 
other cases, combining the two kinds of chroniclers, the writer was far from the 
related facts in both time and space, had no, or very few, documents, and his 
memories are largely disordered. This situation can be attached directly to Al-
Marrākushī, in his book ‘al-Muʿjib’.   
3- The Almohad dynasty passed, during its development, through two main stages, 
during which it moved from being a movement of religious reform to becoming a 
vast empire. This rapid evolution has led the historians, who wanted to write about 
the beginning of the dynasty so as to integrate the Almohad hierarchy of Ibn 
Tūmart with the political reforms that had taken place in the system since ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin came to power. 
The following list provides an idea of the confusion and disorder of the mediaeval 
historians vis-à-vis the Almohad hierarchy. 
 
According to al-Yassaʿ13 According to Kitāb 
al-Ansāb14 
According to al-Ḥulal al-
Mūshiyya15 
1. Al-ʿashra, Ahl al-Jamāʿa 
 (Council of Ten). 
2. Ahl Khamsīn (Council of 
Fifty) 
3. Ahl Sabʿīn (Council of 
seventy) 
4. Al-Ṭalaba 
5. Al-Ḥuffāẓ (Young Ṭalaba) 
6. Ahl al-Dār 
7. Hargha 
8. Ahl Tīnmal 
9. Jadmīwa 
10. Janfīsa 
11. Hintāta 
12. Ahl al-Qabāʾil 
13. Al-Ghurāt (illiterate 
young people) 
1. Ahl al-Jamāʿa 
2. Al-Khamsīn 
3. Hargha 
4. Ahl Tīnmal 
5. Hintāta 
6. Jadmīwa 
7. Janfīsa 
8. Ahl al-Qabāʾil 
9. Kūmiyya 
10. Haskūra 
11. Ṣanhāja 
12. ʿ abīd al-Makhzan 
13. Al-Rumāt 
14. Al-Muḥtasibūn 
15. Al-Sakkākūn 
16. Al-Mūʾdhdhinūn 
17. Al-ghuzāt 
18. Al-Ḥuffāẓ  
19. Ahl al-Dār 
1. Al-ʿashra, Ahl al-Jamāʿa 
2. Ahl Khamsīn 
3. Ahl Sabʿīn 
4. Al-Ṭalaba 
5. Al-Ḥuffāẓ 
6. Ahl al-Dār 
7. Hargha 
8. Ahl Tīnmal 
9. Jadmīwa 
10. Ahl Janfīsa 
11. Ahl Hintāta 
12. Al-Jund 
13. Al-Ghurāt 
Figure 5: The lists of the Almohad hierarchy (Adapted from ʿIzz al-Dīn Mūsā, p. 201) 
                                                   
 
13 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 82. 
14 Kitāb al-Ansāb, p. 59. 
15 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, p. 109. 
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From the lists above, it can be observed that there are apparent discrepancies in the 
number and order of the structures, between the list given by al-Yassaʿ and that 
mentioned in the Kitāb al-Ansāb. Confusion is also apparent in the contrast between the 
order of structures and the chronology of historical events. For example, the Kitāb al-
Ansāb mentions the category of Ḥuffāẓ, while ignoring the Ṭalaba category, although 
the Ḥuffāẓ was introduced to the Almohad hierarchy subsequently. Likewise, Kitāb al-
Ansāb mentions the Kūmiyya category, although the Kūmiyya tribe joined the Almohad 
dynasty after the state and the hierarchy were established. For Mūsā, this lack of 
concordance between the list of al-Yassaʿ and that of the Kitāb al-Ansāb is ‘due to the 
confusion between the partisan organaisation, administrative and military structures, 
and religious functions’. Mūsā also suggests that the two lists in fact represented two 
different phases of the Almohad development. The only categories that would shed light 
on the partisan organisation are: the Ten, the Fifty, the Seventy and the Seven, the 
ṭalaba, the ḥuffāẓ, and the rest of the population (al-kāffa).16 
1.2 The Almohad Pyramid and the Beginning of the Movement 
There is no doubt about the existence of the Almohad hierarchy. Most of the sources, if 
not all, which chronicled the events of the Almohads point out that Ibn Tūmart 
established a strict construction that brought together the tribes and the categories that 
supported the Almohad ideology. However, the purpose behind the construction of this 
ideology is vague, and the question about why Ibn Tūmart created such a system 
remains unanswered. J. Hopkins, among other researchers, believes that the system was 
originally established for military purposes.17 Ibn Tūmart was involved in a long and 
protracted struggle with the Almoravids, and therefore he needed to organise those who 
believed in him and his principles into a military system. This would enable him to 
define their tasks and distribute their roles. However, one might ask why Ibn Tūmart 
used such a complex institutional network, rather than a simple arrangement. The 
answer is simply that far from solely creating a military organisation, Ibn Tūmart was 
seeking to lay the foundations of a new state.  
It is almost certain that the Almohads began their movement when Ibn Tūmart 
failed in his attempt, according to his own account, to eliminate the manifestations of 
                                                   
 
16 Mūsā, ‘al-Tanẓīmāt al-ḥizbiyya’, p. 55. 
17 See Hopkins, Medieval Muslim Government, p. 93. M. Ghannāy, Qiyām dawlat al-muwaḥḥidīn, p. 43. 
A. Najjār, Tajribat al-Iṣlāḥ fī ḥarakat al-Mahdī b. Tūmart, p. 125. 
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moral decay and to return people to the true teachings of Islam.18 He believed that the 
Almoravid rulers had not sought to drive out corruption, nor did they allow anyone else 
to do so. In his eyes, the Almoravids were not real Muslims, and therefore the act of 
changing this government in order to eliminate corruption and to establish the 
foundations of religious reform, had become a sacred duty.19 Once Ibn Tūmart returned 
to his homeland in the Atlas Mountains and thus placed himself under the protection of 
his native people, he began to implement his project. The purpose was clear: a united 
society adheres to the Sharia, or Islamic law, and the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad; 
it also requires a strong government in order to achieve these goals. To ensure this, Ibn 
Tūmart followed three main steps: first, he sought to obtain supporters by spreading his 
ideology of religious reform among his native barbarian tribes of Maṣmūda. The 
Almoravid rulers had no effective power over the Atlantic tribes, which gave Ibn 
Tūmart a good opportunity to move freely and easily between the villages and to spread 
his message among their people. He built mosques and schools where he taught his 
followers and preached against moral corruption and its elimination.  This was possible 
by using an accent and language familiar to the Maṣmūda tribes, as well as using the 
great knowledge that he had gained during his long journey to the Orient.20  Having 
succeeded in winning over supporters who believed in his cause, the next step was to 
impart a cover of religious legitimacy to his character by adopting the concept of 
Mahdism. The belief that God would one day send the Mahdī, who would fill the earth 
with justice and put right the wrongdoing and tyranny that had long existed among 
Muslims.  
The use of a religious gloss to achieve political ambitions was not unheard of in 
the history of the Maghrib, as it has been used by the founder of the Fatimid dynasty, 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Mahdī bi-Allāh (909–934).21 Perhaps Ibn Tūmart realised that Mahdism 
was the best way to achieve his goals, as well as to gain more supporters and ensure 
their permanent loyalty. He therefore began to convince his people about the Mahdī and 
he explained the political and social implications which would be gained by following 
                                                   
 
18 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, p. 111 ; ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 43. 
19 Ibn Tūmart called the Almoravids "worse than the Christians", and more deserving of jihād, in an 
address to the assembled Almohad tribes. ‘Apply yourselves in jihād against the veiled infidels, for this is 
more important than combating the Christians and all the infidels twice, or even more. In effect, they 
have attributed a corporal aspect to the Creator - May he be glorified! In rejecting tawḥīd, they have 
rebelled against truth itself!’, Lévi- Provençal, Documents Inédits, p. 15. 
20 On Ibn Tūmart’s journey to the Orient and his movements between the villages of the Atlas Mountains, 
see: Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, pp. 11-33. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, pp. 61-79.  
21 On the concept of Mahdism and its presence in the Berber regions, see Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn 
Khaldūn, The Muqaddima, vol. 1, pp. 246-252, vol. 2, pp. 142-176; H. Basset, Essai sur la literature des 
berbers (Alger, 1920), pp. 268-272.  
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him. By the time Ibn Tūmart felt that the idea of Mahdism had penetrated the hearts of 
his followers, in a speech near Iglī, his place of birth, he revealed himself to be God's 
Mahdī. 22  Immediately after the speech, a pledge of allegiance was given by the 
followers of the Mahdī. The first to give the bayʿa (an oath of allegiance) were the 
Mahdī’s advisers, close companions and tribal chiefs.23 Next were the rest of audience, 
including the Mahdī’s students and members of the mountain Berber tribes. Ibn 
Tūmart’s bold announcement greatly helped him to increase his popularity and raise his 
status among his followers. Al-Marrakushī described the dominant position of Ibn 
Tūmart among the Berber tribes of Maṣmūda:  
‘The submission of the Maṣmūda to Ibn Tūmart kept increasing, their fascination 
to his character multiplied, and their glorification to his position assured to the 
extent that if he commanded any of them to kill his father, brother or son, he 
would immediately commit the murder without delay’.24 
 
The increase in the number of recruits who formally took the name of the Almohads, 
allowed the Mahdī to complete his final step: that of establishing a political and military 
entity in his nascent state and of declaring an armed conflict against the Almoravids. 
The biggest challenges that the Almohads had to face were the disjointed society and 
the conflicts between independent tribes. Armed conflicts between the tribes in order to 
gain more control over neighbouring areas, or for revenge, were common. The endless 
blood feuds between the tribe of Hintāta and Orīkā, prior to the arrival of the Almohads, 
was an example of the divisive nature of the Atlas Berber community.25 
The Almohad Mahdī realised that he needed to resolve these ancient conflicts and 
re-build the web of relations and blood loyalties between the tribes to create a unified 
and disciplined organisation as a first step. This does not mean that Ibn Tūmart wanted 
to completely abolish the tribal system that existed in the Atlas Mountains, nor did he 
want to destroy the value of lineage and blood relations. He was simply rearranging 
lineage and loyalty to create a more efficient and obedient society of tribes.  
Moreover, an argument that was used by Ibn Tūmart in his public speech 
propaganda campaign against the Almoravids, thus gaining greater loyalty from the 
mountain tribes, was the policy of the Almoravid government, which limited the power 
                                                   
 
22 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, pp. 75-76 ; al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, pp. 254-255. On the doctrine of 
Ibn Tūmart, see Huici Miranda, Historia política, pp. 37-41. Robert Brunschvig, ‘Sur la doctrine du 
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23 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, pp. 254-255. Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, vol. 6, p. 469.  
24 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, p. 137. 
25 On the genealogy of Berber tribes and their relationships, see Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh, vol. 6, pp. 116-135. 
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of the ruling family, plus an autocratic and exploited group of fuqaha (Jurists). The 
Mahdī refers to the tyranny of those fuqahāʾ in a number of sermons.26 They were the 
Amir's right-hand men, which gave them the opportunity to use their positions to 
achieve their personal ambitions, without care for the people's demands. When the 
opportunity came for the Mahdī to build his state, he therefore wanted to create an 
inclusive political system in which the power was distributed over multiple categories to 
cover all segments of society.  
The Shūrā (an Arabic word for "consultation") is one of the most important 
principles that is encouraged by the Islamic religion as a means of making decisions on 
various community issues, and this is in line with Islamic law. Islamic history mentions 
many events which embody the principle of consultation. Even the Prophet Muḥammad 
was ordered by God to consult with believers, although Muslims believe him to be 
infallible.27 The prophet made all his decisions in consultation with the Muslims, except 
for matters which were clearly dealt with by God. The adherence of Ibn Tūmart to 
Islamic teachings, and his determination to follow and imitate the prophet in his 
behaviour and decision-making, encouraged him to represent the principle of Shūrā in 
his political system and to make it central to solving any problems that the Almohads 
might face. 
As will be discussed in more depth later, Ibn Tūmart arranged his followers into a 
multi-tiered structure, or hierarchy. The status of each level depended on the social 
status of its members, or on the role assigned to them. However, these categories can be 
seen as a political system, as propaganda, and as a military apparatus. The political 
system was represented in the Almohad advisory councils, that is, the Ten, the Fifty and 
the Seventy, whose members were chosen carefully from all of the known tribes and 
clans. The propaganda machine was made up of the categories of the ṭalaba and ḥuffāẓ 
and its mission was to disseminate the Mahdī's message and to mobilise large numbers 
of supporters to the Almohad cause. The military apparatus was composed of all the 
Almohad tribes, and its mission was to defend the state against any threat and to provide 
military elements whenever required to do so.  
                                                   
 
26 See Ibn Tūmart, Kitāb Aʿazzu mā-Yuṭlab, ed. ʿAbd al-Ganī Abū al-ʿAzam (Rabat, 1997), pp. 404-410; 
Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān, ed. A. ʿAbbās, 7 vols (Beirut, 1968), vol. 5, 
p. 49; Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, p. 138, 241. 
27 In the Koran, God said to Muḥammad “Thus it is due to mercy from Allāh that you deal with them 
gently, and had you been rough, hard hearted, they would certainly have dispersed from around you; 
pardon them therefore, and ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in the affair; so when you 
have decided, then place your trust in Allāh; surely Allāh loves those who trust”, Sūra 3: 159. 
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1.3 The Almohad Advisory Councils 
1.3.1 Council of Ten 
The identity of the Ten is well established from all the sources, which place them on the 
top of the Almohad pyramid. However, there are still doubts about the real name of this 
category. Al-Baydhaq, followed by Ibn ʿIdhārī, called them the Ahl al-Jamāʿa, without 
any trace of the name al-ʿashra28; the author of the Kitāb al-Ansāb called them the Ahl 
al-Jamāʿa, but in other places he named them Ahl al-Jamāʿa al-ʿashra29; al-Marrākushī, 
more explicitly, gives the name al-Jamāʿa and he affirms that these were the first who 
believed in Ibn Tūmart and his cause.  He adds that from then onwards their name was 
al-Jamāʿa.30 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān referred to them as the al-ʿashra al-Jamāʿa, and occasionally 
as the al-ʿashra31; the name given by the author of al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya is simply the 
al-ʿashra.32 In these contexts, one might ask whether the al-ʿashra means the name of 
the category, or whether it refers to the number of its members.  
The Kitāb al-Ansāb is the only source which states that there were 12 members of 
the Council of Ten. Al-Yassaʿ in Ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s account, although he stated that the 
members of this layer were ten, gave only seven names. Most of the Almohad accounts 
provide ten names, but these are by no means always the same names, nor are they in a 
similar order.33 This consensus gives an impression that the layer could have been 
called, at least in the early days, the Ten, referring to the number of its members, and 
also as an analogy to the companions of the Prophet, whom Ibn Tūmart was keen to 
follow. Later, as a result of the fluctuating number of members, the layer was renamed 
the Ahl al-Jamāʿa. 
There is no doubt that the composition of the Ten varied from time to time, either 
because of expulsion, as happened with al-Faqīh al-Ifrīqī, who denied the infallibility of 
Ibn Tūmart and disapproved of the massacre at Hzimīrah34, or because of death, as 
happened at the famous battle of Al-Buḥaīra in April, 1130, when half of the members 
of the Council were killed.35 There is no clear evidence that Ibn Tūmart replaced the 
                                                   
 
28 Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, p. 32, 42, 43; Ibn ʿIdhārī al-Marrākushī, al-Bayān al-mughrib, qsm al-
Muwaḥḥidīn, p. 80. 
29 Kitāb al-Ansāb, pp. 23, 30.  
30 al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, p. 135. 
31 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, pp. 82, 84,88, 124. 
32 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, p. 108. 
33 See the table of the Council of Ten. 
34 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 97. 
35 Kitāb al-Ansāb, p. 30. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 160. 
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members of the Ten with others, but the variations in the names given in the sources 
provides us with a hypothesis that necessary changes did occur.  
Another case is the names of the members who were attached to the Ten. 
Generally, more than twenty names were given by the Almohad chroniclers for this 
layer, of which only ten are fairly common to all the lists. Among those members are: 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī (the future caliph), Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Ṣanhājī, Abū 
Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. Yaḥyā al-Hintātī, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr b. Yīgīt, and Abū Muḥammad 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥsin al-Wānshrīsī, who is also known as al-Bashīr. The other names 
were mentioned by some sources and omitted by others. This discrepancy raises the 
possibility that these accounts may represent various stages in the development of the 
system and that chroniclers may have recorded the list of the Ten at different periods, 
during which new members were in charge. It could also be a sign of the flexibility of 
the system, which allowed Ibn Tūmart, for some reason, to replace or transfer members 
from one layer to another, either permanently or temporarily. As a result, it is not 
surprising to see some names that were reported as members of the Council of Ten are 
also mentioned in a different layer. For example, the Kitāb al-Ansāb mentions Abū 
Mūsā ʿIsā b. Mūsā al-Ṣūdī and Abī Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ghighāʾī as being 
members of the Ten, and also of the Ahl al-Dar.36 Al-Marrākushī cited Mūsā b. ʿAlī al-
Ḍarīr in the list of the Ten, while other accounts placed him in the Council of Fifty.37 
The disarray in the ordering of the members of the Ten is another confusion which 
makes it difficult for us to ascertain the importance of each member. Most of the 
Almohad accounts cite ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b ʿAlī, the future caliph, at the top of the list. 
Some sources make a clear separation between ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and all the members of 
the Ten.38 Nevertheless, only al-Yassaʿ and al-Marrākushī are presented in a different 
order. Both were in the Muslim East, far from the Almohad court, which gave them the 
scope to write their accounts without any fear of possible retribution. However, al-
Marrākushī’s account cannot always be trusted. The exclusion of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin from 
the top of al-Marrākushī's list is not surprising when one considers that he also excluded 
the famous al-Bashīr from the Council of Ten. In contrast, although al-Yassaʿ did the 
same by dropping ʿAbd al-Muʾmin from the summit of the Ten, his order is more 
logical. According to al-Yassaʿ, and supporting events, al-Bashīr was at the forefront of 
                                                   
 
36 Kitāb al-Ansāb, pp. 26, 32. 
37 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjib, p. 245. 
38 Ibn al-Aḥmar, Mustawdaʿ al-ʿalāma wa-mustabdaʿ al-ʿallāma, edited by M. b. Tawīt (Tetouan, 1964), 
p. 32; Ibn Abī Dinār, al-Muʾnis fī akhbār Ifrīqiya, p. 110. 
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the Almohads. He was the commander during all the battles fought by the Almohads. 
He was the man who was assigned by Ibn Tūmart to carry out the operation of the 
tamyīz; the author of Kitāb al-Ansāb had gone even further, by giving him supernatural 
qualities, when he said that al-Bashir could have disappeared, but he did not die during 
the Battle of al-Buḥaīra in 1129.39  These examples of favouring, and many others, lead 
us to believe that al-Bashīr would have been Caliph after the Mahdī, had he not died so 
suddenly. The remaining members were arranged in different places in each source, 
with the exception of Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-Ṣanhājī, who was always in third or fourth 
place in almost every list. 
The members of this assembly were, somehow, ministers for the Mahdī.40 They 
were his trusted men, whom he consulted about important issues, and who were 
assigned to execute his major decisions. In fact, they were, if one believes Ibn Khaldūn, 
the representatives of the five Maṣmūda tribes which formed the essential core of the 
Almohad administration.41 In addition, the Kitāb al-Ansāb more precisely indicates the 
functions of the most influential members of the board. According to this source, ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin, who the Mahdī called ṣāḥib al-Waqt (the man of the moment), was the only 
follower who had the privilege of riding a black horse; the Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-Hintātī 
was assigned to carry Ibn Tūmart’s shield; Abū Ibrāhīm al-Khazrajī worked as a high 
judge of the people on behalf of the Mahdī.42 
As for Abū al-Rabīʿ Ḥaḍramī, he was the Secretary, the official letter writer 
(Kātib al-Rasāʾil) of the Mahdī; ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān led, as an Imam, the 
obligatory prayers on behalf of the Mahdī. It was his death at the battle of Al-Buḥaīra 
that forced the Mahdī to replace him with ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. We know from various 
sources that during the fateful year, 1129, Ibn Tūmart charged his future successor to 
deal with the prayers, along with the leadership of the troops.43 Ibn Abī Zarʿ and other 
authors claim that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin exercised this mission until the Mahdī 
disappeared. 44  Finally, the Kitāb al-Ansāb ignores the function of al-Bashīr al-
Wānshrīsī, but we are quite sure that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin was able to acquire these new 
privileges due to al-Bashir’s death at al-Buḥaīra.  
                                                   
 
39 Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, p. 33. Kitāb al-Ansāb, p. 23. 
40 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 124. 
41 Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, vol. 6, p. 288. 
42 Kitāb al-Ansāb, pp. 30-31. 
43 Ibid, p. 48. 
44 Ibn Abī Zarʿ, Rawḍ al-Qirṭās, p. 179. 
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Evidence for further information on the Council of Ten is sketchy. At this stage, 
the Almohads did not yet have their own state. The ongoing war with the Almoravids 
had limited the functions of the nascent government in two respects: to gain more 
supporters to their cause, and to win the fight against their sole enemy. Let us not forget 
the death of most of the Ten’s members at the Battle of al-Buḥaīra, and the reforms 
introduced by the ʿAbd al-Muʾmin on the hierarchy subsequently, which will be 
considered in the second part of the chapter. 
1.3.2 Council of Fifty 
There is no doubt among historians about the existence of the Khamsīn (The Fifty) as it 
was recorded in almost every source. Nevertheless, these sources do not provide us with 
sufficient detail to enable us to understand the formation of this council and the tasks 
that were entrusted to its members. Only the author of the Kitāb al-Ansāb and Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān have provided us with an almost complete list of the members of this council, 
yet they are not in agreement on the number of its members. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān tried to count 
the fifty but he listed thirty-nine names only. At this point, he realised the deficit in his 
calculations and says: ‘Thus Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt enumerates them in his book. According 
to this they are about forty or forty-one men; where are the rest of the “Fifty”?’ Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān therefore mentions another seven members whom Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt says are the 
advisers of Ibn Tūmart (Ahl mashwaratihī), and Ibn al-Qaṭṭān hypothesises that they 
belonged to the Ahl Khamsīn.45 In contrast, the Kitāb al-Ansāb lists forty-five names; 
then he adds another nine members who were associated with the assembly after the 
tamyīz.46 
 The confusion in determining the actual number of the Ahl al-Khamsīn has led 
modern researchers to try to address the problem and find a way to explain the 
contradictions between the two versions. J. F. P. Hopkins believes that the Fifty is 
merely a name that was given to this council and that it does not necessarily refer to the 
number of members.47 Hopkins supported his opinion through the French anthropologist 
Robert Montagne’s study of the organisations of Berber tribes. 48  According to 
Montagne, the Council of Fifty was a model similar to a pre-existing Berber tribal 
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council called the Ait Rbʿīn (Forty), even though its members did not exceed ten or 
fifteen. This study was also adopted by Fromherz, who argues that the Council of Fifty 
was based on a pre-existing tribal system.  The Council of Fifty, according to him, “was 
actually made up of forty members, but these became fifty when the Council of Ten was 
added”.49 
However, the existence of Ait Rbʿīn in Berber society does not necessarily mean 
that Ibn Tūmart used it in his organisations. In fact, we do not find any references in the 
Almohad accounts that lead to such a conclusion. Perhaps the only evidence that 
supports this idea is that the list of Ibn al-Qaṭṭān includes only thirty-nine names. 
However, even this does not prove this hypothesis, as Ibn al-Qaṭṭān mentioned 
elsewhere that the number of the members was actually fifty.50 On the contrary, there 
are many sources which confirm that the number of its members was fifty, and that the 
body of the Ahl Khamsīn was completely separate from the Council of Ten. For 
example, the anonymous author of al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya says that, after he listed the 
membership of the Ten, there “followed behind them [the Ten], in this fashion, fifty 
men called Ahl Khamsīn”.51 Ibn Abī Zarʿ described the bayʿa of the ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to 
be caliph and says “The first to swear allegiance to him were the "Ten", the 
Companions of the Mahdī; then the “Fifty”, the Sheikh-s of the Muwaḥḥidīn” .52 Other 
evidence suggesting that the Ten and the Fifty were completely separate is given by the 
Kitāb al-Ansāb. It is the only source that provides the lists of the ten and the fifty, and 
these two lists have no names in common. 53  The sources of disagreement can be 
explained by several factors, such as the failure of memory, the lack of information, 
confusion, mistakes by copyists (especially the integration of new elements into the 
early assembly). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that there is no 
relationship between the Almohad state institution and existing tribal systems. It is most 
likely that Ibn Tūmart would benefit from pre-existing Berber tribal councils, but first 
he would need to make necessary changes and modifications in order to suit the 
structures of his new organisations. 
 The creation of this council presented new problems. Al-Yassaʿ indicates that the 
Mahdī was proclaimed by the Ten, followed by fifty people who once received the 
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50 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 84, 86, 128. 
51 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, p. 108. 
52 Ibn Abī Zarʿ, Rawḍ al-Qirṭās, p. 131. 
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name of Ahl al-Khamsīn.54 Ibn Abī Zarʿ enables us to choose between two versions: in 
the first, it was not until the day after the bayʿa of the Mahdī that the Ahl Khamsīn were 
selected; in the second, the Ten and the Fifty were simultaneously created after the 
bayʿa. 55 Ibn Khaldūn, who rarely spoke about the Almohad hierarchy, states that when 
the number of his companions had reached fifty, Ibn Tūmart called them the Ahl 
Khamsīn.56 The story of Kitāb al-Ansāb is as original as it is exciting. For him:  
‘When Allāh had intended the constitution of the Ahl Khamsīn to be made, the 
Imam Mahdī, may Allāh be pleased with him, began to look at the Almohads, and 
selected from them the members of this assembly’.57 
The members of this assembly, according to the two sources, were presented in groups, 
each belonging to the same tribes that had joined the Almohads, namely the Hintāta, 
Tīnmal, Jadmīwa, Janfīsa, Ṣanhāja, Qabāʾil, Haskūra. 
On the role of this Council of Fifty, information is lacking, and we are still in the 
realms of speculation. As already noted, its members were chosen from the tribes and 
most of them were Sheikh-s, not just normal citizens. They would therefore be allowed 
a representative aspect in Ibn Tūmart’s institutions. 
According to our sources, the Khamsīn were identified as those whom the Mahdī 
consulted, and from whom he was taking advice “Aṣḥāb mashūratihi”.58 Ibn Khaṭīb 
suggests another role: “Ahl al-Sabʿīn, al-Khamsīn, al-Ṭalaba and al-Ḥuffāẓ for 
acquiring knowledge”.59 It is almost certain that the author did not distinguish between 
Almohad categories (Aṣnāf) and their respective roles. I am sceptical about the role of 
Shūra (Consultation) which was attributed to this Council. It would be more than “a 
kind of conduit between the supreme head of the state and the Almohad tribes scattered 
in the folds of the Atlas”.60 By integrating the tribal Sheikh-s into his hierarchy, Ibn 
Tūmart thus ensured his domination, and their commitment to contribute to the 
Almohad movement. 
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1.3.3 The Sabʿa and the Sabʿīn 
If we believe some of the Almohad chroniclers, the aristocratic elements of Ibn 
Tūmart’s hierarchy were not limited only to the Fifty, but they were distributed in two 
other councils: The Sabʿa (Seven) and the Sabʿīn (Seventy).  
With regard to the Sabʿa, Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, always acting on the authority of Ibn 
Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, is the only chronicler to mention this council, and he provided us with 
the names of its members, although without including any information about them.61 
Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt says that the Seven were the advisors of Ibn Tūmart, though he did 
not tell us the differences between them and the Councils of Ten and Fifty, whose 
members also have the same role. This similarity between their roles suggests that either 
this entity had a separate body, or that its members belonged to another council. 
According to Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, these seven people were probably selected from the 
Khamsīn. Yet, according to the list of the Kitāb al-Ansāb, we find only two members 
who actually belong to the Council of Fifty.62  
In Al-Yassaʿ’s list concerning the Council of Ten, the author provided the names 
of only seven members. Is this a simple coincidence, or was the chronicler confused 
about the identities of the members of both councils, the Ten and the Seventy, that 
actually existed? 
In the information reported by al-ʿUmarī, on the authority of Abū al-Rūḥ ʿIsa al-
Zawāwī, about Ḥafsid institutions, we encounter seven characters from the Council of 
Ten. Their role is less significant, compared to the other three, who were close advisers 
of the Sultan.63 This fact does not seem to be a Ḥafsid innovation but is a relic of the old 
Almohad organisation, because we know from the information of al-Baydhaq and al-
Marrākushī that at the death of Ibn Tūmart, three Almohad Sheikh-s played a leading 
role and they governed with ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.64 
However, despite the lack of evidence, it is difficult to exclude the testimony of 
Ibn Ṣāḥib Ṣalāt, who is known to be a reliable chronicler, in regard to the Council of 
Seven.  As always in the history of the Almohads, many questions remain, beginning 
with a process called Iʿtirāf, reported only by al-Baydhaq. 65 Moreover, at present, 
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 63 
giving a conclusive opinion on the existence of the Seven is very difficult, simply 
because all the remaining information about the categories of the Almohad hierarchy 
has come from just four fragmented sources that should be examined at their face value. 
Finally, the attitude of Ibn al-Qaṭṭān in regard to the Council of Seven is very significant 
and it acknowledges the reality of its existence. Just before displaying the list of the 
fifty, the author thus says: “I know al-Jamāʿa al-ʿashra, the Ahl al-Khamsīn and the 
Sabʿā councillors of Ibn Tūmart”.66  
The Council of Seventy is another mystery that has been provided by Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān. After stating, according to al-Yassaʿ, that the third assembly is that of the 
Seventy, the author of Nuẓm al-Jumān leaves us perplexed. He finds the existence of the 
Seventy altogether unlikely. Yet, a few pages later, he resumes his plagiarism from al-
Yassaʿ regarding this council, and gives no acknowledgement of his source.67 
This is a typical example of the compilation processes that are common in Arab 
historiography.68 The author cites his sources and uses them frequently throughout the 
text for the same series of events, regardless of repetitions or contradictions. However, 
by incorporating the information from the same al-Yassaʿ, other chroniclers, such as Ibn 
al-Athīr, al-Nuwayirī, al-al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya and Ibn al-Khaṭīb have summarised the 
status of this council.69 
Finally, the statement of Huici Miranda, in which he denied the existence of this 
council, seems excessive. 70  We might simply say that the convocation of such an 
assembly was called in circumstances that remain cloudy, and its components still 
remain to be determined. 
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1.4 The Propagandists of the Almohads 
1.4.1 The Ṭalaba: The ‘Learned’ 
Propaganda was a critical element in the system that was created by Ibn Tūmart. A 
famous propagandist, the Mahdī awarded this task of disseminating propaganda to a 
special team. Through these hierarchical channels, all Almohad groups, and all the 
rallied tribes, were constantly kept under his control, both politically and ideologically. 
The disciples who surrounded the Mahdī were thus continuously involved in this project 
of propaganda. Who were these pioneer propagandists, and what training did they 
follow? 
Even before forming a special team for this laborious task, Ibn Tūmart, for his 
own campaign, benefitted from the invaluable help of al-Bashir al-Wānshrīsī. Following 
his recruitment, al-Wānshrīsī was not mentioned in the retinue of the Mahdī. As a 
trusted man, he preceded the Mahdī to prepare the ground for him. 71  Was it the 
premature death of al-Wānshrīsī and his important role of propaganda that led Ibn 
Tūmart to shape a new team in his image? 
From our sources, Ibn Tūmart’s new recruits were called the Ṭalaba (the name is 
almost always in the plural). The researcher O. Saidi represents the Ṭalaba as an 
Almohad invention.72 Yet they were known by the Almoravids before the Almohad 
movement took place. Ibn Abī Zarʿ informs us that ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Yāsīn, the founder 
of the Almoravid dynasty, before beginning his conquests, would have sent money to 
the “Ṭalaba of Maṣmūda and to their qāḍī-s”.73 Moreover, a letter issued by the Mahdī 
presents a severe indictment of them, and accuses them of all evil, showing their 
prominence in Almoravid society.74  
With the Almohads, the word ṭalaba, which generally refers to those who seek 
knowledge, took on a special meaning from the moment it was reserved for an entire 
category in Ibn Tūmart’s hierarchy. Despite its age, this institution is very poorly 
documented in primary sources, and perhaps it is for this reason that only Hopkins has 
given it recent attention. It seems certain that Nuẓm al-Jumān, plagiarised by al-Ḥulal 
Mūshiyya, is the only source that effectively speaks of ṭalaba the time of the Mahdī. 
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Conversely, other chronicles seemed to pay attention to this body during the reigns of 
the later caliphs. 
The Nuẓm al-Jumān, always in al-Yassaʿ’s version, set the ṭalaba on the fourth 
rung of the hierarchy, just after the three previous councils. However, as Ibn al-Qaṭṭān 
denied the existence of the Seventy, the position of ṭalaba has risen and has ended up in 
third place.75 Let us not forget that the father of our chronicler was one of the dignitaries 
of the ṭalaba. By being assigned such a high rank, the author thus praised and exalted 
his father, who had suffered injustice at the time of Caliph Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh 
al-ʿAdil (1224-1227) and his brother, the Caliph Abū al-ʿAla Idrīs al-Maʾmūn (1227-
1232). Consequently, the al-Ḥulal version becomes essential. The account of the 
anonymous author of the Kitāb al-Ansāb regarding this category seems strange to me. 
Indeed, his account does not usually miss such information, even for political organs 
that are less important. The enthusiasm he has for everything related to Ibn Tūmart 
sometimes causes duplication and even contradictions. However, the ṭalaba have no 
place in his hierarchical system, and only a simple, brief note is given about them at the 
end of his account.76 
Another point worth considering is presented only by the Kitāb al-Ansāb in a 
passing reference when speaking of Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿUbayd Allāh al-
Ḥaskūrī, member of the Council of Fifty, the anonymous author claimed that he was 
one of the mubashir-s (propagandists) of the Almohad movement.77 Could it be that the 
old name refers to the Ṭalaba, or at least to their former position?  One is tempted to 
believe this, especially when one considers that Ibn Tūmart was imitating the Prophet in 
his every move. 
The ṭalaba were not ordinary students, as has been implied by some recent 
research.78 They comprised the experienced Sheikh-s on whom the Mahdī lavished his 
knowledge for many years. Ibn Khaldūn said that the Almohad Mahdī called his 
companions and intimates that they are "the ṭalaba", and those who rallied to the 
movement "the Almohads".79 This statement generates a further mystery. In fact, only 
two members of the Council of Ten, Sulaymān b. Makhlūf al-Ḥaḍarī and Ismāʿīl al-
Hazrajī, who took the nickname Ṭālib.80 On the other hand, sources attribute the quality 
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of ṭālib to people who had no relationship to either the ʿAshara or the Khamsīn. We 
therefore believe that the category of the Ṭalaba had its own existence, and its members 
were not part of the other councils. 
Based on our sources, the number of the Ṭalaba, at the time of the Mahdī, was 
much higher than of other assemblies. It is surprising when one considers that, in 1121, 
at the beginning of the movement, the Mahdī sent a significant number of the Ṭalaba, 
under the direction of a Namīr b. Tajalud b. Yamlūk, to spread their propaganda in the 
Sus and the Jabal Daran.81 According to Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, the “fishing was successful” 
because a large number of tribes had rallied to the cause of Ibn Tūmart, such as the 
Jadmīwa, Hazmira, Janfīsa, and other mountain tribes. It should also be mentioned that 
the entry of the powerful tribe, the Hintāta, into the Almohad movement is due to the 
efforts of a Ṭālib called Sukātū. The importance of this category in the system of the 
Mahdī is demonstrated by the fact that he awarded its members who were killed in the 
performance of their duties, the term Shahīd82 (martyr). Moreover, the Ahl Tifnūt and 
Ghujdāma, who murdered two-ṭālib-s who were sent by the Mahdī, received an 
exemplary punishment, as the Mahdī ordered their killing.83 
Before discussing the role of the ṭalaba in the primary government of the 
Almohads, we need to refer to the words of Al-Baydhaq. Speaking of the events of the 
year 1125, he writes: “wa fi ʿām 520 baʿatha ṭalabat al-Muwaḥḥidīn”84 (in the year 520 
[Ibn Tūmart] sent the Almohad Ṭalaba). This text raises a very sensitive issue, to which 
researchers have paid no attention. We are dealing with the primary document, and 
there is a clear distinction between the ṭalaba and the Almohad ṭalaba, and this was 
evident during the lifetime of Ibn Tūmart.85 However, we should be aware that this 
story is almost at the end of al-Baydhaq’s book and has been attributed to him only 
because, according to researchers, the last section on Akhbār al-Mahdī b. Tūmart cannot 
have been written by al-Baydhaq.86 Pending a definitive answer, the story is more or 
less proof that the category of the ṭalaba was split into two groups from the time of the 
Mahdī, and would remain in this form until the end of the Almohad dynasty. 
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Regarding the role played by the ṭalaba, we know that, at the beginning of the 
movement, while Almohads had an obligation to fight the enemy of their cause, the 
Mahdī himself participated in battles and was wounded more than once. Several clues 
found in our sources tell us the presence of the ṭalaba on the battlefield alongside other 
members of the Almohad community. If one believes the author of al-Ansāb, combat 
roles were removed from the function of the ṭalaba, because the Caliph al-Nāṣir (1199-
1213) would provide for the carrying of weapons, as well as the muezzins, for this 
duty.87 However, the primary role of the ṭalaba remains in the field of propaganda, and, 
thus, fighting by the word. It was the poets of the early Islamic era who defended the 
new religion with the pen. On this point, the success of the ṭalaba was total, and Ibn Abī 
Zarʿ has even left a passage describing how they acted.88 Finally, all of the sources 
having been consulted, it appears that the ṭalaba of Ibn Tūmart’s time never held 
administrative positions. However, with the evolution which the Almohad dynasty 
would experience, the status of the ṭalaba would undergo radical changes, which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
1.4.2 The Ḥuffāẓ: The “Guardians” 
Among the mechanics of the Almohad primary institutions, which remain obscure, and 
which we still cannot determine, is an organisation called Ḥuffāẓ (sgl. ḥāfiẓ). The title 
ḥāfiẓ, which has traditionally been reserved for those who memorise the Qur'an, had 
begun to be used to designate those who memorise the texts of Imam al-Mahdī.89 The 
term ḥāfiz literally also means ‘the guardian’, the one who memorises and protects, 
traditionally the Qur’an, but in the Almohad case is the Aʿazzu mā-Yuṭlab of Ibn 
Tūmart. 
To my knowledge, no study has yet been published dealing with the category 
known as ḥuffāẓ. Nevertheless, in Hopkins’ magisterial study, the Ḥuffāẓ hold an 
insignificant position, and they are present also in the work of Allen Fromherz. As for 
the study of Mūsā, it ignores them completely during the time of Ibn Tūmart. This 
attitude seems significant and it poses a question: did this group really exist at the time 
of the Mahdī, or was it an invention of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin? 
Al-Baydhaq, in his memoirs about the Mahdī, has made almost no references to 
the Ḥuffāẓ of his time while, during the reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, he mentions their 
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names, but no real details are provided. For example, in his memoirs, speaking of Ceuta, 
he wrote: “ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān and his Ḥuffāẓ came down to Ceuta”.90 Only a few 
lines later, he made a new and surprising statement: “ʿAbd Allāh b. Dāwūd led Jrawah 
[the tribe], in the company of their ḥāfiẓ, ʿUmar b. Mīmūn”. At first sight, these two 
stories are contradictory, because one wonders how a man like ʿAbd Allāh might have 
seen around him a group of ḥuffāẓ, while a tribe, the Jrawah, had only one ḥāfiẓ. We 
need to try to analyse the two versions in an attempt to reconcile them. 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān, who was appointed to the Council of Fifty, had several 
features to his credit.91 Could it be his new job as governor of Ceuta, which allowed him 
to have a group of ḥuffāẓ? It would be impossible to accept the two stories, unless to 
agree that the ḥuffāẓ had two distinct and widely different roles. In contrast, the period 
recorded by our historian, al-Baydhaq, at least for our two examples, shows that the 
ḥuffāẓ were charged with urgent, though short-lived, missions, whether in- or outside 
the capital, Marrakech. For H. Farhat, their competence lies, above all, in the field of 
taxation.92 
Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, along with the anonymous author of al-Ḥulal Mūshiyya, put the 
ḥuffāẓ fifth in the Almohad hierarchy, just below the ṭalaba. These two sources add 
small explanatory notes stating that the ḥuffāẓ are “small ṭalaba”.93 These notes may 
highlight important indicators: First, the clarity that the two authors cast on this 
category eliminates any confusion that would have been noticed. Yet it is obvious that 
the confusion between the ṭalaba, the ḥuffāẓ and the Ahl al-Ḥizb is common in some 
chronicles, to the point that Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt called Abū Yahiya Zakariyya b. Wasnan 
both ḥāfiẓ and ṭālib.94 
Secondly, Nuẓm al-Jumān is the oldest document that gives all young men a place 
in the hierarchy of Ibn Tūmart, and I am inclined to believe that the ḥuffāẓ are 
themselves the Ṣibyān, (young boys) in some of the texts provided in  Al-Baydhaq’s 
account, but without any convincing evidence. 95  Ultimately, it is possible that the 
Mahdī, in order to improve the institutions of government, put the children of the main 
Almohads in a special category. This timid attempt, which cannot have been at the 
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experimental stage at the time of the Mahdī, would be institutionalised by the Caliph 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and for the same layer of the ḥuffāẓ. 
With the version of the Kitāb al-Ansāb, our vision changes, as the ḥuffāẓ drop to 
sixth place in the pyramid, the ṭalaba disappear altogether and the Ahl al-ḥizb make 
their first appearance in the official hierarchy. Moreover, the anonymous author, faithful 
to his image as the best informed historian, surprises us with his statements on the 
ḥuffāẓ. In one highly condensed paragraph, the content very ambiguous: 
 ‘The ḥuffāẓ, may God help them, come from thirteen tribes, and an order of 
succession. There are among them the ḥuffāẓ of Ahl ad-Dar (people of the house), 
at the head of which come Hargha, which are divided into three groups: Awkdān, 
Ait Waghfkammī, which means Ahl bāb al-Dār, the Ghuzāt; then those of Ahl 
Tīnmal, Hintāta, Kidmīwa, Kanfīsa, the Qabāʾil [the tribes], Haskūra of al-Qiblah, 
Ṣanhāja of al-Qiblah, Ṣanhāja of the shadow [al-Ẓil]. There were among them 
neither Kūmiyya nor Haskūra of the shadow’.96 
Hopkins has used this paragraph in his work on the Almohad hierarchy.97 However, 
without wishing to criticise his thesis, we believe that in light of documents that have 
emerged since then, we are able to add further information to the details that are 
provided. 
Sometimes, the original information from Kitāb al-Ansāb can also be a weakness. 
In fact, it is almost impossible to decipher this paragraph without the contribution of 
other sources. We can thus say with some certainty, and without being controversial, 
that our text really describes the state of the ḥuffāẓ at the time of Ibn Tūmart because, 
fortunately, other sources have given us evidence of the changes that occurred in this 
category under the Muʾminid dynasty. 
According to the Kitāb al-Ansāb, the recruitment of the ḥuffāẓ at the time of the 
Almohad Mahdī took place from thirteen specific tribes, but it refers only to eleven.  At 
the apex of this hierarchical pyramid, we have ḥuffāẓ Ahl al-Dār, chosen from the 
members of the Hargha tribe and arranged in three groups. In the first place, it is 
questionable whether there were links between the ḥuffāẓ of Ahl al-Dār and the council 
of the same name, which represented the private entourage of the Mahdī. In the light of 
our sources, only one member of that council was called ḥāfiẓ98, and, in an isolated case, 
it is difficult to conclude that there was a probable relationship between the two 
Almohad organs. The mention of al-Ghuzāt among the ḥuffāẓ seems rather curious, 
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especially when one considers that the anonymous author, a few lines before, discusses 
this category of al-Ghuzāt without mentioning any connection to the ḥuffāẓ. 
The other two components of the Hargha ḥuffāẓ are a matter of debate. If it is 
possible to determine the first, namely Awkdān, or Kudāna, one of innumerable 
fractions of Hargha99, the task is, however, tough for Ait Waghfkammi. This name 
appears in the sources under different aspects: Immi-n-Takimī100; Mintīqimmī101, and 
Iḥitigimmī. 102  The Kitāb al-Ansāb, suspecting perhaps the discomfort that may be 
caused by this inconvenient Berber name, tried to clarify it in Arabic, saying that these 
are the Ahl Bāb al-Dār. Lévi-Provençal, who published the book, has translated it as 
“the attached people to (the) vestibule of (the) palace”, Hopkins makes the same 
point.103 Yet, al-Mann biʾl-Imam, one of the most reliable sources on Almohad history, 
whose work was not yet published at the time of the two Orientalists, informs us that 
Mintīqimmī refers to none other than the famous saqīfa (the caliph’s palace), of which 
Ibn Saʿīd has given a large and meticulous description in his Jeghrafiyya104. 
One more point that is made by Hopkins, but which for us has a new dimension, 
is the exclusion of the Kūmiyya tribe and the Haskūra of the Shadow from the category 
of the ḥuffāẓ. For Hopkins, the absence of the Kūmiyya tribe, which was widely 
favoured by the Almohad chroniclers is mostly inexplicable score, given the links with 
the future caliph. Hopkins has probably forgotten that we are during the period of Ibn 
Tūmart, and the Kūmiyya tribe had not yet rallied to the cause of the Mahdī. On the 
other hand, the reason for the revocation of the Haskūra of the Shadow cannot be 
explained because, as mentioned before, these details are unavailable in other sources. 
At this point in our research, and in this pivotal period in Almohad history, it 
seems absurd to try to determine the true function of the ḥuffāẓ, which remains unclear 
and is still being confused with the function of the ṭalaba and that of the Ahl al-Ḥizb. 
However, if we take into account Ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s note regarding the age of the ḥuffāẓ, as 
well as to their nature at this basic stage of the Almohad movement, we can say with 
confidence that their role was simply to memorise and protect the Koran and the works 
of the Mahdī.  
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1.5 The Mass of the Population or Al-Kāffah 
The majority of the Almohads did not remain without organisation, as Ibn Tūmart 
welded the tribe into a single political and religious unit. He placed at the head of every 
ten people a Naqīb (commander), often preceding reviews (ʿarḍ, Mayz). Each Almohad 
category had a rank (Rutba) and the Almohads had to commit themselves to them, 
whether during travel (Safar), or while they were in town (Ḥaḍar)105. This form of 
organisation was based on rigorous discipline, and anyone who broke it was punished 
by death. This operation seems to have been carried out regularly and for different 
reasons, such as joining a new group to the movement, or when preparing for battle. 
There is also an operation, referred to as tamyīz, which the Mahdī ordered against 
certain tribes. Perhaps Ibn Tūmart needed to use violence to lead the tribes to forgetting 
their quarrels and to assemble around him, as a great socio-political change took place 
within the tribes, who had been used to living in dispersion and conflict.106 
The councils mentioned above played a positive and functional role in the 
strengthening of the Almohad cause. They contributed to the solidarity between the 
supporters of the Mahdī and the different tribes of the Atlas. Moreover, these supporters 
are among the heavyweights and important figures who crystallised as the 
organisational base of the Almohad cause. 
In reviewing the features of Almohad socio-political organisation, it seems that it 
has two classes: on one side, Almohad tribes with authority; and, on the other, the 
people who were from other tribes. This distinction was clearly highlighted by the 
future Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. The mobility in the scale of these ṭabaqāt was very low. 
After the Mahdī, their rise within a tribe or category defined the individual’s rank. Only 
the Kūmiyya, the caliph’s tribe, came to occupy a place in the hierarchy by the reign of 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.  Other individuals could only change their rank if they were joining 
the category of the ṭalaba, which was open to all known intellectuals, if not through 
inheriting a position from a relative, who was a member of a council. Apart from these 
narrow possibilities, mobility was not usually possible. 
Borrowed Model or Original Innovation? 
All those who are interested in studying the primary system of the Almohad government 
have noted the resemblance between the State of Tīnmal and that of Medina. In his 
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article about Ibn Tūmart in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Hopkins rightly pointed out that 
the Mahdī had the Prophet himself as a model.107 Is it a real historiography of facts or of 
compliance to models, both religious and literary, which encourage its repetition, and it 
always starts with the history of the Prophet and the beginning of Islam? In fact, by 
following the steps of Ibn Tūmart ‘Faqīh al-Sūs’, one might have the impression that he 
was imitating the facts and actions of the Prophet, as he claimed. For example, both had 
the same name: Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Allāh, despite the scepticism of certain 
researchers, who claim that the Mahdī forged an Arab genealogy. Indeed, the obsession 
about being given an Arabic genealogy had not completely removed the possibility that 
one could be a Muslim without being of full Arabic race. 
In the early days, the Prophet had in his service Zayd b. Ḥāritha, known as Zayd 
b. Muḥammad. Ibn Tūmart also had his servant, who was none other than our 
chronicler, al-Baydhaq. Most surprising in this assimilation is that, as long as Zayd b. 
Ḥāritha did not hold an important position in the Muslim society along the lines of Abū 
Bakr and ʿUmar, al-Baydhaq was on the same level of responsibility as his predecessor 
in the Almohad dynasty. Compared with ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and al-Bashīr al-Wānshrīsī. 
Ibn Tūmart, like the Prophet, who isolated himself in the cave of Ḥirā, had taken refuge 
in a cave: Ijīllīz. His proclamation under a carob tree is there only to remind us of the 
bayʿat al-Riḍwān or al-shajara (the Pledge of the Tree) of the Prophet. We should also 
refer to the parallels between the Ahl al-Dār of Ibn Tūmart, and the Ahl al-Bayt of the 
Prophet. 
Despite the many gaps in the history of the Almohad Mahdī, one is sometimes 
struck by his conduct in the assimilation of the Prophet's life, which sometimes exceeds 
natural human emotion. For example, the Council of Ten of the Almohad hierarchy is 
actually a reflection of the ten companions of the Prophet who had the promise of 
access to heaven. In this case, the parallels are at their height when one considers that 
the Almohad Mahdī, the moment he had no Garden of Eden to promise to his ten 
disciples, would have at least promised that all who were on earth were their slaves.108 
From the same perspective, we see that Ibn Tūmart, in the image of the Prophet, 
changed the Berber names of his close companions, thus Yarzījin b. ʿUmar became 
ʿAbd al-Wāhid al-Sharqī, Yaṣlatan b. Yalāzghigh became Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, 
                                                   
 
107 Hopkins, ‘Ibn Tūmart’, The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New edition), III, 958-60. See also A. Fromherz, 
The Almohads, p. 54, 55. 
108 Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, p. 55. 
 73 
Faskāt b. Yaḥīya became ʿUmar Intī.109 If we follow this argument, we are tempted to 
believe, with other researchers, that the Almohad Mahdī would have also changed his 
name, although no sources, even those most hostile to the Almohads, have made such a 
claim. 
Beyond these simple layers, the Mahdī adopted the scheme of the organisation of 
the Prophet in every detail. He emigrated from Ijīllīz of Hargha to settle permanently in 
Tīnmal, where he established his home, his mosque, and where he died. After installing 
his headquarters, he sent mubashir-s (propagandists) among the tribes and in the places 
of Almoravid authority. The letters he sent to them evoke the missives of the Prophet. 
At this stage, several symbolic acts can be counted to his credit, thus, in order to 
strengthen the tribal structure of the Almohads, the creative genius of Ibn Tūmart, once 
again, drew its sources from the history of the Prophet. The Mahdī was adopted with the 
Hargha, members of his own tribe, those of his followers who were strangers to the 
Almohad tribes. This is how ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and al-Wānshrīsī were united by the ties 
of brotherhood to the tribe of the Mahdī. The incisive words of the Mahdī have been 
taken as true statements, just like the hadiths of the Prophet; the sources attributed to 
him, even the prophecies. Finally, the military expeditions of the Almohad Mahdī were 
considered to be ghazawāt [sing. ghazwa] (a name given to the battle that is associated 
with the expansion of Muslim territory) and their dead were also considered martyrs. 
Even in his death, the Mahdī was compared to the model of the Prophet. He thus also 
has a Ḥajjat al-Wadāʿ 110and draws attention to his succession, without designating a 
successor directly. 
It is obvious that the sequence of all these imitations does not always agree with 
the true story of the Prophet. However, one feels that the Mahdī was probably sincere in 
his actions, even if his zeal sometimes led him to act violently, to the point that is far 
from the behaviour of his Model, the Prophet. Several researchers accuse the Almohad 
Mahdī of having inflicted capital punishment for minor crimes, and that it is better not 
to mention his claim to absolute impeccability.111 However, if this second point seems 
justified, the first is a far cry from reality. I believe that the information from some 
accounts, which has largely been echoed, cannot always be trusted, as there is no 
supporting evidence. For example, Ibn Abī Zarʿ’s claim concerning the alleged meeting 
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between the well-known al-Ghazālī and the Mahdī, which was echoed by a large 
audience, has been widely challenged by researchers.112  
The obsession to build a state according to the prophetic model, or what can be 
considered to be a return to sources, did not prevent Ibn Tūmart from appropriating 
Berber socio-political traditions. For R. Montagne, the Almohad councils of the Ten and 
the Fifty were wisely similar to the tribal assemblies commonly referred to as Ait Rabin 
and al-Jamāʿa. They were selected, as the two Almohad institutions, from the images of 
mezwār-s (a sort of official or notable) from which it is often difficult to define their 
political and social roles. It would also be very interesting to see how far the Almohad 
Mahdī succeeded in making some of the Berber customs into the real political 
processes. The failure to invite somebody to communal meals, called asmās, means the 
rejection of an undesirable member from the tribe.113  
Having scrutinised the administrative and hierarchical system that was designed 
by Ibn Tūmart, our next task is to analyse the reforms in government practice that were 
implemented by his successor, Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. These reforms were to have 
considerable impact on the structures of government that were introduced to al-Andalus. 
2. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s Political Reform  
We must distinguish between the two phases in the Almohads’ political trajectory 
following the death of al-Mahdī. The first involved the founding of the State, which 
may be considered a continuation of the political legacy of Ibn Tūmart, as ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin, his successor, continued the war with the Almoravids, and succeeded in 
bringing down their state. The second phase involved building the Empire and its 
organisations, when, at the beginning of this phase, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin transferred power 
to his family. The two phases are quite distinct and, hence, the organisational forms that 
were suitable for the first were not necessarily so for the second. It is therefore quite 
natural that the hierarchy developed by Ibn Tūmart would change in both its structure 
and function. 
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2.1 The Almohad Council of Sheikh-s 
After the death of al-Mahdī, there was hardly any mention of Ahl al-Jamāʿa or Ahl al-
Khamsīn in practice, only the matter of their pledge of loyalty to ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.114 
Did ʿAbd al-Muʾmin therefore dissolve these institutional bodies after taking power? 
Essentially, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin faced extremely difficult and challenging conditions. 
After al-Mahdī’s death, the Almohads experienced great turmoil as they disputed over 
his successor.115 In addition, they faced fierce campaigns by Almoravids. Hence, ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin had to confront both the internal weakness and the external threat. He chose 
to focus his attention on fighting the Almoravids, until he succeeded in destroying them. 
He was then confronted by the rebellion of the Berber tribes, who had been impressed 
by the Almohads’ victory and attempted to emulate it. In addition, he had to contend 
with the influence and power that was wielded through the sayings of Ibn Tūmart by the 
remaining Ahl al-Jamāʿa. For instance, Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr b. Yakīt had killed 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s brother, Ibrāhīm, and ʿAbd al-Muʾmin wished to kill him for that. 
However, the Sheikh ʿUmar al-Hantātī, and Abū al-Ḥasan Yūkūt b. Wākāk prevented 
him from doing so, as Muḥammad was the son of one of the Ahl al-Jamāʿa, arguing that 
the Mahdī had said: “Ahl al-Jamāʿa and their children have everyone in the world as 
their slaves”.116 In this context, until 1148 the circumstances faced by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
required all of the Almohads’ efforts in order to remain unified. It is therefore unlikely 
that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin would seek to disband both Ahl al-Jamāʿa and Ahl al-Khamsīn at 
this critical stage, especially since he did not belong to the Maṣmūda tribe, who were 
the backbone of the revolution that had not yet achieved its aims. 
In this period, the remaining members of both bodies were assigned to the high 
posts in the movement. There were military leaders, like ʿUmar al-Ṣanhājī, ʿUmar al-
Hantātī, Yūsuf b. Sulaymān, Yūsuf b. Wānūdīn, Ibn Zijjū, Ibn Yūmūr, and Yakhluf.117 
There were also governors, who administered conquered territory, such as Sulaymān b. 
Wānūdīn of Tlemcen, Yūsuf b. Makhlūf of Ceuta, ʿAbd al-Waḥid al-Sharqī of Salé and, 
finally, Mūsā b. Sulaymān, who was appointed as the governor of Tīnmal.118 However, 
we cannot say that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin maintained these two bodies in the form that had 
been established by al-Mahdī. Indeed, had he not changed them, then all the sources 
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would not have been devoid of their mention. Perhaps, he may have selected a 
consultative group from the members of both bodies while gathering the remaining 
members for general consultation, such as the Almohad Sheikh-s. However, he excluded 
all those who had opposed him, or who had plotted to seize power. His status as an 
outsider among the Maṣmūda tribe required devious diplomacy to achieve his aims. 
This required him to approach matters using gradual steps, in order to pave the way for 
his family to inherit power after him. It is most likely, therefore, that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
was striving to strip both bodies of their power so as to prevent them from challenging 
his leadership or disputing his authority, following a gradual course towards that. 
Hence, while he did not support the continuation of these bodies, he protected the status 
of their members. His approach was to neglect the organisational form, while taking 
good care of individual members, thus dissuading them from uniting against him. This 
change in ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s policy in relation to the bodies created by the Mahdī, 
perhaps sheds light on the 1133 rebellion by Ibn Malwiyya, one of the Ahl al-Jamāʿa.119 
In this way, one can understand the silence of sources about these two bodies, on 
the one hand, while on the other, one can find an explanation for the prominence of the 
body that appeared immediately after the conquest of Marrakesh, as mentioned 
repeatedly by the sources, namely the Almohad Sheikh Assembly. These Sheikh-s 
carried many of the burdens that were previously the responsibility of Ahl al-Jamāʿa 
and Ahl al-Khamsīn, which reinforces the notion that it replaced them. The role of the 
Sheikh-s was consultative in the first instance, and the Caliphs would not declare, or 
prepare for, war, nor would they engage in battles except after consulting them. In the 
majority of cases, the Caliphs would adhere to their advice.120 
When, in 1156, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin appointed his sons as governors, or to sensitive 
posts, he chose some Sheikh-s to act as their advisers.121 In this context, some sheikh-s 
occupied higher executive posts that were close to the Sayyid-s, like the sons of ʿUmar 
al-Hantātī, and of Ibn Jāmaʿ122, and some worked as governors, such as ʿUmar al-
Hantātī and Yūsuf b. Sulaymān123, and others as military commanders.124 
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Since the days of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, the status of Almohad Sheikh-s was quite 
eminent. Indeed, they were at the highest level in Almohad society, supreme over all 
others.125 ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s sons, who were in charge of the provinces, would send 
them regular reports about their regions.126 In the context of the State’s prosperity, and 
the strength of the Caliph’s personality, the Sheikh-s found the opportunity to impose 
authority, yet not to the point of having a monopoly on power. It seems that approval by 
the Sheikh-s was a factor in the choice of who assumed power as Caliph in that phase in 
the State’s evolution. Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, commenting on the victories of Yūsuf b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin over Ibn Hamushk, stated: “This was the reason he became Caliph, as he 
had won the favour of Almohad Sheikh-s”.127 
The tribes of these Sheikh-s were the first to adopt and promulgate the Mahdī’s 
cause. In their loyalty to the early Caliphs, the sons of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin were 
unquestionable, and so they attained great standing and were able to control State assets. 
Such was their power that al-Nāṣir feared that they would overthrow him at first chance, 
and he had many of them massacred before the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa.128 For 
ʿIzz al-Dīn Mūsā, this was one of the causes of defeat in that battle.129 However, this 
tragic event did not affect their power and, following al-Nāṣir’s death, with the 
weakness of his successors, the Sheikh-s once more resumed their controlling influence 
and soon all the Empire major matters were dealt with through their decisions 130, 
Perhaps these circumstances were the main reason that prompted the Caliph al-Maʾmūn 
to cancel all of the Empire’s taxes, as well as the concept of the Mahdī, in an attempt to 
destroy their power base and to contain their far-reaching authority. 
In conclusion, by going through all the information available in the sources 
relating to this category, the following points are worth mentioning: 
First, not all the Sheikh-s were at the same level of prestige. The sons of Ahl al-
Jamāʿa and Ahl al-Khamsīn were more distinguished than all the other Almohads’ 
children.131 This corroborates our earlier conclusion that the Sheikh category was a 
continuation of the early Almohad councils. 
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Second, the majority of the names of the Almohad Sheikh-s indicated that they 
were from Hantāta and the people of Tīnmal. Their strong representation in Ahl al-
Khamsīn seems to have led ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to align himself with them, and so, when 
he came to power, he mainly depended on them. 
Third, there were no names from the Hargha tribe among the Almohad Sheikh-s, 
and it is clear that the attempt by the Mahdī’s two brothers to rise against ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin forced him to expel the Hargha Sheikh-s from prominent positions in the 
Empire. However, the Hargha tribe remained at the forefront of all of the Almohad 
tribes in the ceremonies and official events, as they were the Mahdī’s tribe. 
Fourth, among the Almohad Sheikh-s, men from other than the six tribes on which 
the movement had been based were included. In particular, the Kūmīya tribe, from 
which ʿAbd al-Muʾmin was descended. 
From these facts, it becomes clear that the idea of inheritance in the matter of the 
Caliphate was paralleled by the inheritance of select posts within the Empire, which is 
best depicted in the distinction of the children of ahl al-Jamāʿa and ahl al-Khamsīn. 
However, political events affected the positions of the tribes; those who were allied to 
the Banū ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, steadily rose, while the position of those who opposed him 
declined. However, the new body that included representatives of the tribes for the 
purpose of consultation was much more inclusive of those tribes that had embraced the 
movement later, and had shown loyalty to Banū ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. It seems that the 
composition of the new body aimed to include other than the Maṣmūda in consultations. 
Hence, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin turned his back on the first Council, because it was linked 
through its representatives to the Maṣmūda in the majority. Mūsā and Buresi agreed that 
the transition from the old to the new body took place extremely slowly and gradually, 
which most likely led to the chroniclers failing to note this132. It is highly likely that this 
slow gradual process was due to the strange situation in which ʿAbd al-Muʾmin found 
himself. Indeed, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin was an outsider to the society that he ruled and this 
subsequently led him to bring his tribe to al-Maghreb. Due to this situation, he was not 
hasty in taking and executing decisions, which he would do following clever diplomacy, 
but without displaying weakness. This diplomacy and his graded approach prevented 
the occurrence of a violent reaction to these changes. 
The Khamsīn Council was appropriate for the circumstances of the Almohads in 
the early stages of the movement. At that time, the tribes were few; they were blood 
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relations, and lived in a small geographical territory. However, following their victory, 
and the establishment of their Empire, the Almohads annexed a vast territory, on which 
diverse tribes lived. It was therefore necessary for those in power to undertake 
appropriate change in these new circumstances, and so creating the category of the 
Almohad Sheikh-s was the most appropriate action for the time; indeed, it was neither 
limited by number nor restricted by type. The existence of this body encouraged the 
formation of other similar consultative bodies, such as the Arab Sheikh-s and the 
Andalusi Sheikh-s. These two bodies were mentioned during war operations and will be 
treated in detail in the discussion of the political system. 
While the Khamsīn council evolved into the new body, the Ahl al-Jamāʿa was an 
executive body, which became redundant after the State was established and was 
organised around the Caliphs. The different administrative units (Dīwān-s) supervised 
the execution of instructions emanating from the political authority, i.e., the Caliph. 
From here, the differences between the formations of the Almohads, as a cause, and the 
organisation of the State, became quite clear. However, these formations continued to 
assure the supply of qualified men to carry the burdens of State office. 
2.2 The Ṭalaba (the Students) 
We have discussed how the conditions that followed al-Mahdī’s death impacted on the 
executive and consultative bodies of the Almohads. However, did these conditions 
affect the body that was tasked with propagating the Almohad cause, namely the 
Ṭalaba? 
Initially, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin continued the Mahdī’s policy, and sent the ṭalaba to 
invite the tribes to join the cause.133 Otherwise, sources do not mention them from the 
first part of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s rule until the conquest of Marrakech. After this date, 
primary information is available on the role of the ṭalaba, especially in official 
dispatches. Among the most important messages in this regard is the letter sent by ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin to the ṭalaba in Andalus in 1148, which seems to be a circular letter sent to 
every part of the Almohad Empire.134 ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s letter explained the role of the 
ṭalaba in undertaking the educational, administrative and military duties, as well as 
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judicial responsibilities, in terms of commanding good and forbidding evil (al-Amr bi-l-
Maʿrūf wa-l-nahiy ʿan al-Munkar). There is no doubt that this represented a substantial 
change in the role of the ṭalaba following the establishment of the State, if compared to 
the time of al-Mahdī. This expansion in the responsibilities of the ṭalaba is basically a 
natural progression in the transition from a state of revolution to becoming a wide 
empire with a huge network of political, administrative and judicial institutions. 
However, one must not exaggerate when describing these responsibilities, many of 
which were quite minor, where many of the Ahl al-Jamāʿa and Ahl al-khamsīn, had 
taken prime leadership responsibilities, administrative and military ones, as was 
previously mentioned. These were reduced after ʿAbd al-Muʾmin made rule hereditary 
within his family line. The available information describes the role of the ṭalaba, mainly 
in the military sphere, as evidenced by the names of the ṭalaba who appear in the 
military lists for the deceased.135 
In addition, corroborating accounts describe their responsibilities in the army and 
navy. The ṭalaba would participate in leading troops in their area;136 furthermore, if the 
Caliphs wished to mount a military campaign in any region, they would consult the 
ṭalaba of that area. Indeed, whenever they sent a commander/leader from the capital, 
they would ask the ṭalaba of the area to cooperate with him; 137 sometimes, they would 
consult with them regarding installations of a military nature. In this regard, ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin involved the ṭalaba of Granada and Seville in the committee that he tasked 
with supervising the construction of Jabal al-Fataḥ as a base for military operations in 
Andalus.138However, being asked to participate in leading the army did not necessarily 
mean that the ṭalaba formed the high command. In each province, the top commander 
was the governor, but he would, at times, delegate the command of some campaigns to 
them.139 The commander of a military campaign was typically appointed by the capital 
(al-Haḍrah), while command of a secondary campaign might be delegated to some 
ṭalaba.140 Furthermore, the ṭalaba played a greater role in the supervision of naval 
forces, when compared to the army. The ṭalaba were in charge of preparing and leading 
naval forces, and were known as the fleet ṭalaba.141 
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The only indication that we find regarding administrative duties by the ṭalaba, 
after ʿAbd al-Muʾmin appointed his son as heir, was al-Manṣūr’s appointment of the 
ṭalaba to administer Gafsa after it was retaken 142  (583H/1187), which might be 
considered a general indication, even though such matters may have been of a military 
nature. There is an important objection to the conclusion that the ṭalaba were given 
wider authority following the announcement of hereditary rule. It may be said that the 
letters sent by the Caliphs during the period of renaissance and prosperity were directed 
to the ṭalaba, and these letters included state policy in diverse areas, including military 
matters. So, how can the former conclusion be correct, in light of these letters? 
In order to respond to this point, two matters need to be clarified: 
First, a greater number of letters relating to administrative matters was sent in the period 
prior to hereditary rule. In the subsequent period, the majority of letters revolved around 
announcing a military victory, ending a revolt, issuing a general directive, or 
encouraging the commanding of good (amr bi-l-maʿrūf) and the prohibition of evil 
(nahy ʿan al-munkar). Second, the letters were not exclusively directed to the ṭalaba, 
but also to the Sheikh-s, local notables, and the public. The ṭalaba were key recipients, 
perhaps, due to the knowledge gained from the time of al-Mahdī. 
From this, we can conclude that the majority of letters was aimed at advertising 
specific affairs of state, focusing on amr bi-l-maʿrūf or nahy ʿan al-munkar. The ṭalaba 
were the key recipients, indicating that it is highly probable that, alongside their military 
tasks, they publicised the State’s works, and performed the duties of amr bi-l-maʿrūf or 
nahy ʿan al-munkar. Our conclusion is supported by the fact that the ḥuffāẓ were not 
mentioned – as far as we know – among those who were sent such letters. Accounts 
have indicated that the ṭalaba and ḥuffāẓ co-existed, which means that the existence of 
the ṭalaba did not stop the establishment of the ḥuffāẓ, who assumed the prime 
administrative role, and higher military leadership, while the ṭalaba performed the 
secondary responsibilities. After hereditary rule was announced, many top 
responsibilities were taken on by a new breed of the ṭalaba, formed of the ḥuffāẓ and the 
Ḥaḍar ṭalaba. 
2.3 The Ḥuffāẓ 
Accounts do not mention the date on which this body was established, but we are able 
to determine this with some certainty. It was reported that the sons of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
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were among these ḥuffaẓ, and when they completed their studies their father granted 
them executive posts.143 This was in May 1156,144 and the length of time dedicated to 
studies was six months;145 therefore, the date on which this body was launched was 
1155, at the latest estimates. 
Along with ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s sons, the children of Ahl al-Jamāʿa, Ahl al-
Khamsīn, and Ahl al-Dār were also represented in the body of ḥuffāẓ, as indicated by 
later accounts.146 Furthermore, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin selected intelligent children from cities 
like Seville, Córdoba, Fez, and Tlemecen. 147  He managed to gather around three 
thousand boys;148 indeed, there were 50 boys from Seville alone.149 
The author of the Kitāb al-Ansāb restricted the ḥuffāẓ to the early Almohad 
tribes;150 however, the author of al-Ḥulal al-Mūshiyya, whose account is more extensive 
than others on this topic, mentions that these boys were from the Maṣmūda and other 
tribes.151 This is corroborated by the names of a number of ḥuffāẓ from the other tribes. 
They took up the duties given to the ḥuffāẓ, such as ruling over parts of some provinces, 
with particular mention of the Kumīyah (ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s tribe).152 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin ensured that these boys were of the same young age, enabling them to 
quickly memorise the texts, and also to easily build their character. As such, it was as 
though they had all been born on the same night.153 Furthermore, as educators, he chose 
from the best scholars in the land, qāḍī-s, ṭalaba, kuttāb, and poets.154 He personally 
supervised the boys’ education, and sat with them every Friday.155 
A balanced syllabus that combined theory and practice was designed for them. 
They studied publications by al-Mahdī in the areas of the creed (Tawḥīd), jurisprudence 
(Fiqh), the Koran, and the Ḥadīth.156 Aschbach’s study reveals that they also read from 
several books on provincial administration.157 In terms of physical training, there was a 
day for riding, another for archery, and another for swimming in the lake prepared for 
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ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, outside his farm estate.158 Indeed, they also learned to handle purpose-
built rowing boats on that lake. All the cost incurred was directly paid by ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin.159 
It is clear from this educational syllabus that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin wanted to build 
men with a good grasp of the fundamental concepts underpinning the Almohad cause, 
and who were qualified to take up the higher positions in the civil administration, the 
army and navy. Subsequently, he retired Maṣmūda Sheikh-s from leadership positions, 
but retained them as advisers and consultants, and appointed these ḥuffāẓ in their place. 
The ḥuffāẓ are therefore mentioned as forming the military leadership, 160  being in 
charge of the provinces161 or of smaller areas,162 in the different phases of the Almohad 
state. We may then safely ignore Ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s account, which stated that the ṭalaba 
from Seville returned to their parents,163 unless this was a temporary event, or perhaps 
the initial number was greater than could be absorbed by the State’s needs, and they 
were perhaps employed at a later date. 
From the responsibilities assigned to these ḥuffāẓ, it is clear that those who 
designated them as the ‘young’ ṭalaba164 were perhaps alluding to their beginnings, 
rather than to their positions in the State hierarchy. Regardless of the name, ‘young’ 
ṭalaba does somehow convey the sense that these ḥuffāẓ were lower in rank than the 
ṭalaba, while the reality was quite the opposite. It is likely that the word, ‘Ḥāfiẓ’, was 
used to designate those who had memorised both Ibn Tūmart’s Mūwaṭṭaʾ and his 
doctrine.165 
By establishing the body of ḥuffāẓ, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin aimed to pave the way for his 
sons to inherit his power, and for placing those he trusted in positions of authority. This 
is a radical change in policy, and a large change that affects posts within the Almohad 
formations. So, what were his motives?  
It is clear from the history of the establishment of the body of ḥuffāẓ that this 
came after announcement of hereditary rule, and the rebellion by al-Mahdī’s brothers. 
The event indicates that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin aimed to bring fundamental change to the 
State administration. As such, he first addressed the Almohad formations, and created a 
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generation with exclusive loyalty to him. However, so as not to rouse the anger of 
leading Almohads, he chose to include their sons in the body of the ḥuffāẓ. It seems that 
the corruption of some Almohad elements provided ʿAbd al-Muʾmin with the 
opportunity to justify his actions. Indeed, he pointed to this corruption in the previously 
mentioned message to the ṭalaba of Andalus, where he says: “and we have been 
informed… that those who fear not Allāh… inflict their base desires on wealth and 
souls… and trespass on the sanctities of Muslims without justified right, and rush to 
subvert the Sharīah…”.166 
Hence, given the change in political conditions, the Almohad formations changed 
accordingly. While the Almohad Sheikh Council was based on inheritance, such that the 
children of the prime Sheikh-s would take their place, we do not know the state of the 
ṭalaba, who occupy the lower ranking positions after the appearance of the ḥuffāẓ. 
Regarding the ḥuffāẓ, it is clear from their constituent groups that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin took 
account of two factors: inheritance and qualifications. Inheritance, in the case of his 
own children, and the children of Ahl al-Jamāʿa, Ahl al-Khamsīn, and Ahl al-Dār; and 
qualifications, in the case of the intelligent children selected from the different 
provinces. Indeed, we do not know if new generations of the ḥuffāẓ were raised, and 
hence, it is highly likely that the children of the ḥuffāẓ inherited the positions that were 
occupied by their fathers, who had passed away. 
2.4 The Ḥaḍar Ṭalaba 
Not only were the scope of the tasks of the ṭalaba curtailed by the establishment of the 
body of the ḥuffāẓ, but it seems that the role of knowledge carriers was passed to a new 
element shortly after the conquest of Marrakesh. 
Once matters were firmly in the hands of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, he went about inviting 
scholars in every realm of knowledge, and they travelled to his court: scholars, jurists, 
poets, philosophers, and orators, and settled there. In order to distinguish them from the 
Almohad ṭalaba, they were called ḥaḍar ṭalaba. His successors followed his 
example167, and were keen to develop this new body, which seems to be one of the 
features of the ruler’s court. The beginning of the ḥaḍar ṭalaba was humble, and their 
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status low, although they were neither integrated into the State systems, nor into the 
party ranks; Ibn Qaṭṭān mentions in the noble attributes of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin that:  
‘… he sensed the weakness of the ṭalaba in his august council in the ḥaḍar ṭalaba, 
like Abū Muḥammad al-Māliqī, and others, and so said to the Almohad Sheikh-s, 
may Allāh venerate them, that these Ṭalaba are strangers and weak, and their 
limited means apparent, and so I see that we give them money, as a loan, with 
which they may engage in trade, and repay the loan to us. They said yes; and so 
he gave them money from the treasury; 1000 Dinar each, from which they 
profited, and this was the foundation of their wealth’.168  
However, this situation began to change over time, and the work of these ṭalaba 
expanded, once they had adopted the tawḥīd as their path, and they became part of the 
Caliph’s circle, in their study encounters and supervised teaching and dissemination of 
knowledge, especially in relation to tawḥīd, according to Ibn Tūmart.169 They were 
given the task of defending Ibn Tūmart’s tawḥīd creed, and, indeed, the ḥaḍar ṭalaba 
were the ones who levelled accusations at Ibn Rushd, the grandson, in the Córdoba 
Mosque, and who declared publicly that he was an apostate.170 In addition, they gave 
speeches on special occasions, like visits, or making or renewing the pledge of 
loyalty.171 
These ṭalaba were highly organised, and at the top of their hierarchy was their 
Sheikh, or Muzwār, who was the link between them and the Caliph.172 It is likely that 
the ḥaḍar ṭalaba were divided into levels of Sheikh-s and commoners. Ibn Ṣāḥib al-
Ṣalāt perhaps indicated this, speaking of the caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf: “he brought the 
Sheikh-s of the ḥaḍar ṭalaba closer to him”.173 Indeed, they may have had a private 
meeting place in which to examine newly arrived scholars.174 
The ḥaḍar ṭalaba gained high standing in the State, and the Caliphs lavished abundant 
money and gifts on them,175 which roused the envy of the Almohads, until al-Manṣūr 
said:  
‘O’ Muwaḥḥidūn, you are tribes, and if one of you is afflicted by any problem, 
then he turns to his tribe; but these – meaning the Ṭalaba – have no tribe, but me; 
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whatever problem they face, then I am their sanctuary, and relief; and to me they 
belong’. 
Al-Marrākushī commented: ‘… and since that day, they enjoyed great prestige, with 
Almohads expansively honouring and caring for them’.176 
This text is of great importance, as it clarifies that the ḥaḍar ṭalaba did not come from 
the Almohads, and while their organisation began in the days of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, their 
influence became extensive in the time of his successors, at which point the Almohads 
began to fear them, and complained accordingly. 
The high standing of this new body is evidenced by the honour and hospitality 
received by the elders of the ḥaḍar ṭalaba. Indeed, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ishbīlī was always 
the first person admitted to the audience of Yūsuf, and the last to leave, while 
interceding on behalf of strangers and ṭalaba.177 His successor, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd 
Allāh al-Māliqī, acted as Vizier and Amīn to Yūsuf. 178 The Sheikh of the ḥaḍar ṭalaba 
would sometimes attend committees that were examining corrupt ʿAmmāl.179 
The author of Kitāb al-Ansāb, reports that al-Nāṣir removed the requirement for 
Almohad ṭalaba to bear arms; 180  and he distinguishes between ṭalaba from the 
Almohads and ṭalaba from the Maṣmūda tribe in his narration. In his terminology, 
Almohad ṭalaba mean nobody other than the ḥaḍar ṭalaba. This narration indicates that 
the ḥaḍar ṭalaba worked in the military, alongside their role of imparting knowledge. 
However, participation in the military was lifted in the days of al-Nāṣir, and so they 
were dedicated exclusively to the realms of knowledge. 
The formation of this body represents the most authentic example of the attempt 
by the Almohads to change their formations to suit the new and changing reality. From 
the beginning, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin attempted to include scholars other than Almohads, in 
order to raise the status of his State in peoples’ hearts; especially since scholars enjoyed 
great esteem in society, especially in Andalus.181 With time, they were integrated into 
the Almohad formations, as they were qualified by the knowledge they carried; indeed, 
knowledge was a vital pillar of the Almohad cause and the State. 
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2.5 The Position of Non-Almohads 
The plan to integrate scholars who were not Almohads in the administration placed the 
relationship of Almohads with others under the spotlight. The question being: what was 
their position? 
The relationship of the Almohads with others in Ibn Tūmart’s days was one of 
hostility and war. This changed following the establishment of the State. Those people 
subjected to the Almohad rule, who did not oppose the ideas of Ibn Tūmart, at least not 
publicly, were taken on in the state hierarchy and not in the Almohads’ formations. 
Indeed, some of them were appointed in military leadership positions, like Ibn Khiyār 
al-Jīyanī, Ibrāhīm b. Burāz al-Masūfī, Zīrī b. Makhūkh al-Zanātī, 182  Yūsuf b. 
Mardanīsh, Ibn Hamshak, Ibn ʿAzūn,183and the Sheikh-s of the Arabs of the Hīlāl 
tribe.184 Some of them undertook administrative affairs, like the sons of Ibn Mardanish, 
al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī (of Mahdia), and ʿAlī b. al-Rand in Qafsa.185 It is clear that all of them 
enjoyed high standing in their society before the arrival of the Almohads, and hence 
their integration into the State system was to win them over, on the one hand, and also 
to benefit from their experience, on the other. In this case, considering the positive 
benefits drove Almohad policy in this direction, and this was the motive for change. 
The change that came to the concept of “Tawḥīd”, following the conquest of 
Marrakesh, helped to integrate those persons who submitted to the authority of the 
Almohad State. The concept of Tawḥīd was purely religious at the beginning, yet it 
became a political term after the founding of the State. The Caliphs, from the time of 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, considered that submission to the authority of the State was 
“Tawḥīd”,186 while rebelling against the Caliph represented a rejection of “Tawḥīd”.187 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin explained this new concept in a message he sent to the provinces in 
1148, in which he instructed the Ṭalaba and the Sheikh-s:  
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‘… and know - Allāh protects you - that those included by the word of Tawḥīd in 
the past or present regime, occupy the same area of right to justice, and you are 
accountable for all of them… the term, Almohads, includes us and them’.188 
This new concept was accompanied by a re-structuring of the entire Almohad class 
hierarchy. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin divided them into three classes; first, the early pioneers who 
had pledged their loyalty to the Imam al-Mahdī, accompanied and fought with him, 
living to the time of his successors, and participating in the event at al-Buḥīrah; second, 
those who joined the cause after the event at al-Buḥīrah and before the conquest of Oran 
in 1145; third, all those who joined after that.189 We note that this new hierarchy seemed 
to follow the example of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, when he assumed the Caliphate and 
divided the Muslims into levels according to their precedence in Islam. 
The state of Ahl al-Dhimma, i.e., the Jews and Christians, was worse than ever. 
They faced great oppression and restriction, and since their status was not recognised by 
the Almohads, they were forced to profess Islam,190 which in most cases did not serve 
them. It is reported that al-Manṣūr was suspicious of Jewish converts to Islam, and 
made them wear distinctive clothing. Al-Nāṣir refused to cancel this instruction, but 
merely changed it. 191  This position vis-à-vis Ahl al-Dhimma explains their 
responsiveness to al-Maʾmūn, who cancelled the Mahdī’s taxes, and was followed by 
his son, al-Saʿīd, in the early days.192 Despite all this, the Almohads still employed non-
Muslim soldiers, given the State need. 
The position of the Almohads, as opposed to others, was not fixed, and witnessed 
constant change in specific cases and in response to the developments in conditions and 
events. This confirms our conclusion regarding the flexibility of the Almohads in rising 
to the demands relating to different circumstances. 
2.6 Education at that Time 
The spirit instilled by al-Mahdī into his followers did not diminish overnight, and the 
insurrection after his death was only a temporary event, while the Almohads continued 
along their primary path. Ibn ʿIdhārī reports on their situation under ʿAbd al-Muʾmin: 
‘The man would fight… his father and brother within his household, if they were 
slow to follow al-Mahdī; each would declare the other an apostate’.193 
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ʿAbd al-Muʾmin continued to execute the plan of his mentor, al-Mahdī, and 
conscientiously respected his legacy. After the conquest of Marrakesh, he called 
together the Almohad tribes and spoke to them, somewhat harshly, on the issue of 
knowledge, Tawhid, and the practice of religious obligations.194 Indeed, he established 
an educational system for all the peoples in his State195and refused to accept anything 
less than the first chapter of Koran, i.e., the Sūra of al-Fātiḥa, and other Sūra-s, the 
study and memorising of the al-Murshidah (the “spiritual guide”, one of Ibn Tūmart’s 
texts on the creed), and emphasised the performance of ritual obligations. His 
successors followed in his footsteps, and it would seem that this policy continued until 
the days of Yūsuf al-Mustanṣir, the fifth of the Almohad Caliphs in the Maghreb, who 
issued a directive in March 1220, urging the commanding of good and the forbidding of 
evil, and encouraging the common people to go to the mosques, read a portion of the 
Koran daily, and study the Tawhīd in mosques and markets.196 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, in his education and the formations of the Almohads, took 
account of the roles that were to be performed by the learner, and those things he 
specified for the common people differed from what he required of the élite.197 The 
formation programme he established for the ḥuffāẓ - presented previously - is good 
evidence of this approach. The main policy approach that was adopted by ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin centred on the concept of specialisation, and, as such, the formation of a 
suitable cadre followed this approach. In the same way that he established a school for 
the ḥuffāẓ, in order to turn out senior administrators and leaders, he also established a 
school in Rabat to qualify leaders for the naval fleet.198 Perhaps this trend towards 
specialisation had begun in the time of al-Mahdī, but with ʿAbd al-Muʾmin it was quite 
prominent, given the complex problems and circumstances of the State. 
We mentioned that the foundation of the Almohads was fundamentally based on 
emotional isolation or detachment, and no doubt this isolation weakened progressively 
following the founding of the State, since this isolation at the beginning was that of a 
minority in a “sea” of enemies. However, following the founding of the State, the 
Almohads were now the rulers over the new society. Gradually, this emotional and 
spiritual isolation began to recede, due to the effects of time, civilisation, and openness 
to others. Beliefs began to lose strength, while doubts began to creep into hearts. This 
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occurred in the higher echelons of the State; indeed, al-Manṣūr disclosed to his 
confidantes that he doubted the concept of the infallible Imām (‘Iṣma). If this was the 
case with the Caliph, then what about the common people? 
Weak belief in the idea was the driver of all the events during the phase of 
decline. In this phase, party formations and ruling regimes were weakened. This linkage 
between the weakened faith in the idea in the hearts of followers, and the perturbations 
in organisations and regimes, is one of the key phenomena of the period of decline. This 
confirms the intimate relationship between the capability of an organisation and the type 
of person. 
2.7 Consultative Councils 
During the phase of prosperity, the Caliphs wielded extensive powers relating to the 
religious and the earthly. However, they still consulted special bodies on specific 
matters. We have seen how consultative bodies were formed in al-Mahdī’s time, and 
how these acquired greater importance after his death, to the point of rousing ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin’s fears, and so he set about changing the Almohad formations, replacing them 
with a new body: the Almohad Sheikh Council. He formed this body from the early 
adopters of the Almohad cause, and added other individuals, particularly from his tribe, 
the Kūmīyah. 
As the Almohad State expanded, new elements were integrated into the Empire 
apparatus by ‘Abd al Muʾmin, and two other consultative bodies appeared, namely the 
Council of Arab Sheikh-s and the Council of al-Andalus Sheikh-s. During the time of 
Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, a fourth body was formed from the Sayyid-s, ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin’s male line. 
2.7.1 The Arab and Andalusi Sheikh-s 
The Council of the Almohad Sheikh-s consisted of the leaders of the tribes, which had 
adopted the Almohad cause at the very beginning, in addition to the leaders of the 
Kumīyah, Haskūra, and Sinhājah. Their children subsequently inherited their places. 
The Arab Sheikh Council was formed of the leaders of the Banū Hilāl tribes that had 
accepted the Almohad belief. Typically, the leadership position of the tribes was 
hereditary within a specific family. There is no indication that the first Almohad caliphs 
intervened in the selection of the leaders of these tribes. However, during the period of 
decline, that choice is largely dependent on the caliphs, who played the card of 
obedience and submission. On the contrary, when sovereigns lost their authority, the 
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Arab tribes would impose their own law, and the choice of the qabīlah’s leader will be 
made internally by its members.199 As for the sheikh-s of al-Andalus, or those which the 
sources commonly refer to as Qūwād al-Andalus, this body was formed from the former 
notables and leaders of al-Andalus who had joined the Almohad call very early on, such 
as Ibn ʿAzzūn of Jerez, Ibn al-Ḥajjām of Badajoz, Yūsuf al-Baṭrūjī of Niebla, Abū 
Muḥammad b. Wazīr of Beja, and Yūsuf b. Mardanīsh of Valencia.200 
These bodies were only consulted on military matters, usually each body was 
consulted separately,201 but sometimes with all four present.202 Typically, the Caliphs 
would implement their advice.203 Indeed, the power and jurisdiction of each of these 
bodies differed. For instance, the Andalus Sheikh Council was only consulted on 
matters relating to al-Andalus, while the Arab Sheikh-s were consulted on all of the 
military affairs in which they were involved, and on which they had previously been 
consulted. 
There is no available evidence to indicate that these two latter bodies were in 
continuous existence, compared to the Almohad Sheikh-s and the Sayyid-s, which were 
in constant existence. Moreover, the remit of these two bodies went beyond military 
affairs. We have previously indicated that the approval of the Almohad sheikh-s was 
necessary for the pledge (bayʿa) to be given to the Caliph, from the time that the state 
was founded until its downfall. They also deal with issues of security, 204 
administration, 205  and public funds. 206  The Almohad Sheikh-s participated quite 
effectively in the State administration, and from the time that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
appointed his sons as governors, he sent with them some of these Sheikh-s, both as 
advisers and as scholars. 207  This became a tradition that was followed by his 
successors.208 
The continuous existence of the Almohad Sheikh Assembly is also evidenced by 
the fact that the Caliphs chose a leader or head for these Sheikh-s, who was to act as the 
link with the Caliph. Indeed, this leader represented the Sheikh-s in the private pledge of 
allegiance. Mūsā suggests the possibility that the post was created by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
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prior to the conquest of Marrakesh, and ʿUmar Aṣnāj was the first Almohad Sheikh who 
held this position. Yet it became official after the State was established and it was 
seized by ʿUmar al-Hantātī during the rule of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, and then of Yūsuf.209 
ʿUmar al-Hantātī was succeeded by his son, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Waḥid, who 
stayed in this post during the time of al-Manṣūr, and also of al-Nāṣir,210 who, in 1206, 
appointed him as governor of Ifrīqiya, with exceptional powers to quell the rebellion by 
the Majorcans, and their Arab and A’zaz allies in that area.211 Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-
Wahid was succeeded by three persons, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-‘Azīz b. ʿUmar b. 
Abū Zayd al-Hantātī, Abū ‘Alī ʿUmar b. Mūsā b. ʿAbd al-Waḥid al-Sharqī, and Abū 
Marwān ʿAbd al-Malik b. Yūsuf b. Sulaymān from Tīnmal. They were the ones who 
gave the special pledge of allegiance to al-Mustanṣir on behalf of all of the Almohad 
Sheikh-s.212 When al-Maʾmūn cancelled the Mahdīyyah tax, this body ceased to exist, 
and when al-Rashīd restored this tax, Abū ʿUthmān Saʿīd b. Zakariyya al-Jadmawiy 
became the pre-eminent elder, as he was the first to return to al-Rashīd, and he worked 
to bring back the others.213 The leadership of the Almohad Sheikh-s at the time of the 
first three Caliphs therefore resided exclusively in the family of ʿUmar al-Hantātī and, 
subsequently, was given to anyone who captured the attention of the Caliph. In the 
phase of decline it was occupied by more than one person at a time.214 
2.7.2 The Sayyid-s, or the Almohad Princes 
As for the Sayyids’ body, they had their own meeting place, called Dār al-Qarāba.215 
Their leader was called al-Sayyid al-Aʿlā,216 and he performed the pledge of allegiance 
on their behalf. The position of al-sayyid al-aʿlā was occupied by Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin during the time of Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf.217 During the rule of al-Manṣūr, 
it was held by Abū Zayd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin,218 while, at the 
time of al-Nāṣir, it was held by two Sayyid-s, Abū Zakariyya Yaḥya b. ʿUmar b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin and Abū Mūsā ʿIsā b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, the last of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s direct 
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line of descendants.219 During the time of al-Rashīd, it was held by his uncle, the sayyid 
Abū Muḥammad Saʿd.220 It is clear that this position was, in the majority, kept within 
the family of Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. 
The two positions, al-Sayyid al-Aʿla and the leader of the Almohad Sheikh-s, were 
quite prominent, and may be considered higher than the level of Vizier, where the post 
holders would sit close to the Caliph.221 Al-Marrākushī somewhat indicates this when 
he states that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin respected the status of ʿUmar Aṣnāj, considering that it 
was higher than that of a Vizier, and so granted it to Abū Jaʿfar b. ʿAṭīya. Similarly, 
Yūsuf considered that the status of his brother, ʿUmar, was higher than that of a Vizier, 
and gave it to Ibn Jāmiʿ.222 This may be because the first was perhaps the earliest leader 
of the Almohad Sheikh-s, while the second was the first leader of the sayyid body. 
In addition to these consultative bodies, there was a higher body: the Privy 
Council (Majlis al-Khāṣṣa).223 This was consulted on the most important and sensitive 
of matters. It was formed of high-ranking Sayyid-s, Almohad Sheikh-s, the ḥaḍar 
ṭalaba, the Caliphate orator (Khaṭīb), and the qāḍī al-Jamāʿa. In times of war, others 
who would participate in campaigns were invited, such as governors and judges in the 
larger provinces, as well as the high-ranking Arab Sheikh-s. This council only appeared 
during the time of Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.224 
The role of these bodies never went beyond consultation, and it did not have 
anything to do with a say in ruling, or controlling and monopolising decision making 
during the rule of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, following the conquest of Marrakesh, or indeed, 
during the rule of Yūsuf or al-Manṣūr. During the era of al-Naṣir, and when one would 
expect that the sheikh-s would obtain more power, especially after the removal of the 
leader of the Almohad Sheikh-s: Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Ḥafṣī, from the 
scene, by convincing al-Nāṣir to appoint him as leader over Ifrīqiya, they received harsh 
penalties, and their status declined in favour of the Vizier, Ibn Jāmaʿ, who, according to 
Ibn Abī Zarʿ, was in control of the caliphate. 225 However, this situation did not last long 
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and the sheikh-s soon managed to retrieve control of affairs following the succession of 
al-Mustanṣir, who was too young.226 
Conflict among the Sheikh-s was perhaps the single most serious thing that struck 
the Almohads at the time, who were squabbling over power, control, and status. It is 
sufficient to point out that the sons of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar al-Hantātī were enemies of their 
cousins, the Banī Yawjān; each group conspired to deny the other the position of 
leadership and authority. The fifteenth-century geographer Ibn ʿAbd al-Minʿim al-
Ḥimyarī commented on this animosity, saying: ‘… and Allāh placed [such antagonism] 
between these two households as that which was between the Banī Hāshim and Banī 
Umayyah’.227 
This dispute undermined the power of the central authority, where the opponents 
did not provide sincere advice to the Caliph on matters that related to ministerial or 
military leadership appointments, nor did viziers or commanders trust the advice of their 
adversaries. This was one of the most important reasons for the massive defeat at the 
battle of al- Las Navas de Tolosa.228 Those Sheikh-s who were in command did not 
listen to the advice tendered by their opponents, which reduced the State’s effectiveness 
in confronting its enemies, both internally and externally.229 
Following the death of al-Mustanṣir, the Almohad Sheikh-s were divided into two 
disputing blocs, each wishing to seize and monopolise power, and each seeking the help 
of the Hilāl Arabs. The Hantāta, Tīnmal, and Kidmīwah tribes represented one group, 
and they allied themselves with the Arabs of Sufyān,230 while, on the other hand, there 
were the Haskūra, who were in alliance with the Arabs of al-Khult (the tribe). The 
Hantāta group therefore pledged allegiance to ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Yūsuf, Haskūra and the 
Arabs of al-Khalṭ, whosupported al-ʿĀdīl. Indeed, when Hantāta joined forces with al-
ʿĀdil, Haskūra rebelled against him, 231  killing him, and pledging allegiance to al-
Maʾmūn,232 who conquered Marrakesh through their efforts.233 When al-Rashīd changes 
his position in regard to the policy of his father, al-Maʾmūn, bringing closer to him the 
Almohad Sheikh-s from Hantāta and its allies; this was accompanied by a change in the 
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position of the Haskūra and the Arabs of al-Khalṭ, who joined forces with Yaḥyā b. al-
Nāṣir.234 
Power, in the hands of the Almohad Sheikh-s and their Arab allies, therefore led to 
a highly significant division, which ultimately led to the crumbling of the central 
authority, placing it at the mercy of this group of the other faction. They were helped to 
achieve control by the fact that the State’s core military forces were made up of their 
men, and so the Caliphs fell victim to their whims. 
It is not strange, then, that al-Maʾmūn would contemplate inviting non-Muslims to 
prop up his rule and restore his authority, cancelling the Almohad taxes, and killing the 
Almohad Sheikh-s. It would seem that acquiring greater privileges was the motive for 
the conflict between al-Maʾmūn and the Almohad Sheikh-s. Ibn ʿIdharī depicts how the 
Almohad Sheikh-s received the news of the restoration of taxes during the time of al-
Rashīd:  
‘…by Allāh, the extent of their happiness, and the depth of their satisfaction on 
hearing this; their tongues eloquent in supplication to Allāh to grant victory, help, 
and greater prestige to the Caliph; their revels included old and young, far and 
wide’.235 
However, restoring taxes and privileges did not mean that these Sheikh-s regained the 
authority that they had enjoyed during the time when the Caliphs were weak, because 
al-Rashīd kept them under surveillance, and brutally suppressed those who attempted to 
seize power, especially the Arabs.236 Al-Saʿīd followed the same policy,237 and so many 
of them fled, especially from Hantāta and Kidmīwah to the Hafsid dynasty in Tunisia.238 
Hence, the existence of these consultative bodies was not continuous. 
From the train of events, we note that the bodies that were established to provide 
advice to the strong Caliphs proceeded to monopolise control over affairs in times of 
weakness. 
Conclusion 
It is certain that Ibn Tūmart, in the construction of his state, drew from the prophetic 
model, as influenced by Berber tribal traditions, but what was its originality? With Ibn 
Tūmart, the innovation of the system managed to hold together the two traditions: the 
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prophetic and the tribal. This mixing of the two models that are described culminated 
with this excessive hierarchy. The Mahdī also demonstrates originality in the creation of 
certain categories, like those of Ṭalaba and Ḥuffāẓ, not to mention his new religious 
practices. We note that this pyramidal aspect did not escape the watchful eye of 
chroniclers, who have characterised it as being ‘strange’ (gharīb). Moreover, one 
wonders how a simple Faqīh, and in such a limited time, was able to conceive of such a 
complicated system. The reform introduced by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in this system was both 
comprehensive and effective. He opened the way for new blood to enter the political 
system, and created new institutions for young people in order to train them and prepare 
them to take on the political and administrative functions of the state in the near future. 
All of these measures would ensure the continued effectiveness and stability of the 
political machine of the state. On the other hand, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin extracted from Ibn 
Tumart’s e system its most prominent features when he adopted a hereditary system that 
gave infinite power to his family, and that killed any hope for any member of the 
political categories of access to the throne, and thus, instead of that choice, a system that 
would has been based on competence had become dependent on the blood bond. 
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2 
The Political-Administrative Organisation of  
al-Andalus 
Studying the administrative structures of Islamic governments is a very challenging 
task. Our sources do not shed enough light upon the political system’s organisation, or 
on the various political administrators’ roles and participation. This is mostly due to the 
tendencies of the writers, who seem to be interested in other issues, such as political 
events and the biographies of caliphs and writers. They barely describe the general 
features of political systems which are most often ambiguous and do not reach the 
requisite degree of detail so that we can reach conclusive results. This issue is further 
complicated when it comes to the governments of the cities and provinces that were far 
from the central authority, such as in al-Andalus. 
Regarding the Almohads, the sources provide relatively acceptable information 
about the royal family, as well as the administrative staff and executives, from which 
we can draw a clear picture of the political system in the capital. As for al-Andalus, 
sources are often either silent or they provide information that is scattered and 
confusing. Some provide the official titles of functionaries, but they very rarely explain 
their roles. Perhaps this is what has caused researchers to refrain from research in this 
field and to focus their attention on the study of the sovereign authority in Marrakech. 
Recently, a number of valuable studies have emerged that focus on regional 
governments, rather than on the central authority alone, like that of Mūsā and Buresi.1 
However, this chapter seeks to fill the gap and increase our understanding of the 
political system of the Almohads in al-Andalus by focusing on the political structures of 
its governments, their roles and influence, and how they relate to the government of the 
capital. 
                                                   
 
1 See the introduction to this thesis. See also Ramzi Rouighi, The making of a Mediterranean emirate: 
Ifriqiya and Its Andalusis, 1200-1400 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); 
Dandash, al-Andalus fī nihāyat al-Murābiṭīn wa-mustahall al-Muwaḥḥidīn; A. Bennison, ‘Power and the 
City in the Islamic West from the Umayyads to the Almohads’, in Bennison A. K. and Gascoigne, A. L. 
(eds), Cities in the Premodern Islamic World: the Urban Impact of Religion, State and Society, (London, 
2007), pp. 65-95; ʿA Ḥ. al-Sāmarrāʾī, Tārīkh ḥaḍārat al-Maghrib wa-al-Andalus (Tripoli, 2002); M. 
ʿInān, Dawlat al-Islām fī al-Andalus (Cairo, 1963). 
 98 
1. Provincial divisions 
Despite originating in the Maghrib, the administrative system of the Almohads in al-
Andalus was much more organised than the central administration of their capital, 
Marrakesh. This is mainly due to the traditions of governments that had been 
established in the region since the Arab conquest and the founding of Islamic states, 
such as the Umayyad caliphate and the Taifa Kingdoms 
Under the rule of the Muslims, and for political and administrative efficiency 
from the time of the conquest, al-Andalus had been divided into regions and provinces 
called Kūra (plural: Kūwar), corresponding roughly to Roman and Visigothic territorial 
organisations. The kūwr, in turn, were divided into minor administrative units, called 
aqālīm (kūra districts); each containing towns, villages and castles.2 In most cases, the 
name of the Kūra refers to its capital, which was usually the largest town in terms of 
size and population, for example, the Kūra of Seville, Córdoba, Tortosa and Toledo. As 
for the number of provinces, Arabic sources contain limited, and often conflicting, 
information written according to the authors' own perceptions. Al-Muqaddasī, for 
example, mentioned eighteen Kūwar in al-Andalus, but added that this list is inaccurate 
and incomplete.3 Yāqūt IbnʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥamawī (1179–1229) increased the number 
to 41 provinces. Modern research has suggested that until the eleventh century the 
number of Andalusi provinces was around 20-23 Kūwar, excluding al-Thughūr (the 
border provinces).4 However, after the end of the Taifa kingdoms and the arrival of the 
Almoravids in al-Andalus in the 1090s, the administrative divisions of the provinces 
significantly changed. Some kūwr were removed from the Muslims' control by the 
Christian advance, while others disappeared, to be integrated into different districts.5 
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The Kūra as an administrative division thus seem to be reformed so that the provinces 
of al-Andalus became fewer in number but larger in size than in the previous division. 
Recent studies have estimated that the number of administrative divisions in the 
Almoravid era reduced to only six provinces: Granada, Seville, Córdoba, Valencia, 
Murcia and Zaragoza.6 
During the era of the Almohads, the provinces of al-Andalus retained the 
administrative division that had been used by the previous Almoravid regime, with a 
few exceptions. For example, Zaragoza was lost to Christian Aragon in 1118, and the 
Almohads were unable to retrieve it.7 Málaga, which the Almoravids did not treat as an 
independent province, became a province under the jurisdiction of Ceuta and Granada at 
the beginning of the Almohad era, and later, in the reign of Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, became 
an independent province. Furthermore, the wilāyat al-gharb (The province of the West 
or Algarve)8 joined with Seville after the announcement of hereditary rule and then 
separated again during the succession of Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, to become what it had 
been at the time of the Almoravids.9 However, based on the available information, 
derived from Almohad sources and documents about the administrative divisions of al-
Andalus during the era of the Almohads, we can identify nine major provinces: 
1. The Province of Granada (including Granada, Almeria, Guadix, Almuñécar, Loja, 
and others).  
2. The Province of Seville (Seville, Jerez de la Frontera, Medina-Sidonia, Cádiz, 
Écija, Carmona, Triana, La Algaba, Aznalcázar, Lora del Río, Arcos, Osuna, 
Algeciras, Ronda, and Niebla). 
3. The Province of Córdoba (Córdoba, Baeza, and Andújar).  
4. The Province of Valencia (Valencia, Xàtiva, Denia, Sagunto, and Alcira). 
5. The Province of Murcia (Murcia, Orihuela, Alicante, and Lorca). 
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6. The Province of Málaga (Málaga, Marbella, Bezmiliana, Lamaya, Morón, 
Archidona, Vélez-Málaga, and Alhama). 
7. The Province of Jaén (Jaén, Úbeda, Baeza, Calatrava la Vieja, Baza, Quesada, and 
Segura). 
8. The Province of the wilāyat al-gharb, containing Badajoz, Silves, Beja, and 
Mértola. 
9. The Province of Mallorca (Mallorca, Ibiza and Menorca). 
 
Figure 6: The Provinces of al-Andalus during the Almohad Era 
At the head of the administrative offices in each province, there was a wālī 
(governor), who lived and had his headquarters in the al-qaṣaba (the term for a walled 
fortification, from which the Spanish term Alcazaba was derived). 10  This official 
represented the leader of the Almohad dynasty in the province, and under his authority 
were the governors of all of the cities in the Kūra. Below the governor, in all of the 
provinces, there were offices for official correspondence, judicial affairs, and tax 
collection. All expenses were covered by money collected from people in the province: 
legal fees, extraordinary contributions, taxes, fines, and any other special expenses that 
the government decided to undertake. It was expected that the money collected in every 
province should cover its military spending and pay both the ʿaṭāʾ (salaries) of the 
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soldiers and the cost of the defences in the border areas. The rest of the money, and 
other receipts and funds in the provinces, wassent to Marrakesh and remained there.11 
In addition to the capital of Marrakech in al-Maghrib, the Almohads chose Seville 
as their capital in al-Andalus. For some researchers, this only means that the city 
became the place where the caliphs usually settled when they crossed to al-Andalus12, 
and also the place used as a gathering point for armies in preparation for jihad 
campaigns.13 However, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāḥ’s account suggests other advantages were 
enjoyed by the capital. In his record of the events of 1164, when Caliph ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin decided to move the capital of al-Andalus from Seville to Córdoba for security 
reasons, the author, who was an eyewitness, spoke about this transfer, stating that the 
order was issued for Córdoba to be “the base of Almohad government in al-Andalus as 
it was during the Umayyad epoch, so the management of institutions (Aʿmāl al-
Ashghāl) would be settled in it and the orders would be released from it to the other 
regions”.14 The transfer of the capital to Córdoba did not last long, as in mid-May 1163, 
the next caliph, Yūsuf, returned Seville to its preeminent position. 15  However, the 
statement of Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt provides a clear indication that the capital was also the 
centre of the Almohad administrative system and that governmental institutions in 
Andalusian cities, or some of their offices, were subject to the management of the 
capital and were under its control. The author also referred to some of these offices, and 
said that many of the kuttāb (secretaries) and mushrifūn (tax officers), accompanied by 
leading citizens, were ordered to move from Seville to the new capital.16 Unfortunately, 
there is insufficient information to determine the nature of the administrative relations 
between the government of Seville and the Andalusian cities. The collection of al-
ʿAzzāwī states that Caliph Yūsuf I mentioned to the wālī of Granada that he had asked 
the government of Seville to pay salaries (barakāt) for the government of Granada and 
Córdoba, and to provide weapons and necessary equipment to the garrison at Córdoba.17 
However, it is most likely that the authority of Seville was limited to financial 
management and its responsibility did not go beyond overseeing the workflow in their 
                                                   
 
11 The financial system, including sources of income and expenses, as well as the judiciary and its 
institutions, will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
12 ʿI Musa, al-Muwaḥḥidūn fi al-Gharb al-Islāmī, p. 175; Buresi, Governing the Empire, p. 62. 
13 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjab, p. 282; Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, pp. 132, 186, 193, 196, 200. 
14 Ibn Ṣāhib al-Ṣalāh, al-Mann, p. 138. 
15 Ibid, p. 175. 
16 Ibid, p. 138, 139. 
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offices, while the authorities to appoint and dismiss and to account for staff were a 
prerogative of the central administration in Marrakech. 
As for the political authorities, the power of the government of Seville did not 
extend beyond its territory. Unlike the Almoravids, the Almohad caliphs did not appoint 
deputies to rule al-Andalus. The only exception came with Caliph al-ʿĀdil who, in 
1225, appointed his brother, Abū Al-ʿUlā al-Maʾmūn, as Governor of Seville, and as his 
deputy in al-Andalus. This position included the authority to appoint or remove 
governors.18 It is worth mentioning the motivation behind the selection of Seville as the 
capital of al-Andalus. Córdoba was always the first choice for Islamic governments 
since the Muslim conquest of al-Andalus and the rise of the Umayyad dynasty. Even 
when this status declined during the Taifa period, when each province became 
independent and had its own capital, Córdoba soon became the capital again under the 
Almoravids. What prompted the Almohads to change this policy and choose Seville as 
their capital in Andalus? 
The Moroccan author ʿIzz al-Dīn Mūsā, believes that the Almohads chose Seville 
as their capital in al-Andalus because it was the first major city to declare its allegiance 
and to enter peacefully into the Almohad doctrine.19 This may be true, taking into 
account the policy followed by the Almohads under which those who joined the 
Almohad early on benefitted from great advantages and a high position at the top of the 
Almohad hierarchical classification. However, there is another, and more important, 
motivation that is related to the security situation in Córdoba, which was imposed by the 
political situation in al-Andalus after the fall of the Almoravids. The conflict between 
the Almohads and Ibn Mardanīsh, the King of Valencia and Murcia, which continued 
throughout the reign of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, posed a major threat to Córdoba 
because of its proximity to combat zones, and therefore the possibility of exposure to 
repeated attacks from Ibn Mardanīsh's forces was too high.20 Let us also not forget that 
the site of Córdoba, not far from the borders of the Kingdom of Castile, was unsuitable 
as the capital of al-Andalus since its territories would be vulnerable to attacks by the 
Christian forces. In contrast, Seville was relatively far from the conflict zone, which 
gave it the advantage of being a secure and stable base for the Almohads in al-Andalus. 
Additionally, the Guadalquivir River, which passes through Seville, as well as the 
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agricultural resources of its rich territory, made Seville the most suitable place to 
assemble armies and acquire the supplies required for the major campaigns that the 
Almohad caliphs launched in al-Andalus. 
2. Government structures  
The organisation of the Almohad state in al-Andalus was not an easy task for ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin, firstly, because he had to unify a patchwork of independent principalities and, 
secondly, because the institutions bequeathed by Ibn Tūmart to the Almohad 
community, confined to the mountains of Darān, were not suitable for such a vast 
empire. Through sources, documents and official correspondence we have identified 
various and manifold administrative institutions. However, in this chapter we will deal 
with the upper categories of the pyramid in the administrative regional government. 
2.1 The Wālī (governor) 
At the top of the Regional governmental structures, there was the wālī (the governor), 
who was responsible for the security, safety, and the provision of public services to the 
people of his province. His duties, authority, and the way he was chosen, varied based 
on the type of mandate that was awarded to him and the period in which he was 
appointed. 
In the Almohad sources and documents, two titles have been given to the 
Almohad governors: sometimes they were referred to as wālī (plural wulāt), and 
sometimes ʿāmil (plural ʿummāl).21 ʿAzzāwī claims that the title wālī was often given to 
governors from the ruling family, while governors from the categories of Sheikh-s and 
ḥuffāẓ were called ʿummāl.22 Apart from this, there does not seem to be any major 
difference between the two titles, and, in most cases, the use of a title depended on the 
author's own cultural background and writing style. However, unlike the wālī, the term 
ʿāmil was also used to refer to those who were part of the provincial fiscal 
administration. In theory, all governmental institutions in the province, including the 
financial administration, came under the authority of the governor. However, during the 
era of the Almohads, and especially at the zenith of their power, the financial 
administration was tied directly to the state financial administration in the capital, 
Marrakesh. According to the Almohad sources, therefore, in each province there was a 
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governor (wālī / ʿāmil) and anʿāmil (fiscal officer).23 In Valencia, for example, there 
was anʿāmil who was separate from the wālī at the head of the civil administration, and 
who controlled the activities of provincial treasurers, assessors and tax collectors.24 
The appointment of the governor was the prerogative of the caliph, who would 
choose a person from the Almohad aristocracy whom he believed had the characteristics 
of leadership and the ability to apply the caliph’s policy in his province. In his study of 
the political and administrative systems of the Almohads, Mūsā provides lists of the 
Almohad governors that are mentioned in primary sources and Almohad documents, 
organised according to location and period of appointment.25 Based on the data in these 
lists, along with relevant information recorded by chroniclers regarding the appointees, 
we can distinguish three historical phases of the Almohads that are reflected in the 
caliphate’s policy on the selection of governors: the period before the establishment of 
hereditary rule (1157); the period of prosperity and power, and the period of 
disintegration and fragmentation. 
During the first period, the majority of governors were selected either from the 
Almohad political councils and military leaders, generally called Sheikh-s, or from local 
rulers who joined the Almohad authority soon after the conquest of Fez in 1146.26 The 
sources do not mention the reasons for the government's reliance on these two 
categories. The only logical explanation can be inferred from the historical stages that 
theAlmohads went through in the establishment of their empire.  
At this stage of their development, the Almohads did not yet have complete 
control over all Andalusi territories. It is not surprising, then, that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
resorted to the Sheikh-s, the most reliable men loyal to the cause of the Almohads, in 
order to lay the foundations of their emerging state and to ensure that occupied 
territories would remain under their authority. Among the Sheikh-s chosen were Burrāz 
b. Muḥammad al-Mussūfī, Yūsuf b. Sulaymān, and Abū Zakarīya Yaḥya b. Yūmūr, 
who ruled the provinces of Seville and Córdoba, respectively. 
The same can be said about the use of local rulers. Several Andalusi territories 
were ruled by individuals who abandoned their loyalty to the Almoravids and 
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recognised the superiority and authority of the new rulers in Marrakech. Among those 
governors there were Ibn Quṣī of Mértola, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥajjām of Badajoz, and 
Yūsuf Ibn al-Baṭrūjī of Niebla.27 By accepting their loyalty and retaining them in their 
positions as governors, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin sought to ensure loyalty and stability in the 
regions under their influence, and may have hoped that this measure would also 
encourage other governors to offer their loyalty. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that 
the Almohads were in a formative stage, transitioning from being a revolutionary 
movement to being a state with political systems and administrative institutions.  ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin probably thought that by retaining the former governors, who had 
knowledge and experience of the principles of governance and administration, this 
would help in the growth of the state, especially since the Almohads were formed from 
Berber tribes who were not familiar with such matters.  
However, this policy carried serious risks, the results of which appeared very 
early, and at the first opportunity. In 1148, a massive revolt that was launched against 
the Almohads by the tribes of the Sus soon attracted support from all over the Maghrib, 
including Ceuta and Sijilmāsa in the south. In al-Andalus, most of the leaders who had 
accepted Almohad rule renounced their allegiance, and only Ibn ʿAzzūn, in Jerez and 
Ronda, remained loyal. In response, Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin sent his armies, who 
succeeded in restoring control over the rebellious areas. Shortly afterwards, the local 
leaders were summoned to Marrakech and were replaced by new governors.28 This 
decision was taken as a precautionary measure in anticipation that those who had 
already rebelled might be tempted to do so again at the first opportunity. 
The second class of leaders appeared in 1155 as a result of a major political 
reorganisation that was launched by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin when he placed his family in 
control of the caliphate. The first generation of rulers were initially replaced by the 
ḥuffāẓ and, subsequently, by Sayyids. The story behind this measure is reported by 
several chroniclers, but the most interesting detail is given by the historian Ibn Athīr: 
‘Since it was difficult [for ʿAbd al-Muʾmin] to remove them [the Almohad 
Sheikh-s, who were well-known companions of Mahdī Muḥammad b. Tūmart, 
and to whom ʿAbd al-Muʾmin had entrusted the government in several 
provinces], he kept their children with him to be educated. Then, when they were 
big enough to serve as models, he said to their fathers ‘I want to have you with 
me to support my plans with your advice, and your children, who are now 
scholars and good jurists (fuqahā'), and will govern on your behalf’. They agreed 
very gladly and their children become governors. Then he (ʿAbd al-Muʾmin) told 
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a man that he trusted (who was selected for this) to tell them that: ‘I think you 
have done something very terrible and unkindly’. They said: ‘what is it?’ He said: 
‘your children have places as governors, while those of the Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 
although they are well educated and have good political consciousness, have 
none. There is reason to fear that you will lose the esteem of the Amīr al-
Muʾminīn if he realised’. Struck by the truth of this remark, they went to ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin and asked him to give his son governance, but he pretended to refuse, but 
they insisted and would not leave him until he finally acceded to their request’.29 
This event was reported in most of the Almohad sources but, with the exception of Ibn 
al-Athīr's account, none of them suggests the role of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in the 
appointment of his sons as governors of the provinces. Furthermore, according to an 
official letter issued by Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, the idea came from the Sheikh-s, ṭalaba 
and governors (ʿummāl). After consultation, the caliph decided, in order to make these 
designations officially, that he would associate each of his sons with a government, 
consisting of ṭalaba, ḥuffāẓ, fuqahāʾ (Islamic law scholars), qāḍīs and personages of 
trust, as well as élite officers.30 
Despite this, we cannot turn a blind eye to the story of Ibn al-Athīr, since 
Almohad sources were always cautious about Almohad higher authority, especially 
during the early stages, and consequently avoided recording what might have had a 
negative impact on the reputation of the royal family, which Almohad chroniclers 
always held to be beyond reproach. We also cannot rely entirely on the letter of ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin, which denied that he had any involvement in the appointment of his sons, 
simply because this letter was issued by the man who was the direct beneficiary of this 
decision. Further, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin had just installed his son Muḥammad as heir-
apparent in place of ‘Umar al-Hantātī, the most powerful man other than the caliph, and 
the primary candidate to succeed him.31 By doing this, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin created a new 
policy in the Almohad movement, which destroyed any hope for the Sheikh-s to ascend 
to the throne, as the choice of the new caliph would no longer be based on leadership 
abilities, but on blood ties. The new decision was not welcomed by some Almohad 
Sheikh-s and there was initial opposition from the Mahdī's brothers, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and 
ʿIsā, who attempted to seize power in Marrakech. They failed and were put to death32. It 
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 107 
was thus necessary for ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to follow this decision with another political act 
to reduce the authority of the aristocracy (the Sheikh-s), giving the ruling family more 
control, not only over the central authority in Marrakech, but also over the major 
provinces of the Empire. 
Whatever was behind this measure, the decision was undertaken and sayyid-s 
were sent to the provinces as governors. The Sheikh-s, who had had an important role in 
the central and provincial government, were relegated to secondary levels as advisers to 
the sayyid-s. With few exceptions, control of important towns was given to the sayyid-s, 
while the ḥuffāẓ took control of smaller towns. Sources list nine of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s 
sons who ruled districts, including two in al-Andalus: Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān of Granada, 
and Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf of Seville.33 However, it is believed that all sayyid-s were 
appointed as wulāt, even the very young boy Abū Zaīd, who was given the leadership of 
the Sūs, the Almohads’ cradle’.34 
Choosing the governors from the sayyid-s was a policy adopted by all Almohad 
caliphs. The number was sufficiently large to spark condemnation and criticism from 
some of the Almohads, even among the Sheikh-s. Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik al-Marrākushī 
referred to the Almohad Sheikh Abū Al-ʿAbbās Aḥmed b. Yaḥya, who criticised Caliph 
Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr's policy on the appointment of his sons, young brothers, cousins and 
relatives, as governors in al-Maghrib and al-Andalus.35 
A new pattern of governors emerged during the late Almohad era in Andalus, 
particularly after the reign of ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Yūsuf, which was considered a period 
of decay and fragmentation. Governors from the ḥuffāẓ suddenly disappeared, and the 
position almost exclusively, washeld by members of the Mūminid family. There were 
no clear criteria for selecting a new governor that can be monitored. Sometimes it was 
sufficient that the candidate be a member of the royal family, regardless of his ability 
and leadership potential. In some cases, the people of a city demanded that the caliph 
appoint one of the sayyid-s as their wālī in order to show their submission and loyalty to 
the royal family. In other cases, the position became hereditary within the family of the 
governor. The son of the governor was likely to begin his professional career as wālī in 
a small town, or beside his father as nāʾib (deputy), before succeeding him.36 Indeed, it 
seems that even health and physical condition were not prerequisites for the selection of 
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governors. Ibn ʿIdhārī stated that Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Ghanfīsī, the wālī 
of Sijilamāsa and Darʿā at the time of al-Murtaḍā, was disabled, and could only move 
with the help of his slaves and the men paid to move him (rijāl mustabiddīn li-thalika 
wa ʿabīd).37 
The appointment of the wālī  
In theory, the appointment of a new wālī, which generally coincided with the beginning 
of a new reign, depended on the dismissal of the former wālī, which was dictated by the 
caliph and notified by a letter of dismissal. Pending the arrival of the new governor, the 
position did not remain vacant; a shūra council assumed interim control. 38  A 
notification of appointment would be sent to the province before the arrival of the new 
governor. In this announcement, the caliph was eager to highlight specific points: his 
interest in the province, the reasons for appointing a new governor, the governor’s 
attributes and status among the Almohads, and the main tasks that were to be entrusted 
to him: 
‘We devote to it (the city or province) all the care and attention we can, our 
concern for it continues at all hours and moments. We choose for its affairs (li-
ashghali-ha) competent and efficient people so that its interests might advance 
along the path of righteousness and that it might receive a protection that pushes 
aside the attacks of evil and corruption..... In terms of what we have just evoked 
of our intentions to improve the lot of the subjects (Iil-raʿīya) and their land, and 
of [our] desire to grant them security in green sweetness of its opulent plains, we 
have named Fulan to lead your regions ... to take charge of their interests and their 
resources, to spread complete security to all places and all localities, to guarantee 
for all regions, near and far, regular visits, to lead all districts, in improving easy 
paths and removing obstacles. He is known for his wisdom and reputed for his 
firmness, following the path of his predecessors in courage and bravery’. 
At the conclusion of the letter, the caliph advised the recipients to support the governor 
and to stand by his side in order to enable him to perform his work properly.39  
‘Thus, when he arrives among you, with the help of God - May He be glorified - 
refer to him for all your financial affairs, advance in obedience and collaboration 
on the true paths, be with him as one hand united to ordain good and prohibit evil. 
Much success to your interests, small and large, if God on High wills it...’ 
After the appointment was approved, a formal ceremony was held in Marrakesh on the 
day the new governor left for his province, and another was held in the province upon 
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the governor’s arrival, attended by its notables and dignitaries, to celebrate and 
welcome the appointment.40  
The Roles of the Governor 
The roles of the governor were derived from two main responsibilities: security and 
financial management. The wālī had a duty to maintain order in his province and to 
suppress any revolt in the name of the caliph. Further, the wālī was required to 
contribute to the military campaigns that the Almohad caliphs consistently launched in 
al-Andalus, either by sending soldiers or by providing military equipment and supplies. 
The wālī was also obliged to collect taxes, to punish the corrupt, and to ensure the 
implementation of judgments and orders issued by central government. Furthermore, 
the governor was responsible for providing public services, such as the building of 
mosques and markets, the repair of bridges and roads, water provision and the building 
of cisterns.41 These, and other functions, were performed by the wālī through the offices 
of his government, which were very similar to those of the caliph in Marrakesh, but 
more limited and on a smaller scale.  
The authority of the wulāt was not the same during all of the empire's stages. 
Several sources, including official documents, indicate that during the time of the first 
four caliphs, more precisely, from ʿAbd al-Muʾmin to al-Nāṣir, the power of the wulāt 
was relatively limited and was subject to strict control by the central government in 
Marrakech. In contrast, we do not see such control during the late stages of Almohad 
rule. For example, in the first period, the entourage was chosen under the care of the 
sovereign. In letter No. 14, already mentioned, we read that Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
provided each of his sons’ governorships with a government consisting of a council of 
ṭalaba, ḥuffāẓ, qāḍī-s and personages of trust, as well as an élite of trustworthy 
officers.42 Similarly, Caliph Yūsuf I sent with Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Ibrāhīm, who was 
appointed to govern Seville, a large group of selected Sheikh-s and ḥuffāẓ, in addition to 
a battalion of soldiers.43 In 1183, Caliph Yūsuf appointed his four sons wulāt of Seville, 
Córdoba, Granada and Murcia, and sent them judges and ḥuffāẓ that were selected to be 
members of their governments. 44  However, during the period of decay, the caliph 
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delegated this role to the wulāt of the provinces, who took charge of appointing the 
personnel in their government.45 Even the authority to choose the governor, which was 
in the gift of the caliph, became a grant given to some governors. The sayyid al-
Maʾmūn, wālī of Seville, was given full authority to manage al-Andalus by his brother, 
Caliph al-ʿĀdil, and through this power, al-Maʾmūn had the right to choose or dismiss 
governors without consulting the government in Marrakech.46 This phenomenon also 
appears in the administrative powers relating to the financial management of the 
province. With few exceptions, during the period of the first four caliphs, fiscal 
functions were overseen by an independent administrative ʿāmil (agent), who was 
appointed by the caliph himself, and the caliph alone had the right to hold him 
accountable or to dismiss him. In contrast, 70% of the taqādīm (letters of appointment) 
that relate to the late Almohad period give the governor the right to control financial 
affairs.  
The following letter of appointment, which is believed to have been issued by the 
Caliph of al-Rashīd, provides a good example of the full authority enjoyed by some 
governors in the late Almohads: 
‘We, persuaded that you are excellent representatives and assured that you seek to 
deploy all of your efforts and all of your zeal and that you are able to do so, 
entrust you with the administration of the aforementioned land and all that has 
come under your responsibility, as well as with [the administration] of 
neighbouring regions and places, both far and near, that come to you as a result of 
your [military] enterprises. We place under your competence all responsibility for 
finances in the region, whatever their nature. We have full confidence in your 
guardianship (ishrāfikum) and your vigilance (iṭṭilāʿikum) for all [of the land's] 
affairs. Exercise this power through persons that manifest noble competence and 
great care in the administration of interests and the permanent quality of counsel. 
Appoint to the office of guardian (ḥāfiẓ), judge (qāḍī) or agent (ʿāmil) those 
whom you judge [apt] and whose sense for responsibilities you appreciate. 
Choose for each post someone who will steadfastly invest it with his authority. 
Control all affairs, both small and large, in a way that respects, in this land and 
with its inhabitants (raʿiyyatihā), our beautiful project and our generous 
principles’.47 
This letter provides a clear picture of the extensive power enjoyed by governors, in 
contrast to the Caliph's authority. It should be noted that, during this period, the sources 
did not record any occasion on which a wālī or ʿāmil was held accountable or punished, 
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even the dismissal of a governor from his position was probably done at the request or 
consent of the inhabitants.  
Control and Punishment of Governors 
Upon ascending to the throne, the Almohad caliphs sought to strengthen their influence 
and extend full control over all parts of the empire. The caliphs were thus constantly 
eager to reduce the power of the governors, on the one hand by monitoring their 
activities to determine the extent of their loyalty, and, on the other, by examining their 
ability to manage their provinces, and to detect any irregularities or corruption in which 
they engaged, or which they did not take decisive action to prevent. In his letter, Risālat 
al-ʿadl (Letter of Justice), ʿAbd al-Muʾmin reveals his intentions, and h encourages his 
wulāt to show fairness and responsibility in any matter and not to make decisions on 
certain issues without being consulted.48  
The caliphs used different methods to be kept informed of what was happening in 
the provinces. On several occasions, the caliph summoned one or more governors to his 
majlis (council) in order that they be held accountable for their decisions and actions, 
and so that they could be punished in cases of misconduct.  For example, in 1152 and 
just before ʿAbd al-Muʾmin launched his campaign toward Ifrīqiya, the ʿummāl of the 
Seville Province were requested to come to Ceuta and meet the Caliph in order to give 
him a report about the progress of work in their areas. Likewise, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt 
reported, t in 1169, that Caliph Yūsuf summoned the governors of al-Andalus to 
Marrakech, including his brothers, the sayyid Abū Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl of Seville and the 
sayyid Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm of Córdoba. According to information provided by the 
author, the visit was very serious, as it lasted for as long as eight months and was 
followed by a decision appointing a new government.49 In other cases, the caliph drew 
on information about the performance and behaviour of the governor that was based on 
the people of his province, either by receiving delegations and letters of complaint, or 
by listening to traders and craftsmen. Al-Marrākushī, for example, highlighted the 
biography of Caliph al-Manṣūr, and said that:  
‘he [the caliph] issued an order which allows ʾumanāʾ al-sūq [market secretaries] 
and Sheikh-s to meet him twice each month, in order to ask about their markets, 
their prices, and their rulers. Moreover, when a delegation from a province came 
to visit him, the first thing that he inquired about was their ʿummāl [employees], 
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their qāḍī-s and their wulāt. So if they praised them, he would say: You must 
know that you are responsible for this testimony on Yawm al-Qiyāma [the Day of 
Resurrection], thus none of you should say anything except the truth’.50 
From their early days until the first decade of the thirteenth century, the Almohad 
sovereigns exercised strict and immediate control over the management of provinces. 
The governors did not have the right to leave their seat of government.51 In order to 
meet the Caliph, they were required to make a written request for permission to travel.52 
For example, the wālī of Seville, who is believed to have been the sayyid Abū Isḥāq 
Ibrāhīm b. al-Manṣūr, had to make several attempts in this regard by sending three 
formal requests until Caliph al-Nāṣir finally agreed to meet him.53 On the other hand, a 
governor who was inept or corrupt faced a critical reaction from the caliph. The type of 
offence and the degree of risk determined the type of punishment. Sometimes the 
Caliph would find it sufficient to remove him and to replace him with a new governor. 
Abū Bakr b. Wazīr of Beja, for example, was removed and replaced by a new governor 
after the notables of the city complained about his poor policies and management. In 
other cases, the Caliph would arrest the governor because of the governor's despotism. 
Yaḥya b. Yaghmūr, Governor of Seville and Córdoba, was thus arrested and brought to 
Marrakech in 1154, as a result of his tyranny and his mistreatment of the people of his 
province.54 The Caliph might resort to the death penalty against a governor if it were 
proven that he was corrupt, had betrayed his trust, or had plotted to cease his obedience 
to the Caliph. For example, in 1212 Caliph Nāṣir issued an order to kill the corrupt 
rulers, Mohammed b. Yaḥya Al-Musūfī of Ceuta and ʿAbd al-Haq b. Abī Dāwūd of 
Fez, who had taken advantage of the Amwāl al-makhzan (money of the financial 
department).55 
A passage from al-Bayān regarding the wālī of Murcia, Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar al-
Rashid, al- Manṣūr's brother, exemplifies this theme. Ibn ʿIdhārī mentioned the abuses 
and atrocities of the governor, as well as the latter’s claims to power, to the point that 
the Caliph summoned him to the capital and had him executed in 1189. Among the 
irregularities committed by the wālī were that: he imposed heavy illegal taxes on 
merchants, and he forced:  
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‘the ʿummāl [treasury officials] to hand over the monies in their coffers [Būyut al-
Amwāl], he imprisoned the mushrif of Murcia, Ibn Raja, and then killed him 
because he was unable to submit records of all contributions [taqyīdāt al-Majābī]; 
he also assassinated the kātib, Ḥakam b. Muḥammad, and threatened the Ṣaḥib al-
Aʿmāl of Murcia, Ibn Sulaymān, who had to flee to Valencia’.56  
This event gives us an idea not only of the punishment of corrupt governors, but also of 
the nature of the administrative-political situation during the reign of al-Manṣūr: an 
independent tax administration facing the representative of the regional political power. 
 It should be noted that information on the livelihood of officials in the Almohad 
state apparatus is extremely rare. It is believed that every governor had a fixed salary. 
Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm thus complained about lower pay, and he asked the Caliph, in 
writing, to regularise the situation.57 We also know that the governors received largesse, 
in the form of lots [Sihām] and silver [In'am], from the sovereign; and they possessed 
iqṭāʿāt (land grants) and land that could be situated hundreds of kilometres from their 
workplace. In writing, the Caliph asked his governor to take his gift from the makhzan 
of Seville, although this gift was in the district of Regraga.58 This example is not 
unique: the Ifriqiyan chronicler al-Zarkashī reported several Almohad Sihām, the most 
interesting being the famous governor of Ifriqiya, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wahid b. 
Abī Ḥafṣ, who had iqṭāʿāt in al-Andalus in the Qarya (village) of Qarba near 
Córdoba.59 ʿAzzāwī says that these gifts were reserved for Sayyid-s and some influential 
Almohad Sheikh-s.60 
While it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions, it is notable that, despite 
their often extensive powers, which were granted to them as a result of their office and 
were supported by their status as Sayyid-s or Sheikh-s, the governors in the reigns of 
the first three sovereigns had limited room for manoeuvre. The centralisation of the 
state and the presence of the Caliph's grip obliged the governors to reduce personal 
initiative and to always refer to the capital. This situation did not last long. Ambitious 
governors, like Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. Abī Ḥafṣ of Ifrīqiya, no longer 
maintained a link with the central government, apart from informal and ineffective 
recognition. The Almohad Empire, in the sense of being pervasive and centralised, thus 
no longer existed, even before the fall of its sovereign authority in the capital city of 
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Marrakech. The fourteenth-century historian, Ibn Abī Zarʿ, summed up the situation of 
the Almohad government at the time of Yūsuf al-Mustanṣir, the fifth Almohad Caliph:  
‘He did not invade in his days nor he was able to do so; his orders were not being 
followed, and all of the governors have had full control over their city. The 
Almohad state in his days thus became powerless, struck by decrease, and started 
the way to disappearing’.61 
The state of weakness that plagued the ruling power in Marrakech overshadowed the 
cohesion of the empire, and thus the power and influence of the governors of the 
provinces increased and their political ambitions were no longer limited to maintaining 
their position as governors, but rose to controlling the throne. Unfortunately for the 
Almohads, the fragmentation and divisions in the empire were caused by the Almohads 
themselves, and the most serious defections against the authority in Marrakech were 
carried out by the sayyid-s, the governors of the provinces, and members of the ruling 
family. In 1224, the sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. al- Manṣūr, Governor of 
Murcia, did not recognise the authority of the new Caliph, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-
Wāḥid, who was killed two months after ascending to the throne.62 He declared himself 
caliph, with the title al-ʿĀdil. Three years later, the sayyid Abū Al-ʿUlā Idrīs b. al-
Manṣūr, the Governor of Seville, proclaimed himself caliph, with the title al- Maʾmūn, 
abandoning his obedience to his brother, al-ʿĀdil, who was killed by the Almohad 
Sheikh-s after refusing to give up his throne.63 Finally, in 1230, the sayyid Abū Mūsā b. 
Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr of Ceuta refused to acknowledge the authority of his brother, the 
Caliph al-Maʾmūn, and declared himself caliph, with the title al-Muʾyyad. When he 
did not find support from the Almohads, he gave his allegiance to the Andalusian 
ambition, Ibn Hūd, who stopped obeying the Almohads and managed to gain control of 
most of their provinces in al-Andalus.64 
2.2 The Vizier 
The Vizier was not included in the hierarchy that had originally been developed by Ibn 
Tūmart. The first appearance of this word is uncertain. Al-Marrākushī was the only 
chronicler who claimed that Abū Ḥafṣ Aznāj was the first Vizier, and yet his account, 
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which has been considered dubious, does not accord with historical analysis.65 Most 
sources agree that the office was created soon after the Almohads established 
themselves in Marrakech, and the first to hold the position of Vizier was the 
Andalusian, Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmed Ibn ʿAṭīyya. He began his career as a kātib in the 
Almoravid government, and, at the fall of Marrakech, he surrendered to the Almohads 
and participated in the army that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin sent to eliminate the revolt that was 
launched by al-Massatī in 1148. Sources talk about an impressive message written by 
Ibn ʿAṭīyya, who described the battle between the Almohads and the rebels and 
displayed his proficiency in language and style, to the extent that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
requested his services in the government. Summoned by the Caliph, he began his 
service as Secretary (kātib), and he distinguished himself so much that he was soon 
given positions of authority and received the title of Vizier.66 Ibn Khaldūn even argues 
that Ibn ʿAṭīyya: 
‘… made his authority fill up across the empire; he commanded the army corps; 
he amassed treasures that he later spread profusely; and has finally reached a high 
degree of favour with the sultan that has never been reached since’.67 
This was the beginning of the vizierate in the central capital, Marrakech, and the office 
continued until the end of the Almohads. As for al-Andalus, information about the 
presence of a vizier in the government of the provinces is either confusing or 
insufficient, to the point that one might wonder if this office even existed. The 
chroniclers were often interested in describing the leaders of the Almohads who took 
over an important position in provincial governments, for instance, as governor, writer, 
or judge, but we do not see such an interest in relation to the vizier. On the other hand, it 
seems that the presence of the Almohad Sheikh-s around the provincial governor as 
advisers and aides, reduced the need to use viziers. The role of the Sheikh-s, which was 
usually the prerogative of the vizier, may thus be the cause of the confusion among 
sources regarding some Almohad Sheikh-s, who were sometimes called Sheikh-s and, at 
others, were presented with the title of viziers. References about the presence of this 
position in the provinces often refer to individual cases, and on specific occasions, and 
even these are subject to debate. 
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The first appearance of the term vizier in the provinces coincided with a massive 
political reorganisation that was launched by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in 1155. During this 
event, the caliph placed the Sayyid-s at the head of the provincial governments, and he 
provided them with a government formed from the Almohad political categories. 
Among the elements of the government there were the Sheikh-s, who were selected for 
their wisdom and political experience. Ibn al-Qaṭṭān is the first author who indicated 
that those Sheikh-s were appointed as viziers to the sayyid-s. However, his account 
cannot be considered reliable if we take into account that he was the only author who 
referred to the members of the ʿashra council as being viziers to Ibn Tūmart. Ibn 
Khaldūn followed the example of Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, and his statement has been accepted by 
some researchers to demonstrate the presence of the vizierate office in provincial 
government, without any supporting evidence from other sources.68 In contrast, Ibn 
ʿIdhārī and the author of al-Ḥulal al-Mūshῑyyah listed the names of the Sheikh-s who 
accompanied the governors to the provinces, but without giving them the title of 
viziers.69 For both authors, the main purpose behind the appointment of the Sheikh-s 
was to train and assist the Sayyid-s in their first leadership positions. We know that the 
sayyid-s had just graduated from the school that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin opened in Marrakech 
for the education and training of leaders. After they were chosen as governors, 
therefore, it was necessary for them to be accompanied by Sheikh-s who had experience 
and ability, in order to train them and to prepare them to carry out their first challenges. 
In his account of the appointment of the sayyid Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf as governor of 
Seville, ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī stated that “(ʿAbd al-Muʾmin) left him with 
Sheikh-s who have wisdom and education so he would discuss his ideas with them and 
rely on them in whatever he intends to do”.70 The presence of the Sheikh-s around the 
governors as advisers had become a feature of the Almohad government from the time 
when ʿAbd al-Muʾmin set his sons as governors of the provinces. On many occasions, 
sources refer to them as kuttāb, quḍāt, shuyūkh al-qabāʾil (tribal leaders), udabāʾ 
(literati) and qādah (military commanders), but they are never mentioned as viziers. 
Another point worth noting is that some Sheikh-s, whom Ibn al-Qaṭṭān and Ibn 
Khaldūn referred to as viziers, disappeared from accounts of events, while others 
appeared with new missions through direct instructions from the sovereign in 
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Marrakech, shortly after their appointment. 71  For example, the Sheikh Yūsuf b. 
Sulaymān, who was appointed in Fez, appeared in 1161 at the head of a large army sent 
by Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin from Marrakech to support the combined forces in Seville.72 
Was this office a temporary job that ended when its objective was achieved? Let's not 
forget the statement of Ibn ʿIdhārī and the author of al-Ḥulal al-Mūshῑyyah, which gives 
the chosen Sheikh-s a specific task: to train the sayyid-s. 
Further references to the post of vizier, but this time regarding the era of Abū 
Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, have been found. Ibn ʿIdhārī pointed out that the Caliph appointed Abū 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm as Governor of Seville, and chose Abū Zechariah b. Sinān as his 
vizier.73 In contrast, Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī stated that the sayyid Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān, 
Governor of Granada, selected Abī Jaʿfar b. ʿAbd al-Malik to be his vizier.74 There is no 
apparent rule that can justify why the Caliph appointed a vizier for one governor, while 
another governor was allowed to choose his own. Perhaps the status of the Caliph 
allowed him to estimate which were the provinces that required a vizier alongside the 
governor, while he gave the freedom to some sayyid-s of high standing, like Abū Saʿīd 
ʿUthmān, to choose their own viziers. However, based on the information available, we 
cannot draw any definitive conclusions. Until new sources are discovered, this issue 
will remain without a clear answer. 
These are the only occasions recorded that involved the appointment of viziers in 
the provinces. Furthermore, more than 176 official letters have been discovered, along 
with 77 letters of appointment, yet none of them mentions the appointment of a vizier in 
any of the regional governments. If this office really existed in the reign of ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin and Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, we can thus say with confidence that it fell into 
abeyance under successive Almohad caliphs. 
The 16th century historian, al-Maqqarī, said that after the Umayyad state the title 
of vizier in al-Andalus “has become a general term for all of the kings' visitors and 
companions”.75However, this statement does not apply to the dynasty of the Almoravids 
and their followers, the Almohads. Based on the available sources, this office was not 
an essential part of the provincial governments following the transfer, by the Berber 
dynasties, of power to Marrakech. In other words, the presence of the vizier, at least 
during this period, was confined to the central government, with only a negligible 
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presence in the provinces. In contrast, when the cities of al-Andalus had the chance to 
be independent from the control of Marrakech, their rulers launched this office again. 
When the Almoravids lost their strength and the cities of al-Andalus became 
independent, its rulers took viziers. The same happened with the Almohads. After the 
disintegration of the Almohad Empire, when al-Andalus was out of their control, the 
rebels declared themselves independent and the vizier's office returned to prominence. 
2.3 The Kātib 
The fundamental office in government was that of the kātib, not only in terms of the 
complexity of the tasks entrusted to it, but also because of the number of people who 
were involved in it. In his Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldūn speaks about the transformation of 
writing to an official job (ḥirfah):  
‘In the Muslim dynasty, the Arabic language situation and (the custom of) 
expressing what one wants to express in good form intensified the need for the 
office. Thus, writing came to convey, as a rule, the essence of a matter in better 
stylistic form than was possible in oral expression... When the language became 
corrupt and a craft (that had to be learned), (the office) was entrusted to those who 
knew (Arabic) well’.76 
With the development of Islamic governments the need for kuttāb (writers) increased. 
Their functions expanded and soon they became part of several governmental 
institutions, such as the judiciary, the financial system and military affairs. However, in 
this section, we will shed light on two categories of writers that had close contact with 
the ruling powers. The first, and the predominant type, was the kuttāb al-rasāʾil. This 
class was responsible for drafting official correspondence, editing decrees and letters of 
appointment, and providing advice to governors or caliphs when needed. Moreover, the 
Almohad caliphs relied on them in the education and training of the young sayyid-s, 
who were appointed in the provinces and who had no experience of how to govern, as 
well as the sayyid-s who were studying at the school in Marrakech where the kuttāb 
were members of faculty.77 They were a good tool for spreading the Almohad doctrine 
and the caliphs’ points of view. In this capacity, the letter al-ʿAdil of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
states:  
‘… read it [the letter] to the entire population from the pulpits (manābir). Invite 
delegations from tribes of the countryside and cities. Make them hear distinctly 
and loudly.... When you have finished reading it to the masses and you have 
                                                   
 
76 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddima, English trans, vol. 2, p. 26.  
77 Al-Ḥulal al-Mūshῑyyah, p. 151. M. Manūnī, Ḥaḍārat al-Muwaḥḥidūn, pp. 16–20. 
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enabled every citizen to be informed and to understand the content, make copies 
of it for the benefit of every tribe and town in your province’.78 
The second class of kuttāb, which seems to have been formed officially during the era 
of Caliph Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, was the kuttāb al-jund.79 Nothing much can be said 
with certainty about the duties of those kuttāb. Basically, they were responsible for 
dīwān al-jund (the military registry). In al-Māwardī’s view, the task of this dīwān was 
to register military personnel and determine their salaries.80 This office was interested 
only in those who joined the regular army, which was formed mostly from the Almohad 
tribes, who settled in the Iberian provinces, in addition to the most reliable Andalusian 
solders.81 However, sources mention another dīwān that had a branch in al-Andalus, 
which seems to have been administered by the kātib al-ʿaskar of Seville, and concerned 
the regular soldiers and tribes who were recruited into the army in times of war and at 
the start of campaigns. 82 The duty of this dīwān, called the dīwān al-tamyīz 
(discrimination registry), was to record the names of those recruits who would be given 
grants for their participation.83It was also responsible for providing the army with the 
necessary weapons and ammunition, along with organising fighters in units on the basis 
of their tribes and social status, in preparation for campaigns.84 
The sayyid-s had no role in this office and, unlike previous offices, the post of the 
kātib was almost exclusively the preserve of Andalusi notables.85 The leadership of al-
Andalus in this field, which was a product of the cultural prosperity of the Taifa period, 
lasted until the end of Islamic rule. Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī was therefore surprised when 
one of the Nasrid Sultans of Granada appointed a Moroccan kātib as his secretary.86In 
fact, the transition of political power to the rulers of al-Maghrib during the period of 
Berber dynasties gave the Andalusi kuttāb more space and new opportunities to increase 
their leadership in this office. For example, al-Marrākushī described the kuttāb in the 
era of the Almoravid Yūsuf Ibn Tāshfīn, and his successors: “he (the Sulṭān) and his 
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the same meaning, such as Kātib ʿAskar, kātib al-Jaysh, See Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, p. 254; al-
Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshā (Beirut, 1989), p. 33. 
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85 See ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, pp. 18–36, M. Bencherifa, Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih al-Ḥafīd: fuṣūl min sīra mansiyya 
(Beirut, 1992), pp. 19–24.  
86 Ibn Saʿīd, al-Mughrib fī ḥulā al-Maghrib, vol. 2, p. 215. 
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sons gathered around them from the kuttāb and the knights of rhetoric who have never 
been gathered to others in any ages”.87  
Acquiring a position in the government as an official kātib was not easy. The 
kātib required highly specific qualities and levels of skill, such as a vast literary 
education, perfect knowledge of the Koran and the hadith (the traditions of the Prophet), 
very good calligraphy, good moral qualities and a good physical appearance.88 Such 
katib was the traveler, author and poet Ibn Jubayr, who was a katib in Ceuta and 
Granada for the sayyid Abū Saʿīd ʿUthmān, governor of Granada, before he left on his 
journey which he wrote about in his well-known book, "The Travels of Ibn Jubayr".89 In 
addition to these skills, the sovereign was very careful when choosing a kātib. The 
candidate was subject to a comprehensive test to check his loyalty, his talents, and his 
belief in the teachings of the Mahdī.90 It is worth mentioning that some kuttāb had 
graduated from the schools that the Almohads established in al-Maghrib in order to 
produce leaders, scholars and faqīhs. The Moroccan author, Muḥammad Bencherifa, 
believes that the kuttāb Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih, as well as the famous Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, 
studied there.91 
 At the time, the number of kuttāb in al-Andalus was very high, and biographical 
dictionaries are replete with the names of kuttāb and their literary and work activities. 
For the government and political authorities, this gave them a wide range of choice. 
Unfortunately for the kuttāb, it created strong competition and getting this job became 
an extremely difficult task. Perhaps the presence of such a large number of kuttāb 
explains the lack of indulgence by some wulāt to their kuttāb, who were dismissed, or 
even put to death, for lapses or simple mistakes. For example, the sayyid Othman b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, the wālī of Granada, killed his kātib, Abī Jaʿfar b. Saʿīd, during the 
era of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, because he discovered that both were in love with the same 
woman.92 The same sayyid killed ʿAbd al-Ghanī b. Ṭāhir by poison when he found a 
message sent from ʿAbd al-Ghanī to sayyid Ḥafṣ b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin was expressing the 
desire to work with him again.93 Sometimes the kātib was punished because of the 
actions of his wālī. Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī described the suffering experienced by 
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Muḥammad Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAyyash, a kātib for the wālī of Murcia, who fled out of 
fear after the Caliph al-Manṣūr killed his wālī and threatened to punish his companions, 
including Muḥammad.94 
The risks of the job did not prevent the kātib from seeking the position and taking 
advantage of any opportunity to display their skills and talents so that a governor might 
offer work. Some kuttāb managed to work for several governors.95 For example, the 
Andalusian ʿAbd al-Malik b. ʿAyyāsh, first worked for Abī Isḥāq b. Burāz, Governor of 
Seville, then for the sayyid Abī Ḥafṣ of Tlemcen, then for the sayyid Abī Muḥammad b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, and, finally, he returned to Seville to work for the sayyid Yūsuf b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin.96 However, if someone were dismissed, he would be upset and seek 
help to return, or to obtain the same position in another place and for another 
governor.97 
3. Al-barīd (Postal Service) 
There is a real lack of information about the postal service, and so far only one text on 
this topic, which was written at the beginning of the empire, is known to have been 
preserved. It provides a very brief description of the status of the postal system and the 
government's efforts to develop it. The text is found in a circular letter (Risālat al-ʿĀdil) 
of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, which was written in 1148.98 The caliph painted a bleak picture of 
the situation of the barīd, which deals with the two separate units of the Almohad state, 
the Maghrib and al-Andalus. The Raqqāṣ-s99 (postmen) were also under the oversight of 
the caliph. 
                                                   
 
94 Ibid, p. 82. Further examples: the caliph al-Maʾmūn killed his kātib Abī ʿAlī b. Yabqa al-Māliqī; the 
caliph al-Rashīd killed the kātib Ibn al-Muʾmnānī; the caliph al-Murtaḍā’s directive to kill the kātib Abī 
Jaʿfar: M. Bencherifa, Ibn ʿAbd Rabbih al-Ḥafīd, p. 17, note. 3. 
95 See Ibn Saʿīd, Ikhtiṣār al-Qadḥ, p. 124; Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik, al-Dhayl wa-l-takmila, vol. 5, pp. 107, 607; 
Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, p. 26. 
96 Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik, al-Dhayl wa-l-takmila, vol. 5, p. 27. 
97 M. Bencherifa, Abū al-Muṭarrif Aḥmad b. ʿAmīrah al-Makhzūmī: ḥayātuhu wa-āthāruh (Rabat, 1966), 
pp. 123–24. 
98 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 162–63. 
99 While the couriers were called raqqāṣ in the Maghreb and al-Andalus, he had several names in the 
East, such as fayj, rasfūl, and sāʿī. J. Gruiguer, ‘Une organization du vieux Maroc, les Raqqas’, in La 
tribune du vieux Maroc (1948), pp. 5–9. For an extensive description of barīd in the Omayyad and 
Abbasid periods see: Adam Mez, Die Renaissance des Islams, English trans, S. Khuda and D. S. 
Margoliouth (Patna, 1937) pp. 501–505; S. D. Goitein, “The Commercial Mail Service in Medieval 
Islam”, in Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Apr – Jun., 1964), pp. 118–123; Y. 
Ragheb, ‘La transmission des nouvelles en terre d'Islam. Les modes de transmission’, in Actes des 
congrès de la Société des historiens médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public, Vol. 24, No. 24 
(1993), pp. 37–48. 
 122 
Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin denounced the poor organisation and management of the 
postal service and, above all, the raqqāṣ’ misconduct. The text states that the postmen 
forced people to provide them with better food, as well as with feed for their horses, 
which suggests three possibilities: either they were not paid for their services, their 
grants were not sufficient for travel expenses, or they simply abused their prerogatives. 
It seems that they were moving too slowly and in groups, and that they were taking long 
breaks during their travel, which caused mail and news to arrive late. After outlining the 
disadvantages of the mail service, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin suggested the steps for reform that 
the governments of al-Andalus had to follow, which can be summarised in four basic 
rules.  
First, the government must improve the postal service by choosing new postmen 
who are honest, trusted, and have the ability to perform their jobs efficiently. Certainly 
there are other attributes that postman must possess. He should have a high level of 
fitness, enabling him to travel long distances, sometimes without breaks. The job 
requires particular skills, such as running and horseback riding.100 Sometimes, postmen 
were described as knights, which raises the possibility that the postmen, or at least a 
branch of them, were formed from military elements – especially those who were 
entrusted with the transfer of governmental correspondence and military news from the 
battlefield.101 The Almohads engaged in many wars in different places, and mail was 
sent to and from the battle camps continuously.102 The Almohad sources do not have 
anything more to say on this point. However, the fourteenth-century historian and 
geographer, al-ʿUmarī, claimed that the Ḥafsids, the successors of the Almohads (or, as 
someone might say, the Almohads' new version), used guards and slaves as mail 
couriers.103 
Second, the government was requested to provide sufficient food and other 
supplies to the postman for his travel. The postman might take more than a month for 
his journey, and carrying enough food for such a long journey was illogical and would 
hinder the raqqāṣ' movement. The most logical solutions were either that the postman 
be given enough money for his travel expenses, or that food be offered to them at every 
town and village between the starting point and the final destination.  
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The third point in ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s postal reform was to reorganise the mail 
service by setting a timetable stipulating the time required to deliver mail according to 
the length of the distance between cities. This required the provision of postmen and 
relay stations where riding animals – mules, horses, or camels – were changed 
frequently in order to ensure that mail arrived quickly and without interruption. We 
have noted that, occasionally, the barīd arrived faster or slower although following the 
same journey. The Moroccan scholar, ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Tāzī, has indicated that there was 
a regular courier, who moved too slowly, and raqqāṣ al-Sharṭ, an express courier, who 
was faster and would travel day and night without rest until he reached the desired 
destination.  
The fourth and final point in the Caliph’s plan to improve the service was to 
observe the behaviour of the postmen, punishing those who behaved rudely with people, 
or forcing them to provide hospitality. 
Conclusion 
The Almohads built their provincial government on the basis of the political 
administrative systems of previous states. Their originality lies in the strategy followed 
by the Almohads in the operation of these institutions. The choice of governor was 
limited to the classes of the Sayyid-s and the high-ranking Sheikh-s, which prevented 
taking into account the competence and experience of those who were suitable for major 
leadership positions. The state lost the opportunity to benefit from the previous 
experience of the Andalusian leaders. The ḥuffāẓ, who were groomed to take over 
management positions, and on whom the state relied in the management of cities, 
disappeared following the second quarter of the thirteenth century. The Andalusians 
were excluded from the post of governor, while those whose loyalty was tested were 
absorbed as kuttāb to governors and sayyid-s, as well as financial managers. ʿIzz al-Dīn 
Mūsā believes that the appointment of the sayyid-s as the wālīs had a positive effect on 
the growth of the empire and its increased cohesion, but they became a cause of 
weakness and conflict at the stage of collapse. It could be argued that limiting the 
position to one class was a fruitless policy from the outset, but the presence of powerful 
caliphs prevented its negative impacts from being apparent at the beginning. However, 
when weak successors took power and lost control of their provinces, ambitious 
governors took advantage of the opportunity and showed their desire to become de facto 
independent from the central authorities. 
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3 
The Financial Administrative System   
The financial administrative system formed the mainstay of the Almohad regional 
government. It organised the financial relationship between the citizen and the state and 
identified the sources of income and the objects of expenditure. The government also 
relied on its financial organisation in the formulation of its various strategic policies, 
regarding whether projects of development or security operations, such as the 
preparation of the military campaigns which the Almohads consistently launched in the 
Maghrib and al-Andalus. In his Muqaddima, Ibn Khaldūn describes the financial 
institution, which he called Dīwān al-Aʿmāl wā al-Jibāyāt Office of Business and Levies 
(The Ministry of Financial Operations and Taxation): 
‘This ministry is an office that is necessary to the royal authority. It is concerned 
with tax operations. It guards the rights of the dynasty in the matters of income 
and expenditures. It takes a census of the names of all soldiers, fixes their salaries, 
and pays out their allowances at the proper times. In this connection, recourse is 
had to rules set up by the chiefs of such operations and the stewards of the 
dynasty. They are all written down in a book which gives all the details 
concerning income and expenditures. It is based upon a good deal of accounting, 
which is mastered only by those who have considerable skill in such operations. 
The book is called the diwan. At the same time, the word dīwān designates the 
place where the officials who are concerned with these matters have their 
offices’.1 
However, the sources briefly speak about the financial system and provide vague terms 
to name the staff in this sector, such as ṣāḥib al-aʿmāl, ṣāḥib al-ashghāl, nāḍir fī aI-
Majbā, ṣāḥib al-Makhzan, al-Mushrif, etc., without either an explanation or determining 
what their specialisations were, or their actions. In addition, some sources give us 
information that is incorrect and has no support from other sources. For example, Ibn 
Abī Zarʿ claimed that Caliph Yūsuf put Ibn Ṣaqr in charge of al-khazāʾin wa Bayt al-
māl (the government treasury), although the remaining sources agree that he was only 
responsible for the Khazāʾin al-Kutub (the Library of the Caliph).2 Likewise, Ibn al-
Maqarrī was the only one who claimed that the chief financial officer in al-Andalus was 
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called ṣāḥib al-ashghāl al-khirājiyya.3 In fact, all the evidence indicates that this title 
was originated bythe Almohads and had always been called ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl, or Ṣāḥib al-
Ashghāl al-Makhzaniyya, when sitting at the head of the financial organisation in the 
provinces. 
In this chapter we will shed light on the financial administrative system, examining its 
structures and their functions. Then we will discuss the sources of income and the 
aspects of exchange, and we will conclude by addressing the ʿUmlah (currency) and its 
development.  
1. Finance Officers 
1.1 Ṣāḥib Ashghāl al-Barrayn 
This official can be considered the main manager of the financial institution in the 
Maghrib and al-Andalus. His office was located in the capital city of Marrakech, next to 
the Almohad Caliph, who alone had the right of appointment, dismissal or is able to 
hold this official accountable.4 None of the four main sources for early Almohad history 
(al-Baydhaq, al-Mann, Naẓm al-Jumān, al-Muʿjib, and even the Kitāb al-Ansāb) speak 
of a ṣāḥib al-ashghāl. It was not until 1196-1197 that this term made its first appearance 
in Ibn ʿIdhārī’s account of the investiture of Ibn Yujjān at the head of the vizierate and 
the Ashghāl al-Barrayn ([financial] operations of the Maghrib and al-Andalus).5 
Impressed by the efficiency and extreme honesty of his vizier, Caliph al-Manṣūr 
recommended that his successors keep Ibn Yujjān in his position.6 This wish was 
fulfilled only for a time, because under the next Caliph, al-Nāṣir, we meet a vizier 
separately, Abū Saʿīd Ibn Jāmiʿ, and a finance officer, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Azīz b. 
ʿUmar b. Abī Yazd al-Hantātī. The latter is designated either by the title Ṣāḥib Ashghāl 
al-ʿAdwatayn, or by the title Ishrāf al-Barrayn. 7  Based on the information of Ibn 
ʿIdhārī, we believe that this officer was replaced by the famous Ibn al-Muthanna, who 
was designated with the simple title Ṣāḥib al-Ashghāl.8 
The sources have nothing to say about the office under the four caliphs who 
followed, until Ibn ʿIdhārī surprises us, for the first time, with a list of ṣāḥib al-ashghāl-
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s who were assigned during the era of al-Rashīd.9 There is no definite explanation for 
the sudden interest of the author. Nevertheless, Dandash suggested the possibility that 
this might be a sign of the growing stature of the official in the central government from 
the time of al-Mustanṣir, and their great responsibilities, which exceeded financial 
matters.10 Ibn Khaldūn, followed by al-Zarkashī, mentioned the power of the Ṣāḥib al-
Ashghāl and their relations with the viziers. The vizier, Ibn Jāmiʿ, and the ṣāḥib al-
ashghāl, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Abī Zaīd, began negotiations with the famous governor of 
Ifrīqiya, Abī Muḥammad b. Abī Ḥafṣ, to recognise the sovereignty of the young Caliph 
al-Mustanṣir.11 
Without exaggeration, and despite the late appearance of this office, it is believed 
that the holder had a lot of respect among his partners in the Almohad administration. 
Indeed, only Almohad Sheikh-s had access to this position, which was exercised by one 
man at a time.12 They were chosen carefully by the Caliphs and, unlike other positions, 
the sources did not record any case in which they were arrested or were under suspicion 
for corruption. 
 As previously mentioned, the ṣāḥib al-ashghāl was the head of the financial 
organisation and therefore all financial offices in the provinces were subject to his 
authority. He was also responsible for the corrupt members of the government, 
including the governors, and had the power to punish or dismiss them if they were 
found guilty. It is also through his advice that the Caliph brought order into the financial 
administration. Ibn Khaldūn summarises these trends by saying: ‘He had complete 
charge of income and expenditures. He audited the finances, collected payments, and 
punished defaulters. One condition was that he be an Almohad’.13 
1.2 Ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl or Ṣāḥib al-Ashghāl al-makhzaniyya  
Ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl is typically a provincial position, and its presence is confirmed in almost 
all Almohad regions. The office represents the highest level of the Almohad financial 
apparatus in the province. The sources employ a number of terms that are used in 
                                                   
 
9 Ibid, p. 299. This list is not complete. A further Ṣāḥib al-Ashghāl, Abū 'Abd Allāh b. Abī Zayd b. Alī b. 
Yūsuf al-Tīnmalī, surfaced in Marrakech shortly before the preparation for the conquest of Gharb al-
Maghreb. Ibid, p. 335. 
10 Dandash, al-Andalus fī nihāyat al-Murabiṭīn, p. 141. 
11 Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, vol. 6, p. 337; Al-Zarkashī, Tārīkh al-dawlatayn, p. 19. 
12 Mūsā, Tanẓīmāt al-Muwaḥḥidīn, p. 198. 
13 Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, vol. 1, p. 300. According to al-Ghubrīnī's description, which cannot 
be dated, ṣāḥib al-ashghāl was also commissioned by the Caliph to pay the salaries of imams in mosques 
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al-dirāyah, p. 325. 
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reference to the office, such as al-Ashghāl al-makhzaniyya, Aʿmāl al-Makhzan, or al-
Ashghāl al-khirājīyya. These terms have almost the same meaning, which can be 
translated as the fiscal administration or the treasury, and the fact that such terms are 
used probably related to the context and the author’s own expression. Likewise, the 
sources offer more than one title for the employee who is in charge of this office, such 
as ʿāmil, ṣāḥib and nāḍir. However, the classic title ʿāmil was the term that was most 
frequently cited in our documents, especially in the Almohad taqdīm-s, which were first 
published by ʿAzzawī.14  
As previously stated, the fiscal administration in the provinces was often separate 
from the authority of the governors and was tied directly to the central financial 
administration in Marrakech. In each province, therefore, there was a wālī and anʿāmil. 
The functions of the ṣāḥib al-aʿmāl seem to be very similar to those of the ṣāḥib 
ashghāl al-Barrayn, and thus if the latter was responsible for the financial management 
of the Empire and was the link between Marrakech and provinces, the ṣāḥib al-aʿmāl 
was the one who ran the financial institution in the province and its districts. He was in 
charge of: ‘levy, collecting, and handling money; to controlling the activities of officials 
and agents in this connection, and then to make disbursements for the proper amounts 
and at the proper times’.15 The ʿāmil was also being asked to prepare military 
expeditions and occasionally to supervise the Caliph's properties in the province.16 
Sometimes he was used to supervise public building projects, such as bridges, roads and 
palaces.17 
Like other important Almohad offices, the appointment of the ʿāmil was a 
prerogative of the Caliphs only. The sources do not throw a clear light on the office at 
the beginning of the Almohad dynasty. Yet, in his study on the Almohad political 
organisation, Mūsā claims that the Almohads relied on the financial officers of previous 
governments for the management of the provinces.18 However, with the growth of the 
Almohads, the office became exclusive to the Almohad Sheikh-s.19 Ibn Khaldūn raised 
the possibility that occasionally, and in some places, the office was held by persons who 
were not Almohads, although there is no evidence to support his statement.20 In fact, the 
newly discovered Almohad letters prove that the Caliphs committed to the policy of 
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15 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddima, English trans, vol. 2, p. 24. 
16 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, p. 31.  
17 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣālat, al-man, pp. 240, 253. 
18 Mūsā, Tanẓīmāt al-Muwaḥḥidīn, p. 200. 
19 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣālat, al-man, p. 396. 
20 Ibn Khaldūn, Tārīkh Ibn Khaldūn, vol. 1, p. 304. 
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choosing the ṣāḥib al-aʿmāl from the Almohads, even in the later periods, when 
weakness and fragmentation began to creep into the pillars of the empire.21 The first 
reference to the office in al-Andalus was in 1145, and Abū Isḥaq b. Burāz al-Musufī 
seems to be the first of the Almohad Sheikh-s to have held the position, immediately 
after the Almohads’ occupation of Seville.22 Abū Isḥāq showed the capabilities and 
managerial skills that were appreciated by Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt and, most likely, by ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin as well. When the Caliph decided to transfer the capital of al-Andalus from 
Seville to Córdoba, Abū Isḥāq was instructed to manage the transfer of the 
administration and then led the financial office until his death in 1163/4.23  
Being chosen for the position of ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl was both a big ambition and a 
great opportunity to gain high political and social status. Al-Maqqarī, describing the 
status of the ṣāḥib al-Aʿmāl in al-Andalus, said that he was ‘greater than Wazīr, and has 
more followers and companions; more beneficial; to whom necks are tended and palms 
are opening’.24 Nevertheless, the job carried great responsibilities, and the ʿummāl were 
subject to careful monitoring and examination to assess their performances and 
integrity. Those who were proven guilty of corruption or negligence were faced with 
heavy penalties, ranging from a fine to imprisonment or death. Caliph al-Manṣūr, for 
example, set up a commission in order to investigate the ʿāmil Dāwod b. Abī Dāwod on 
corruption charges. The interrogation continued for as long as six months and, in the 
end, Dāwod was suspended from his office and fined an estimated 150,000 dinars.25 
1.3 Al- mushrif (plural. mushrifīn) 
The khuṭṭa of al-Ishrāf had been known in al-Andalus since the Umayyads, and was 
present in the Almohad financial administration from the reign of Caliph ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin.26 Unlike the Ṣāḥib al-Ashghāl, the mushrifīn existed in fairly large numbers in 
all regions of the Almohad state. They survived even after the demise of the Almohad 
Empire. Their relatively large number can be explained by a sort of common internal 
hierarchy in their category and, above all, by their essential role in the management of 
the treasury and tax. 
                                                   
 
21 See ʿAzzawī, Rasāʾil, pp. 409-78; Buresi, Governing the Empire, pp. 245-405. 
22 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, p. 36. 
23 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣālat, al-man, pp. 138-39. 
24 Al-Maqqarī, Nafḥ al-Ṭīb, vol. 1, p. 217. 
25 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, pp. 224-25. 
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Based on a single passing reference by the thirteenth-century writer and poet Abī 
Baḥr Ṣaffwān b. Idrīs, Abdellatif Sabbane believes that mushrifīn had a leader who was 
responsible for them and who was called the Mushrif al-Mushrifīn, and his headquarters 
was located in the capital city, Marrakech, and was called Dār al-Ishrāf.27 However, the 
claim that the mushrifs had separate department that was managed by a Mushrif al-
mushriffīn in Marrakech is illogical and not consistent with the hierarchy of the 
financial institution, because it would eliminate the role of the ʿāmil al-ashghāl, who is 
recognised by several Almohad sources as the head of the pyramid in the provincial 
financial organisation, as well as being the direct supervisor of its staff. Moreover, 
Sabbane failed to notice that the title mushrif al-mushrifīn was used once again, by the 
same Ibn Idrīs, to refer to Abū Rejāl b. Ghalbūn, who seems to have served as a mushrif 
of Murcia during the reign of Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, and who died in 1193. 28  This 
certainly refutes Sabbane's opinion but, at the same time, it raises another possibility, 
that the term mushrif al-mushrifīn could be used to denote the head of the mushrifīn at 
the provincial level, and not of the empire as a whole. In his description of the transfer 
of the administration from Seville to the new capital of Córdoba, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt said 
that the mushrifīn and the kuttāb of Seville and its districts were summoned to come to 
Córdoba.29 It has previously stated that in each city there was a local administration that 
had almost the same structures that the capital of the province had and, thus, it is most 
likely that the mushrif was a member of the local government, while the main mushrif, 
or, as Idrīs called him, the mushrif al-mushrifīn, was in the central administration in the 
provincial capital. As for the Dār al-Ishrāf, Marrakech was not the only city that 
possessed a headquarters. These appeared in four other cities, namely, Seville, Murcia, 
Fez and Tlemcen, and it is most likely that each province had one in its main city.30 The 
headquarters itself seems to have been used as a centre for assembling financial data 
that related to the revenues and expenses of the province, as well as being the place 
where the mushrif and his staff were based. 
It is very difficult to pinpoint what exactly the role of the mushrif was. In his 
L'histoire et la littérature de l'Espagne, Professor R. Dozy claims that the role of the 
mushrif in al-Andalus was limited to controlling trade on the border and to collecting 
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taxes on imported goods.31 However, during the era of the Almohads, the duty of the 
mushrif seems to have been expanded to include the collection of kharāj (land tax), 
Zakāt (alms) and public taxes. For example, during the process of the reconstruction of 
Córdoba, in 1165, mushrifīn were assigned to oversee the process of collecting Zakāt 
and other legal taxes (al-Farāʾiḍ al-Mafrūḍa).32 Likewise, Ibn ʿIdhārī stated that the 
land tax, as well as the market tax of Beja, was handed over to the Dār al-Ishrāf of 
Seville.33  
The position was a great opportunity for those who aspired to improve their 
professional career and also their social status. Yet, it carried a lot of responsibilities 
and ethical challenges. Through study of the Almohad sources and the records of the 
chroniclers, we have realised that most of the characters who were charged with 
administrative and financial corruption in the Almohad governments were from the 
category of mushrifīn. The punishment for corrupt mushrif was strict and had multiple 
forms. Sometimes, the punishment was not only confined to the mushrif, but affected 
his staff as well. For example, during the process of investigation which was led by 
Caliph Yūsuf I against corrupt administration officials in September, 1201, this resulted 
in the punishment of 18 employees, including the mushrif of Fez, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. 
Yaḥiya, and his staff, Al-Dhahbī and al-Ṭarḥūqī.34 The Almohad Caliphs were keen to 
stiffen penalties against corrupt members of the government so as to send a clear 
warning message to those who might consider doing the same. In some cases, the 
penalty was greatly exaggerated. Ibn ʿIdhārī described the punishment of Muḥammad b. 
Isa, the mushrif of Seville, who was found guilty of financial corruption in January 
1176.  
‘His money and his estates were confiscated and then he received a severe 
punishment. The pain was so great that he tried to kill himself using a knife, but 
he failed. They continued to torture and beat him until he died, then he was 
wrapped in a mat connected in the middle with rope and threw him in the wādī of 
Seville [Guadalquivir].... so this became a lesson for people of understanding, we 
seek refuge with Allāh from the bad consequences’.35 
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1.4 Kuttāb al-Makhzan (The Secretaries of Finance) 
The relative abundance of information that we have about the Secretaries of the 
Almohad Chancery (Kuttāb al-Inshāʾ), contrasts with the paucity of data available on 
the Secretaries of Finance. Obviously, ignoring the latter is not due to the scarcity of 
their presence in the Almohad governments. In fact, some researchers have estimated 
the number of the kuttāb from this category to be very high, compared to other 
employees.36 The expansion of the empire; the increase in the number of its provinces; 
and the wide diversity of income sources and overall expenditure, all increased the need 
to recruit large numbers of kuttāb who possessed the required knowledge in different 
financial departments, or dwāwīn (single. Dīwān). However, with the absence of 
information on the financial institution, only two types of kuttāb can be identified: 
kuttāb of military affairs, and kuttāb of public finances. 
We mentioned earlier that the financial affairs of the military were managed via 
two organs: dīwān al-Jund and dīwān al-Tamyīz, and the kuttāb of these organs were 
assigned to record military personnel, both regular and irregular army, and to determine 
the grants that were given to them. 
The second type of kuttāb, about which the information is too little, belonged to 
those who worked in public financial institutions. They appeared in the sources only 
three times, but with different duties. The first appearance was during the process of the 
construction of the settlement, including the castle, which was established by ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin in Gibraltar in 1160. The kuttāb were responsible for the preparation of 
financial records and for providing the necessary expenditure for construction work.37 
Their second appearance was during the transfer of the capital to Córdoba in October, 
1162. During this event, the kuttāb, who were brought from Seville, were assigned to 
restrict the amwāl al-makhzan (money from the city treasury) of Córdoba and its 
territories, including the areas that were recovered by Ibn Mardanīsh. They also were 
entrusted with the task of collecting the Zakāt (alms) and taxes. Our chronicler, Ibn 
Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, was an eyewitness to this event and most likely belonged to this type of 
kuttāb, because he was one of the kuttāb who were chosen to move to Córdoba, but he 
apologised, preferring to remain in Seville.38 For Ibn Khaldūn, all these tasks fall within 
the duties of the dīwān al-aʿmāl wa-l-Jibāyāt (financial operations and taxation) which 
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were managed by the ṣāḥib al-ashghāl. This seems to be true, because on both 
occasions the person who was in charge of the transference of Córdoba, and who was 
one of the chief managers of the settlement's project in Gibraltar, was the same ṣāḥib al-
ashghāl, Burrāz b. Moḥammad al-Mussūfī.  
The third reference was presented by Ibn ʿIdhārī, in his record of the events of 
1197. During his stay in Seville, Caliph al-Manṣūr ordered an investigation into some 
members of the government who were under suspicion of corruption. Among them 
there was Abī Sulymān Dāwod b. Abī Dāwod, the ʿāmil of Seville. The author stated 
that almost fifty kātib-s has been tasked to look into the records and financial 
documents to find out the truth about this case.39 This kind of investigation against 
corrupt members was carried out several times throughout the empire and, based on this 
occasion, the kuttāb were most likely the key element in such an operation, not to 
mention the large number of kuttāb who were assembled to conduct the investigation, 
which gives us an idea about the extent of their presence in the financial management of 
the state. 
Certainly, having high skills in accounting, and a good knowledge of Sharia Law 
on various financial affairs, are two of the most important requirements for obtaining 
this position. Apart from that, there is no clear distinction between the attributes of 
those kuttāb and the kuttāb al-Inshāʾ. In fact, several kuttāb, through their talent, gained 
access to both offices. Abū al-Ḥasan al-Hawzānī, for example, began his career as Kātib 
with the ʿāmil Ibn al-Muʿallim of Seville, before getting noticed, thanks to his technical 
accounting (al-Muḥāsaba) and his calligraphy skills, by the Vizier, Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar, 
who added him to the group of Secretaries in the central government.40 
1.5 Other Financial Officers 
Different sources indicate the existence of other financial officials, but the information 
about them is so rare that it sometimes does not go beyond a mere mention. Al-Baydhaq 
mentioned an official called Amīn al-Ḍīyaʿ. The author stated that Abū Bakr b. Malūl 
was Amīn al-Ḍīyaʿ during the reign of al-Manṣūr.41 This term has appeared in al-
Andalus since the Umayyad dynasty, and it was used to refer to the official in charge of 
the Caliph's domain42. Some researchers, such as Mūsā and Sabbane, have claimed that 
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the term Mutawallī al-mustakhlaṣ, or al-Mukhtaṣ, which appears once in Ibn ʿIdhāri's 
account and once in the taqādīm, was used also to denote the same employee. 43 
However, this term appeared in al-Andalus very early on and it is used infrequently in 
Arabic sources. It is most likely that it describes the state's properties, such as buildings, 
farmland and markets, although the available information does not allow for the 
drawing of definitive conclusions.  
Another financial official that the sources rarely speak about was the khāzin, who 
seems to be the manager of a warehouse, which were present in all major cities. They 
seem to have had different duties. Ibn ʿIdhārī makes a mentioned of two of them: one 
responsible for the city treasury (khāzin al-māl), and the other for granary and food 
(khāzin al-ṭaʿām).44 Both khazīn-s seem to administratively belong to the dār al-Ishrāf, 
and their direct supervisor was the mushrif. However, there os evidence to suggest the 
existence of other Khāzin-s for clothing and weapons, and they were most likely under 
the supervision of the dīwān al-Jund.45 One might argue that the official who ordered 
the khāzens to bring significant sums of money to be distributed to the Almohad army 
during the events of 1171 was none other than the Vizier Abū al-ʿUlā Idrīs Ibn Jāmiʿ.46 
However, let us not forget that the vizier was responsible for the financial institution 
throughout the reign of the first two caliphs, and that the position of ṣāḥib al-ashghāl 
does not appear in the Almohad government until the era of Caliph al-Manṣūr. 
Finally, the official Nāẓir al-Majābī (tax collector) also raises many questions to 
which the sources have not helped us to provide a definitive answer. The position 
appeared once during the occupation of Seville, in 1147, and the Sheikh Abū Yaḥya b. 
Jabr was the first of the Almohads who held the office 47 . Surprisingly, the job 
disappears completely from the sources, to appear once again in the taqādīm that 
emanate from the era of al-ʿĀdil to Murtaḍā (1224 to 1269).48 The sources did not 
mention the reason behind this disappearance. Nevertheless, sometimes management 
strategies can be understood through their historical contexts. Soon after the Almohads 
established themselves in al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, the Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
annulled all mukūs (excise), taxes and qibāla, with the exception of al-kharāj (land tax), 
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which was organised in 1160 and was managed and collected by the dār al-Ishrāf.49 
However, the Caliphs who followed abandoned ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s restrictive policy on 
tax, and taxes increased gradually until they reached their highest rates in the period of 
decay.50 It is most likely, therefore, that the position of the Nāẓir al-Majābī was also 
cancelled during the era of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin because the purpose of his presence no 
longer existed. In contrast, when the tax increased, the post once again found its way 
into the Almohad government. 
2. Revenue and Expenditure of the State 
2.1 The State Revenue 
The study of the financial resources of the Almohad Empire is a daunting task. First, 
there are no financial records that have survived, like those produced by the crowns of 
England and Aragon, which can provide a better understanding of fiscal policy, such as 
the amount of the revenue and the size of the empire’s treasury. Second, the revenue, 
which was expected to be legitimate, was presented along with other resources that are 
inconsistent with the religious principles that were advocated by the Almohads, and this 
was one of the factors in their success at the beginning of their movement. Although the 
state was trying to show control over it, as we will see later, it always found a way back, 
even if in the shadows. On this subject, we will shed light on the revenues and methods 
that were used to collect the state’s revenue, and then we will look at the taxes, which 
were considered illegal, and how the Almohads dealt with them. 
2.1.1 Ghanāʾim or Booty 
The Ghanīma (plural: ghanāʾim) was the primary source of income for the Almohads 
during the stages of their development and in the transition from being a religious 
reform movement to becoming a vast empire. During their rule, the Almohads launched 
several military campaigns against their enemies, who were both Islamic governments 
and the Christian kingdoms. The Almohads considered Muslims who did not accept 
their call as both their enemies and as kuffār (Infidels).51 Everything that was captured 
from those who submitted to the Almohad authority by force, such as wealth, animals 
and weapons, was considered to be lawful spoils. In al-Andalus, the cities surrendered 
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peacefully, with the exception of the eastern province, which remained under the 
authority of Ibn Mardanīsh, and the Almohads were unable to impose their control on it 
until the beginning of the reign of the second Caliph, Yūsuf I. The sources record the 
stages of this military conflict and mention that a fair amount of war booty was obtained 
from Ibn Mardanīsh and his Christian allies on different occasions.52 For example, in 
1164, a battle was fought near Murcia at a site known as Faḥṣ al-Jullāb and, according 
to the Arabic sources, Ibn Mardanīsh’s forces were heavily defeated and fled to Murcia, 
while the Almohads dispersed to plunder and pillage in the region without any 
resistance.53 Shortly afterwards, the Almohads launched a series of raids in the areas of 
Galera, Caravaca, Baza and Segura Mount, and the forces returned with great booty 
along with tens of thousands of animals, including cows.54  
Sporadic raids were also launched in the lands of the Christian kingdoms, 
especially in periods when a truce was broken, but the largest and most valuable booty 
came from the major military campaigns that were organised and led by the caliphs 
themselves. For example, in the battle of Alarcos, according to Ibn al-Athīr, 13,000 
Christian solders were captured, along with massive spoils consisting of 46,000 horses, 
100,000 mules, 100,000 donkeys, 70,000 helmets and 60,000 shields.55 Although these 
figures seem exaggerated, it was clearly a harsh defeat, and the volume and value of the 
spoils were extremely large. 
Obviously, not all collected ghanāʾim belongs to the state treasury. According to 
Islamic law, only one-fifth of the ghanāʾim goes to bayt al-māl, while the remaining 
four-fifths are distributed among the soldiers who captured them.56 The state's share of 
the spoils, although this seems very low, was enough for the Almohads at the beginning 
of their state’s existence, at least in terms of covering army expenses and the 
requirements of military operations. However, with the expansion of the state, the 
expenses increased and frequent wars, which were fought by the Almohads in al-
Maghrib and Al-Andalus, burdened the state treasury and therefore new sources of 
revenue were introduced, including land tax, which was imposed by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in 
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1160.57 In fact, one notion that it is possible to suggest is that the repeated defeats 
suffered by the Almohads after the era of al-Nāṣir, along with the lack of spoils, were 
one of the reasons for the emergence of illegal taxes. 
2.1.2 Zakāt 
Zakāt is legitimate tax, which represents one of the five pillars of Islam. It is a practice 
of taxation that is imposed on Muslims on the basis of accumulated wealth, and which 
is to be distributed to poor Muslims in order to eliminate inequality among the followers 
of Islam. The zakāt is expected to be paid by all Muslims, but this depends on the 
amount of wealth and the type of assets that the individual possesses. In Māwardī’s 
view, zakātable wealth is of two kinds: manifest and hidden. He says:  
‘… the first refers to that which cannot be concealed, like crops, fruit and cattle; 
the second, to that which can be concealed, like gold and silver and merchandise. 
The person in charge of tax collection does not concern himself with the zakat of 
concealed goods and wealth, as their owners are more entitled to pay the zakat 
thereof, unless they hand it over to him of their own free will’.58 
The zakāt is required on many products for which Islamic law specifies the taxable 
minimum. The amounts can be summarised as follows: 
- Grains: Zakāt is payable on all stored grain. The guideline is set to 1/10th of the 
crop for dry farming, and 1/20th for irrigated crops. The taxable minimum is 5 
awsuq (plural of wasq, the equivalent of 60 Ṣāʿ, or 653 kg). 
- Tree crops: fig, walnut, almond and other fresh or dried fruits are not subject to 
zakat. Only grapes, dates, and olives for the press are concerned. 
- Livestock: First, for camels, the taxable minimum is five camels, for which the 
zakat is set at a one-year-old goat or a sheep. For sheep, the taxable minimum is 
40 heads, and the zakat is attached to one goat or sheep (not less than 1-year-old). 
Finally, for cattle, the minimum is 30 heads, for which the zakat is set at one-year-
old calf. 
- The zakat of gold and money relates only to amounts that are hoarded and not 
involved in the circuits of trade and not loaned to a third party. The rate is fixed at 
1/40th of the total. 59 
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Being a state built on the basis of a religious movement, the Almohad Caliphs showed 
their eagerness for Zakāt, which, they claimed, had been neglected by the Almoravids 
and replaced by illegal taxes. In his famous letter, al-Fuṣūl, Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
ordered his ʿummāl to take on the duty of collecting Zakāt seriously, and to look for 
those who hesitate or refrain from performing the payment, and punish them.60  
The operation of collecting Zakāt began very early and, in some cases, coincided 
with the access to the Almohad movement. Al-Baydhaq, for example, claimed that once 
the famous tribe, the Birghuwāṭa, had acceded to the Almohads, the caliph sent three of 
his men to receive the zakat.61 In al-Andalus, zakāt affairs was administered by a fiscal 
administration kātib, who also seems to have been responsible for the affairs of 
inheritance (al-mawārīth). There is no information about the way in which the zakāt 
affairs were administered in al-Andalus during the period. Yet, Ibn Saʿīd mentioned the 
khuṭṭa of zakāt and inheritance in Seville during the era of Caliph al-M'mūn, in passing, 
and he commended its workflow, through an interesting phrase: "it is brilliant" (inaha 
nabihat hunāk).62 As for zakāt al-Fiṭr (alms for breaking the fast), even if it is a tax that 
is not included in the state treasury, it was carefully managed by the Almohads from the 
reign of Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. So, upon arrival of famous letter, al-ʿadl, in Seville, 
Ibn ʿIdhārī informs us that among the incarcerated ʿāmil, two were in charge of this 
zakat.63 Zakat al-Fiṭr is a duty for a particular period of time, and the product of this 
zakāt would be distributed to the poor once it had been collected, without first putting it 
into the state treasury.64 The distribution process was conducted by a qāḍī, who was 
also subject to state control. Ibn Saʿīd, in his advocacy of the qāḍī Ibn Marwān, who 
was removed from his post, said that the latter was accused of mishandling the products 
of the zakāt al-Fiṭr.65 
2.1.3 The Fifth: Metals (Akhmās al-Ma'ādin) 
On this subject, our sources are extremely sketchy. In all of the material, we have only a 
few poor clues that do not value this rich vein for mining in the Almohad period. In 
relation to the events of the year 1171, al-Baydhaq briefly recounts an offensive of ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin against a faction of the Wāwzguīt tribe that had attacked the ʿadāniyīn 
                                                   
 
60 Lévi-Provençal, Rasāʾil, p. 133. 
61 Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, p. 69. 
62 Ibn Saʿīd, al-Mughrib, vol. 2, pp. 286-87. 
63 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, pp. 37-38. 
64 Lévi-Provençal, Rasāʾil, p. 167. 
65 Ibn Saʿīd, al-Ghuṣūn al-Yāniʿa fī maḥāsin shuʿrāʾ al-miʾa alsābiʿa, ed. I. al-Abyārī (Cairo, 1945), p. 
29. 
 138 
(operator of minerals) in the Jebel Sirwa (mountain). To defeat the rebels, the Caliph 
mobilised three corps of his army and lead it himself. Once order was restored, ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin went down to Ijilīz of Hargha to begin a pilgrimage to the tomb of the Mahdī, 
which was located near the scene of the incident.66 
The text of Ibn ʿIdhārī’s account is very brief, but it is very informative, and 
begins ‘summary the dispatch of the caliph Abū Yaʿqūb into the Sus region to put an 
end to the activities of fraudsters [al-munāfiqīn] of the mines’. In Safar 1183, the Caliph 
began a punitive expedition against mineral operators in the Daran Mountains, near the 
region of the Hargha tribe of Ibn Tūmart. The author tells us that the sovereign 
demanded the income from the tax that rightfully his, and that he had not, at that time 
yet received from this activity. The text reveals neither the nature of the minerals, nor 
the part of the Caliph in this. All we know is that the production from the mine has been 
profitable (akhraja minhu shayʾun lam-yuʿhad fī qadīm al-zamān wa-lā ṣalaḥ qaṭṭu 
ahlu dhālika al-Makān), and thus Abū Yaʿqūb built a fort and left a permanent garrison 
(ajnād), probably for the next royalties of the state but mainly to cope with the almost 
constant rebellion in that place.67 
We still cannot unravel the mystery of the silence of the sources on this subject, 
and yet the soil of the Empire was full of various minerals, to the point that the author of 
al-Muʿjib reserved an annexe in his book for mining exploitation in the Maghrib and al-
Andalus in the Almohad period. In al-Andalus, Marrākushī pointed out some areas 
where metals are located, as follows:  
- In the region of Córdoba, in a place called Shlūn, mercury was extracted and 
distributed to the Maghrib. 
- The metal, lead, is found in the region of Almería, in a place known as Dalayia. 
- In the region of Almería also, iron is located in Bacarés (Bakkaārish). 
- Iron was also extracted from Urba, a place between Dénia and Xàtiva.68 
2.1.4 The Kharāj or Land Tax 
In a well-known passage, Ibn Abī Zarʿ indicates that the caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, aware 
of the lack of tax revenue, began a Cadastration (taksīr) of the entire al-Maghrib so as to 
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impose kharāj.69 Without repeating all the criticisms that have been made of the text, it 
is believed that the first Caliph may well have reorganised the perception of the land tax 
and expanded it to areas where it was not yet a common practice.70 
However, what about al-Andalus? If one follows the information in the same 
chronicle, it informs us, a few pages later, that the land was subject to the land tax.71 
Nonetheless, by reporting events that had taken place in Jerez, Ibn Abī Zarʿ claimed that 
the inhabitants of this town were not paying the kharāj, in recognition of their very 
early entry into the Almohad movement.72 Moreover, in her study on the political and 
cultural history of al-Andalus during the second Taifa period, Dandash went even 
further, and claimed that the Almohads had imposed land tax in al-Andalus that were 
half the amount of the tax levied in the lands of al-Maghrib. In her view, the Almohads 
resorted to this measure to ensure the loyalty of Andalusians and also to encourage the 
eastern provinces in the same way.73 These two procedures encourage us to say that the 
land tax was established differently, not only between cities, but also between both parts 
of the Almohad Empire: al-Andalus and al-Maghrib. 
Apart from this classical document, but still questionable, it is rare to have clearer 
indications, particularly on the part the Almohad chroniclers, with one exception, that of 
the author of al-Muʿjib. Al-Marrākushī, in a paragraph he calls ‘The Extent of the 
Empire and the Rise of the Kharāj’, emphasises the importance of the tax that he 
believed would contribute to the financial strength of the second Caliph. As an example, 
the author has stated the kharāj of Ifriqiya only (Tunis) was 150 mule loads per year.74 
Then, immediately afterwards, and with no apparent connection, he began cutting a 
[whole territory into provinces (ʿumālāt) with estimates of the extent of each one, and 
finally he took his dissertation on the kharāj.75 Would there have been relations between 
the estimated kharāj of Ifrīqiya and this note on the Almohad provinces? I believe that 
the description is not coincidental. In making the comparison between the extent of the 
territory of each province, and those of Ifrīqiya, the author certainly wants to give an 
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idea of the cash received from the kharāj. Al-Marrākushī adds, a few lines later, that 
one of his friends (aṣḥābī), who took care of the public treasury (Buyut al-Amwāl), 
showed him documents (khrāʾiṭ) and bags from the proceeds of kharāj. Unfortunately, 
apart from these two texts (those of Rawrḍ and al-Muʿjib), the sources are always silent. 
Finally, it is believed from many scattered references in the sources that the kharāj was 
paid either in kind or in cash. 
2.1.5 Confiscation (Al-Muṣādarah) 
Confiscation was one of the means used by the Almohads as a punishment, and also as a 
legitimate source of income for the state. This procedure began very early on, and was 
used firstly against the Almoravid leaders and their allies immediately after the 
Almohads came to power.76 Almohads also took possession of the properties of rebels 
or traitors who cooperated with the enemies of the state. For example, in 1162 and 
immediately after the recovery of Granada from Ibn Hamushk's forces, the Almohads 
confiscated the money of those who assisted and supported the invading forces and this 
money was deposited in the state treasury.77 Government members did not survive this 
procedure. In fact, the most common forfeitures in Almohad sources are those carried 
out by the Caliphs against officials who were charged with administrative and financial 
corruption.78 Apparently, the revenue produced from seizing properties in this category 
was too large. For example, during the investigation launched by Caliph al-Manṣūr in 
Seville, in 1196, two members of the government were found guilty of corruption: 
Dāwud b. Abī Dāwud and Abū ʿAlī ʿUmar b. Ayyūb. Besides being imprisoned, their 
property was seized and they were both fined 15,000 and 50,000 Dīnārs respectively.79 
2.1.6 Investments 
Arab sources report a number of investment projects carried out by the Almohads in al-
Maghrib and Al-Andalus. Agricultural investments were at the forefront of the Caliph's 
concerns and formed a steady source of revenue for the empire. Among these projects 
there were the Sultan’s orchards, like those of the Sharaf region to the west of Seville, 
which were densely planted with olive and fig trees.80 The Almohads also received 
revenue from iqṭāʿāt (fiefs), or what the Almohad sources used to called Sihām (single. 
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Sahm). In her study, Dandash claimed that the feudal system of the Almohads was 
based on sharecropping, in the sense that the state entered into a partnership with the 
owner and had a share of the proceeds of the land.81 If we believe Dandash, the revenue 
from this source was massive, taking into account the large amounts of land that had 
been granted. The Caliphs used to reward the Almohad Sheikh-s and Andalusian leaders 
with fiefdoms, especially in the territories of al-Andalus.82 Furthermore, Al-Marrākushī 
stated that the Almohad solders were given iqṭāʿāt along with fixed salaries.83 
The Almohads also invested heavily in the construction of Aswāq (markets) and 
Ḥwānīt (shops), which were built, and then rented, across the state in order to increase 
its revenue and improve the commercial activity in the country. Thanks to Ibn Ṣāḥib al-
Ṣalāt we have valuable information about the markets of Seville during the era of Abū 
Yusūf Yaʿqūb. In 1196 the Caliph ordered the construction of markets and shops around 
the Great Mosque, Adabas, on the land that is currently occupied by the cathedral.  It 
was carefully built and had four doors and a magnificent architectural form. After the 
construction was completed, traders and craftsmen crowded round to rent the ḥūānīt 
(shops) and, as a result, "the kharāj grew dramatically". 84  A further reference 
concerning the sūq in al-Andalus is found in al-Bayān al-Mughrib. Ibn ʿIdhārī 
mentioned the sūqs and houses (ruba') which were built in Beja in 1175, and states that 
the rent was sent to dār al-Ishrāf in Seville85. The rent process was carried out through 
bidding, which appears to have been managed by the dār al-Ishrāf, which was also 
responsible for collecting rent and then depositing the money in the bayt al-māl.86 
2.1.7 Other Taxes 
Eliminating illegal tax has always been a mobilising slogan in the Muslim world. Like 
the great jurist al-Māwardī, Ibn Tūmart, during his religious reform, reserved an entire 
chapter of his AʿAzzu mā-yuṭlab to the taxes of the Almoravids, which he presented as 
being heavy and non-canonical. 87  Upon coming to power, his successor, ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin, in his famous letter of 1152, made clear his intentions with respect to taxation, 
and he took stock of the infractions and abuses that would condemn the Almohads: 
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‘If we informed - and Allāh is the witness - that a kind of these forbidden types, 
or a sort of these dark varieties, is carried out by anyone, or that he allowed such a 
deplorable act, we will punish him by eliminating him, a punishment which will 
remain an example and a lesson for those who warn of the injunction, and wke-up 
call for those who are heedless’.88  
He did it again four years later, in an official letter addressed to the inhabitants of 
Constantine in the central Maghrib.89 ʿAbd al-Muʾmin did not resist the temptation to 
engage in a severe indictment of the Hammadid tax system (1008–1152). Here, the tone 
is set for a return to basics: the establishment of an Almohad tax, based on the principles 
of Islam, the Qurʾan and Sunnah. We can always ask: why, and for what purpose, did 
the first Caliph write the two letters? This could be a reference to the multiplicity of 
illegal taxes in this period and to the presence of resentment among the people, to the 
point that it required frequent intervention from the Caliph to rectify the situation. One 
might also wonder whether this tax had survived the Almoravid period, or was quite 
simply a product of the Almohad movement. Yet, between the death of Ibn Tūmart and 
the installation on the throne of ‘Abd al-Muʾmin, little time had elapsed, and this would 
certainly not have supported the development of a new tax.90 Al-Idrīsī, one of the most 
vocal authors against the Almohads, acknowledged that they had removed multiple 
taxes.91 In al-Andalus, a lot of illegal taxes and excise were introduced in the period that 
followed the rule of the Almoravids, which is known as the second Taifas. As a result of 
the turbulent political situation and economic stagnation, some Andalusian leaders 
handled the fiscal deficit by imposing exorbitant taxes, which increased public 
discontent and eventually led to them being overthrown.92 The situation was much 
worse in the eastern provinces. Ibn Mardanīsh, in order to meet his heavy financial 
commitments to his Christian allies, went too far in the imposition of taxes and levies, 
which, according to Ibn al-Khaṭīb, were imposed on everything, even on occasions such 
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as weddings and parties. Taxes were very high, to the extent that many farmers and 
smallholders were obliged to abandon their farms because they were unable to pay the 
taxes, which exceeded the value of their land yield.93 There is no doubt that this bleak 
picture changed with the entry of the Almohads into al-Andalus and the extension of 
sovereignty over its provinces. However, we cannot say for sure that the Almohads got 
rid of all the illegal taxes, or whether irregularities remained in some areas, and thus the 
removal of taxes is reported at the beginning of each reign, without ever mentioning 
where they had been imposed, or who had imposed them. 
Despite ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s anti-tax campaign, taxes still appear in some parts of 
the empire and maybe even in the capital, which drove the Caliph to say "If this abuse 
exists in our capital, then what about distant places?”94 However, if the Almohads had 
succeeded in reducing illegal taxes in the empire during the era of the early Caliphs, the 
situation appears to have been changed from the beginning of the thirteenth century, and 
the later Caliphs lost control of it, at least in the provinces. Almost all the Almohad 
letters of appointment (taqādīm) from the reign of al-Rashīd urged the stopping of this 
scourge called tax, which won the few parts remaining in the empire. Every sovereign 
strongly calls his newly elected officials to stop the rise and the heaviness of illegal and 
illicit taxes (maḥaq al-Rusūm allatī lā yubīḥuhā al-sharʿ). The nature of these abuses is 
not specified, but one could infer from a few recommendations to the responsible tax 
authorities, that one of the practices that was criticised was the collecting of taxes before 
the legal deadline. In fact, insisting repeatedly on the need to fulfil the duty (or amounts 
due) when the legal deadline was one year for both livestock and goods hoarded. The 
writer also refers to the need to respect legal procedures in tax matters: process (Islūb) 
and law (qānūn) of the financial administration (Ashghāl makhzanīyya) are frequently 
cited to describe the normative framework regulating the activity of the tax authorities.95 
This attitude of sovereigns leads us to a question: who imposed these taxes? 
Certainly not the Caliphs, since several taqdīms declared the abolition of a particular 
type of tax in one area, while in others nothing was reported. Moreover, the Caliphs 
were often decisive about the phenomenon of illegal taxes, and the most common 
behaviour was to dismiss a governor and then to appoint a new one, and this indicates 
the exclusive involvement of local government in this matter. Local rulers must have 
acted individually and imposed their tax policy, which contravened the instructions of 
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the Caliph, taking advantage of the large distance between al-Andalus and the central 
government in Marrakech, together with the difficulties and slowness of 
communications, not to mention the turbulent political situation, which the empire has 
passed through in the period. 
Our documents, mostly chronicles, give us very little information on taxation in 
the Almohad period. In her recent article, H. Ferhat gave an overview on "Taxation in 
the Maghrib", and she notes the ambiguity of the terms used and the shift in meaning 
from one period to another.96 In the taqdīm-s, a number of terms were used to refer to 
non-legal taxes, but provided no detailed descriptions of their nature. Instead, the 
sovereign described them by using religious terms that would have an impact on society 
in order to show his rejection, such as muḥdathāt, munkarāt and maẓālim. Among the 
terms for the tax in the Almohad era, four that keep appearing in our sources: rusūm, 
maghārim, mukūs and qibālāt (the words used nearly always in the plural). The rusūm 
are defined as taxes put on goods and agricultural products in the suq-s and open 
markets (Maḥq al-Rusūm allātī lā yubīḥuha al-Sharʿ min al-Aswāq wa-l-Abwāb).97 It is 
believed that this scourge had, by the end of the empire, won many Almohad cities, and 
thus, when he came to power, the last sovereign, Abū Dabbūs, abolished several taxes, 
among which Ibn ʿIdhārī quotes (rights of doors or grant).98 
Excise, mukūs, were tolls on merchandise that had to be paid when a merchant left 
a city or a district with goods. This is certainly different from the tithe (ʿushūr), which is 
considered a legal tax according to Sharia Law, and which was imposed on non-Muslim 
traders when they entered the country. As for al-maghārim, the Almohad sources have 
nothing to say. Yet, in his study of the Umayyad governmental system in Al-Andalus, 
Sālim stated that this tax appeared in al-Andalus from the reign of the Umayyads and 
was imposed by the Caliph or governors on the inhabitants of a region or a city as a 
punishment.99 This could be the case with the Almohads because we read in al-Nāṣirī’s 
al-Istaqṣāʾ that in the al-Rashīd era the commander, Ibn Wānūdīn, imposed a heavy 
maghārim on the population of Miknasa for not being faithful to the Almohads.100 The 
two official letters from the time of 'Abd al-Muʾmin, already reported, mention two 
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taxes: al-Mukūs and al-qibālāt. So early in his reign, the Almohad Caliph stood up 
against the qibālāt, which would have re-emerged around the various Almohad cities, 
including in the capital. We know from several indications that. At the time of the 
Almoravids this tax affected all products that were manufactured, and no doubt, this 
would have been maintained during the Almohad dynasty.101 Moreover, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-
Ṣalāt, amazed by the architecture of a bridge built in Seville during the reign of Abū 
Yūsuf Yaʿqūb in 1171, wrote twice that the Caliph put it at the disposal of people 
without paying qibāla (tolls). The fact that this historian insists on the free use of the 
bridge implies two things: first that it is an exceptional circumstance, secondly that the 
qibālāt, despite the severity of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, had not disappeared completely, or else 
it had reappeared after the death of the Caliph.102 
2.2 The State’s Expenditure 
2.2.1 Military Expenditure 
The military absorbed the largest share of the Almohad state budget. Due to the 
continual wars in North Africa and Spain, the Almohad military budget far exceeds that 
of other sectors. In addition to equipment and maintenance, Almohad regular troops 
received salaries (rawātib) and although the sources do not mention the amount of the 
salary, it was described as being quite generous. The rank of the soldier and the 
category to which he belonged were recorded in the dīwān in order to determine the 
amount of his salary, which, according to Marrakesh, was offered three times a year, 
every four months.103 
The Almohads also gave money in the form of bonuses or grants (baraka), which 
were distributed to the troops either before, during, or after military operations, along 
with clothing, weapons and horses. 104  Sometimes, the baraka was too large. For 
example, in 1171, a significant amount of baraka was distributed to a massive army, 
consisting of 10,000 Almohads and 10,000 Arabs, which was gathered in Marrakech for 
a major campaign which Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf was preparing to launch in al-
Andalus. Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt provides a detailed record of payment rates: among the 
Almohads, a fully equipped horseman was given 10 dinars, a partially equipped one 8, 
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with 5 for a fully equipped foot soldier, and 3 for the remainder. As for Arab troops, the 
rate was higher: 25 for the fully equipped horse man, and 15 for the partially equipped 
one, with 6 dinars for the foot soldiers. Each Arab Sheikh was given 50, and each tribal 
chief 200 dinars, along with three thousand horses to be distributed among their Arab 
forces as well as clothes and weapons.105 This type of military campaign was costing the 
state treasury very large sums of money, not to mention the military supplies and food 
expenses, especially if we take into account the size of the army and the duration of 
campaigns, which would normally last for several months. 
The relationship between the two sectors of the army and expenditure was a close 
one. In fact, for every great expedition, sources speak of revocation and punishment of 
those accused of mismanagement 'ummāl. Ibn Ṣāḥib Ṣalāt, upon the indictment of the 
Vizier, ʿAbd al- Salām al-Gumī, noted this with the words: ‘in the past, Lamtūna the 
[Almoravids] ruled up to Tlemcen and paid their jund. And we [Almohads] own more 
than they had, in addition all Ifrīqiya, and yet have nothing to be given to Almohads’. 
The answer came. On that day, two Almohad Sheikh-s who were present in the circle of 
the Caliph, were: loss the money of the makhzan (taḍyīʿ al-makhāzin) and incriminated 
the vizier and his financial policy. However, in my opinion, the most interesting thing in 
this passage is the close link between finance and the military: the maintenance of jund, 
which was mainly based on the payment of balances that were funded by the Almohad 
makhzan (Bayt al-Māl). 
Al-Mwāsāt was another type of pay that was often a certain amount of money 
given monthly, once or more often, depending on the availability of resources, and at 
the request of the Caliph. For example, Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin offered Mwāsāt two or 
three times a month when funds were available, while his successor, Abū Yaʿqūb 
Yūsuf, provided it once in a month.106 However, Mwāsāt may sometimes be an amount 
of yield, which was distributed annually among the soldiers when it had been collected. 
This was the case with the Hafsid state, which, in many ways, was a new version of the 
Almohad state, and most of its political and administrative organisations were adopted 
from its predecessor.107 
Further military expenses were those relating to the Almohad fleet, such as 
shipbuilding and maintenance, as well as the sailors’ expenses, such as salaries, food 
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supplies and weapons.108 The fleet played an important role in the twelfth century, 
especially in the control of Ifrīqiya and to secure the necessary support for infantry 
forces during military operations.109 The Almohad Caliphs focused their attention on the 
reconstruction of ports and shipyards on the coast of al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, taking 
advantage of the availability of iron ore and wood in the two parts of the empire. The 
sources differed in determining the size of the fleet. Ibn Abī Zarʿ said that 400 ships 
were built in 1162, including 80 ships built in al-Andalus.110 The seventeenth century 
historian, Ibn Abī dīnār, increased the number to 700 ships. 111 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, 
recording Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s preparations for his military campaign in al-
Andalus, pointed out that the number of ships that were built to take part in the 
campaign reached 200 ships.112 Although these figures are varied, it give us an idea 
about the great size of the fleet and, even if the sources provide no information about 
the amount of expenditure in this field, there is no doubt that significant funds were 
spent from the state treasury to raise the efficiency of the fleet, which became, as 
Charles-André Julien said, the most powerful fleet in the Mediterranean in the twelfth 
century.113 
2.2.2 Salaries and Rewards (hibāt) 
Salaries ranked second in the list of the state's expenses. All members of the 
government received a salary from the state treasury, for instance, the ʿāmil, kātib, ṣāḥib 
al-ashghāl and Nāẓir al-Majābī. 114  The Almohad Sheikh-s received the highest 
privileges. In addition to the feudal lands that were given to them, the Sheikh-s thus 
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enjoyed a salary of 40 dinars, which was distributed four times a year.115 The qāḍīs also 
received a monthly salary (Mwāsāt). This includes those people who are relevant to 
judicial organisation, such as shurḍī (policemen) and muḥtasib, as well as those who 
work in the religious field, such as the faqīh, imām and muezzin.116 The fourteenth-
century historian, al-ʿUmarī, points out that qāḍī al-Jamāʿā, in the Hafsid State, earnt 
fifteen dinars as a monthly salary, and it is most likely that this amount did not differ 
much from those salaries offered in the Almohad state.117 The ṭalaba, the caliphate's 
favourite project, received a special privilege from the reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. The 
ṭalaba thus not only received monthly salaries, but the government provided them with 
financial grants for investment in economic projects to improve their situation. Ibn al-
Qaṭṭān pointed out that Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin lent a thousand dinars to the ṭalaba, 
which were taken from the bayt al-māl, to be used in trade to help improve their 
financial situation and, yet, they were never asked to repay the loans. The author adds 
an interesting note that this contribution came to fruition and these loans were the cause 
of their wealth.118 
There were other categories that benefited from fixed salaries, but they were in a 
narrow range and were limited to those who were in close contact with the government. 
Among them there were doctors, such as Ibn Zuhr, who served Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
and his successors, Yūsuf and Yaʿqūb; Ibn Ṭufaīl, doctor of Caliph Yusūf; Ibn Rushd, 
doctor of Caliph Yaʿqūb.119 There are also engineers, such as the famous Ahmad b. 
Bayāsa, who carried out the wonderful architectural works in Seville and Gibraltar, as 
we shall see.120 
We will conclude this topic with the sums that were given to certain people who 
had a great social or political influence which could be used against the state's interests. 
From the reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, the Almohad Caliphs granted former leaders funds, 
fiefdoms and gifts, in order to gain their satisfaction and ensure their loyalty so that they 
would never think about the conspiracy against them again. Among those who enjoyed 
these funds were Yaḥya b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the former leader of Béjaïa, Banū Mardanīsh 
of Valencia and Murcia, al-Ḥasan Ibn ʿAlī of al-Mahdīya, the Hilaliyyah Arab leaders 
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and the Banū Ghānīya of the Balearic Islands.121 Writers and poets were also among 
those who enjoyed the generosity of the sovereign. Praising the Caliph and boasting of 
his military victories and achievements through poems that they wrote, were the best 
source of income for the poets and were a great way to gain more publicity and fame for 
the Caliph. In all events that were hosted by the Caliph, poets were among the first to 
attend, competing in declaiming poems of praise and veneration in the hope of getting 
paid generously and of being given valuable gifts. Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, for example, 
gave one poet 1,000 dinars in exchange for one single praising verse, and gave another 
an estate as a reward for a poem.122 Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf also spent generously on 
this category. Poet Abū al-Ḥakam b. al-Riḍā Al-Balancī, for example, recited a long 
poem praising the Caliph and once having completed it, he was granted property 
(sahim) in his native Malaga, along with bags full of gifts, a promotion decree and a 
permanent monthly wage from the State Treasury. Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, who recorded this 
event, received his own share of the Caliph's generosity, which consisted of a loyalty 
decree and a salary (mūāsāt).123 Caliph al-Manṣūr and his successor, al-Nāṣir followed 
the tradition of their predecessors in granting money and gifts on any occasion, 
especially when these coincided with military victories.124 It should be noted that from 
the reign of al-Mustanṣir such traditions and occasions, where money and gifts were 
distributed, were no longer mentioned by the sources, either because the historians lost 
interest in recording them, or because the rulers stopped performances on these 
occasions because the State Treasury could no longer afford such expenses. 
2.2.3 Construction Projects 
An extensive construction boom was witnessed by al-Maghrib and al-Andalus during 
the era of the Almohads. The chronicles collect together all of the construction activities 
of the Almohads and mention proudly the works carried out by each Caliph, 
accompanied by the annals of his reign. The sovereign was directly involved in the 
planning of each construction project. Among these projects are the building of towns, 
as in Gibraltar and Rabat, the founding of bridges, mosques and sūq-s, as in Seville, and 
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the construction of hospitals, as in Marrakesh.125 The Caliphs also devoted special 
attention to public utility works, such as the water industry.126 For example, the ʿAīn 
Baraka aqueduct in Sale, which was launched during the era of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, and 
the sewers of Carmona in Seville, by Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf, in 1171.127 Some of the 
projects were allocated to members of the government and to statesmen, such as the 
construction of cottages for government officials and Sheikh-s. According to al-
Maqqarī, the number of residences for Ahl al-dawla in Córdoba, during the Almohad 
era, was 6,300 houses.128 There were also reconstruction projects that were set up by the 
Caliph to restore security to certain cities and towns that had been devastated by rebels, 
or that were subjected to enemy attacks, such as the renovation project of Alcacer de Sal 
in 1191129; the reconstruction of Córdoba after the attacks of Ibn Mardanīsh’s forces in 
1155 130; the construction of a wall and ditch around Seville, and the great tower, known 
as the Torre del Oro, on the banks of the Guadalquivir, around the year 1220.131 In some 
cases, the cost was too heavy. Caliph al-Nāṣir spent 120 loads of gold to repair the 
devastation caused by Ibn Ghānīya in Ifrīqiya.132 
The Caliphs were extremely generous in their spending on these projects. Al-
Ḥimyarī, talking about the city of al-Fatḥ in Gibraltar, said that the money raised for the 
constructions could not be counted.133 Sometimes, this spending was too excessive, 
perhaps in order to show the richness of the Empire, or to bring more publicity for the 
Caliph's reign. Ibn Abī Zarʿ claimed that the bronze gilded balls, which were placed at 
the top of the minaret of the mosque in Seville, were worth 100.000 golden dinars.134 
This, and other architectural projects, drained the empire's budget. Some consumed 
large amount of funds and ultimately seems to have failed to achieve their purpose. 
According to Ibn Abī Zarʿ, Caliph al-Manṣūr, in his last days, expressed his regret about 
three acts during his rule, including the large amounts of money that he had spent on the 
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reconstruction of Ribāṭ al-Fatḥ to no avail.135 Finally, it is worth noting that most of the 
construction projects, if not all, were set up in the time of the first four caliphs as a 
result of political and economic stability, not to mention military victories, which were 
the main source of spending for most of these projects. However, if the authority spent 
generously on architectural plans during its golden age, it was not able to do so in 
subsequent periods as a result of the absence of military victories, and the resultant lack 
of resources and an increase in the number of economic crises. 
The Almohad sovereigns showed a clear interest in relation to social 
contributions, and historians recorded a number of occasions on which the Caliphs 
distributed huge amounts of alms, and handouts to the poor and low-income people, 
whose names appear to have been kept in a special file among the state documents so as 
to track their numbers and facilitate access to them. After Caliph Yūsuf recovered from 
his illness in 1170, 30 Dīnārs were distributed to each of those whose name was 
recorded under the poor section (Miskīn). 136 The sources recorded a number of 
individual handouts paid by the Caliphs on sporadic occasions. However, major alms 
giving was usually linked to important events, such as the renewal of allegiance to the 
Caliph, or the arrival of a new one. For example, the first action taken by al-Manṣūr 
after he was announced as the new Caliph, was to take 100,000 gold Dīnārs from the 
bayt al-Māl and to distribute them to the poor.137 The government was also responsible 
for providing the necessary assistance to the residents of areas that were suffering from 
a serious crisis. For example, when famine occurred in 1213, Caliph al-Mustanṣir 
ordered the warehouses, which were intended for the storage of food, to be opened and 
the food to be distributed, without cost to the poor, and with a price to the wealthy.138 In 
this regard, Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt spoke of Cuenca residents who had suffered weakness 
and a severe shortage of supplies as a result of the blockade that was imposed by the 
Christian forces for as long as five months, in 1172. Caliph Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf 
requested the conducting of a census and found that there were just 700 inhabitants. The 
Caliph then gave them payment, which was distributed as follows: 12 dinars to a 
horseman, 8 dinars to a foot soldier, 4 dinars to women and children. They were also 
given 70 cows and a large amount of grain, and the Caliph encouraged his entourage to 
give them alms.139 
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The socio-medical field did not escape the ruler’s attention. Dozens of 
Bimaristans were created, especially under the reign of al-Manṣūr.140 The Almohad 
Bayt al-Māl took care of patients and paid the costs of hospital stays and medication. 
Al-Marrākushī, a fervent admirer of al-Manṣūr, said that the latter would provide, at the 
beginning of each year, for the circumcision of young orphans and the abandoned. He 
writes that he ‘Gives each a small mithqāl (Dinār), a garment, a loaf, a pomegranate, 
and often adds two brand new dirhams’.141 
To conclude on this theme, two facts must be considered. Firstly, there is 
considerable ambiguity with respect to the origins of these huge sums. With the 
exception of very rare cases, the sources provide no clear distinction between the funds 
of the state treasury and those of the sovereign, to the point that one might wonder if the 
Caliph himself recognised such a distinction. This confusion also appears in the gifts of 
land and estates that were given by the Caliph on many occasions, without any 
reference to their origin. Secondly, all the money was given under the supervision of the 
Caliph himself, or by his order, which leads us to believe that spending authority, in this 
field, was outside the terms of reference of local governments. Even the subsidies to 
towns were provided by his permission. For example, the inhabitants of Alcacer de Sal, 
a small town near Lisbon, had to wait until 1191 when Caliph al-Manṣūr ordered 
payment of regular subventions from the treasuries of Seville and Ceuta to help them to 
survive in their dangerous position.142 
3. Al-Sikkah or Almohad Coinage 
In his essay on Almohad numismatic reform, Prieto Vives describes the profound 
changes that they introduced into their currencies.143 The specific form introduced by 
the Almohads in numismatics is the square coin, a feature that makes the Almohads’ 
and their successors’ coins easily recognisable. However, the fact that the Almohad 
coins had no issue date on them makes it difficult to determine when the first Almohad 
coin was minted.  Some historians have stated that the first coin was minted during the 
reign of the Mahdī, who set the precedent for coining square dirhams and for engraving 
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a square on the round dinar.144 Ibn Khaldūn went even further, and he claimed that “the 
Mahdī was described as the ‘master of the square dirham’ by the practitioners of magic 
who predicted the coming of his dynasty”.145 This statement, and the fact that the 
Almohad coins have no date of issue, casts doubt among modern researchers. Salvador 
Fontenla, for example, believes that, although Ibn Tūmart never produced gold coins, he 
must certainly have minted silver dirhams. 146 He support his argument, beside the 
statement of Ibn Khaldūn and al-Marrākushī, with the fact that ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, who 
produced silver half dirhams bearing his own name, did not, however, have it engraved 
on dirhams which, in Fontenla's interpretation, was a way of respecting the style and 
inscriptions of the coins that the Mahdī had put into circulation.147 Other researchers, 
like F. Codera and Maribel Fierro, believe that the first coin was produced during the 
reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and most likely after the occupation of Marrakech and the 
founding of the empire.148 Codera considered that, although it might be assumed that the 
dirhams that have engraved on them the name of al-Mahdī were coined during the life 
of the founder, this is not acceptable in any way, because many of them had on them the 
names of towns that were not conquered by the Almohads until after the death of al-
Mahdī. We must also take into account that, during the period of the Mahdī, the 
Almohads had not yet obtained political authority over the ground that qualified them to 
issue their own currency. However, in spite of serious attempts and arguments made by 
each team to support its point, the fact still remains that, with the absence of dates on 
the Almohad coins, there is no way to prove whether Ibn Tūmart or ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
minted coins before the year 541. 
The monetary policy of the Almohads differs greatly from that carried out by the 
Almoravids as their respective ideologies were radically different. Dinars minted by the 
Almohads represent not only a complete numismatic breakdown regarding their 
defeated predecessors in power, but also a radical departure from the policies of coin 
minting that were generally followed in the Islamic world. While the quality of the gold 
remained at exactly the same grade until then, the weight, size and the design were 
drastically altered. The old standard weight of 4.2 grams, which had been the weight 
                                                   
 
144 Abī al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, ‘al-Dūḥah al-Mushtabīkah’, ed. I. Muʾnis, Ṣaḥīfat Maʿhad al-
Dirāsāt al-Islāmīyah, 1-2 (Madrid, 1958), pp. 63-204. 
145 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddima, English trans., vol. 2, p. 57. 
146  Salvador Fontenla Ballesta, ‘Especificidad la moneda almohade’, Los almohades: Problemas y 
Perspectivas, vol. 1, pp. 53-67. 
147 Salvador delivers other arguments to support his point of view, such as: the mention of people in 
charge of the mint in the hierarchy of Ibn Tūmart in the version of Kitāb al-ansāb (which is highly 
debatable); the existence of Almohad dirhams minted in Tīnmal, the Almohads' first capital. 
148 F. Codera y Zaidín, Tratado de numismática arábigo-española (Madrid, 1879), p. 22. 
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desired by the Almoravids, was inconsistent with the Umayyad dinar that was 
established during the first century of Islam and which was adopted, despite political 
differences or ideological ones, by the `Abbasids. Instead, the Almohads introduced a 
smaller dinar with an average weight of 2.27 grams and a diameter of between 19 and 
22 mm. This reduction in weight could have been due more to economic restrictions 
than to reasons of ideology. The route to sub-saharan Africa and the gold mines would 
not have been fully protected by the Almohads in the early phase of its hegemony. It is 
also uncertain that the cordial relations that linked the Almoravids with West Africa, 
where gold was mined and exported, continued to exist after the Almoravids were 
defeated by the Almohads. 
Consequently, the Almohads coined what modern numismatists have come to call 
the “double dinar”, whose average weight is 4.55 grams and whose diameter ranges 
between 27 and 32 mm. This dinar would emerge for the first time during the caliphate 
of Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (1184-1199) and appears to have been introduced to 
fill the gap in the circulation of gold coins after the collapse of Ibn Mardanīsh and the 
consequent devaluation and eventual disappearance of the dinars that he coined. 
As for al-Andalus, the situation is less difficult. Studies agree that the first coin 
was minted during the reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. According to Ibn Abī Zarʿ, the first to 
swear allegiance (bayʿā) to the Almohads in al-Andalus was ʿAlī b b.ʿĪsā Maymūn, the 
Almoravid naval commander, who delivered the first khuṭbā of loyalty to the Almohads 
in al-Andalus in the mosque at Cádiz, in 1146. 149 There is no evidence, so far, that 
coins were issued as a result of this act. However, taking into account the evidence now 
availaable, the first coins issued by, or on behalf of, the Almohads were minted in al-
Andalus workshops even before their final victory against the Almoravids in 1146.150It 
is fairly certain that the early Almohad coins must have been minted by ʾAḥmad b. Qasī 
in western al-Andalus (Gharb al-Andalus). They were engraved on one side with the 
Shahādatān (the two testimonials of Muslims) and, on the other side, with what could 
be described as an expression of the Almohad doctrine: Allāh rabbuna wā-Muḥammad 
nabiyyuna wā-l-Mahdī imāmuna. The Almohad Caliph would only be identified by his 
title, al-Imām al-Qāʾim bī-Amr Allāh.151 
                                                   
 
149 Ibn Abī Zarʿ, Rawḍ al-Qirṭās, p. 121. 
150 See José Rodrigues Marinho. ‘The monetary issues of Ahmad ibn Qaṣī in Silves and the beginning of 
the characteristic Almohad coinage’, pp. 43-58. 
151  Among the many variants, see: Vives Antonio y Escudero, Monedas de las dinastías 
arábigoespañolas (Madrid, 1893), No. 1915, p. 318. 
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3.1 The Almohad Dinar 
The first dinar coined in the name of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin was stamped at the mint of Jaén 
in1146152. Interestingly, it is in the style of the Almoravids’ dinars. In one of the central 
areas there are phrases as follows. 
lā ilāha illha Allāh  
waḥdahu lā sharīka la-hu 
amīr al-muʾminīn  
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī  
There is no God but Allāh 
He is only One. No partners for Him 
Leader of the Faithful 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī 
In the phrases on the border the following are collected: 
bism Allāh, ḍuriba hadhā al-dīnār bi-Jayyān, ʿām iḥda wa-arbaʿīn wa-khams mīʾa 
(In the name of God, this dinar was struck in Jaén in 541) 
In the other central area the phrases are as follows: 
 
While the phrase that can be read on the border is the "Prophetic Mission". 
 
Figure 7: Dinar, minted in Jaén153 
The use of the Almoravid style in these dinars is also seen in subsequent Almohad 
releases conducted in the mint at Ceuta, where a rare copy was coined in 1147154, in 
whose central obverse phrases we read: 
lā ilāha illā Allāh 
Muḥammad rasūl Allāh 
ṣalla Allāh ʿalay-hi wasallam 
al-Mahdī al-qāʾim bi-amr Allāh 
There is no God but Allāh 
Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allāh, 
May Allāh honour him and grant him peace 
Al-Mahdī is the One who carries out God’s orders 
 
                                                   
 
152 Arlette Nègre, ‘Le trésor islamique d'Aurillac’, trésors monétaires, 9 (1987), No. 49; Hanna E. Kassis, 
‘La moneda, pesos y medidas’, in Viguera (ed), El retroceso territorial, vol. VIII/2, pp. 303-37. 
153 Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection 
http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almoravids_taifas.htm (Last accessed 1 August, 2015). 
154 This coin, and another issued in the following year, are treated in Hanna E. Kassis, ‘Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ's 
Rebellion against the Almohads in Sabtah (A. H. 542-543/A. D. 1147-1148): New Numismatic 
Evidence’, pp. 504-14. 
Allāh rabbuna 
Wā-Muḥammad nabiyyuna 
Wā-l-Mahdī imāmuna 
Allāh is our God 
Muḥammad is our Prophet 
Al-Mahdī is our Imam 
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The dinars from Jaén and Ceuta are not at all representative of the Almohads' monetary 
policy, since in their dinars, without exception, they did not include the date. Moreover, 
most of the known coins do not indicate the mint at which they were struck. 
In contrast to what was happening with their predecessors, the Almohads’ dinars 
are very uniform, in as far as style and phrases are concerned. Generally, we could 
group the Almohad coins that are associated with al-Andalus into six distinct phases, as 
follows: 
- First phase: The reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin (1146-1163) 
The dinars minted during this phase have an average weight of 2.28 grams. This weight 
became a pattern for subsequent dinars, containing the following core phrases: 
Obverse: lā ilāha illā Allāh, Muḥammad rasūl Allāh  
Reverse: al-Mahdī Imām al-umma, al-qāʾim bi-amr Allāh. 
The phrases on the border or margin, which usually have a circular shape surrounding 
the central phrase, are here put in a square, thus being divided into four segments, as 
follows: 
 
The obverse: 
1st. Segment: bism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm 
2nd. Segment: ṣallā Allāh ʿalā Muḥammad 
3rd. Segment: wa- ahli-hi al-ṭayyibīn  
4th. Segment: al-ṭāhirīn 
The Reverse: 
1st. Segment: Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd 
2nd. Segment: al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī 
3rd. Segment: amīr al-muʾminīn 
4th. Segment: al-ḥamd li-Allāh rabbu al-
ʿālamīn. 
 
Figure 8: 1/2 Dinar minted in Córdoba155 
The name of the mint, if present, is inscribed in smaller characters, in either position, 
either above or below the central phrases. Among the cities whose names are engraved 
                                                   
 
155  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection, http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1 August, 2015). 
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on the dinars minted in this phase, three were located in al-Andalus: Córdoba 156 , 
Seville 157  and Jaén. 158  Clearly, the absence of Kurʾanic passages in the phrases is 
something that rarely happens in Islamic numismatics. Equally remarkable is the claim 
of the caliphate by ‘Abd al-Muʾmin, set, as shown, in the Jaén dinars mentioned above. 
There is no evidence that might suggest that the term Amīr al-Muʾminīn refers to the 
Abbasid Caliph of Baghdad. However, any debate one may have about this claim to the 
caliphate is dissipated by the phrases of the dinars minted in the second phase. 
- Second phase: The reign of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, with his designated heir Abū ʿAbd 
Allāh Muḥammad (1156-1163) and the first part of Abū Yaʿqūb Yusūf’s reign 
(1163-1168) 
While starting the second phase of monetary development in 1156, the Almohads had 
established an iron grip on al-Andalus, except in the area of Sharq al-Andalus, which 
remained under the control Ibn Mardanīsh. The dinars issued during this phase firmly 
established the style of coinage for the rest of the Almohad period. The legends reflect 
more strongly the politico-religious ideology, particularly in terms of the caliphate. 
Moreover, the absence of Kurʾanic passages on the dinars from the previous phase was 
rectified by introducing the following verse: wa-ilāhu-kum ilāhun wāḥid lā ilāha illā 
huwa al-raḥmān al-raḥīm, (your God is one God. There is no deity [worthy of worship] 
except Him, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially Merciful)159, a verse that reflects the 
theology of the Almohads. 
The central legends give the impression that the text that was started on the front 
continues on the back: 
Obverse: 
bism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm, lā ilāha illā Allāh, Muḥammad rasūl Allāh, al-Mahdī imām al-
umma 
Reverse:  
al-Qāʾim bi-Amr Allāh al-khalīfa Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī, amīr al-muʾminīn. 
 
The central phrases are framed by marginal phrases on the same manner as they were in 
the first phase dinars: 
                                                   
 
156 J. D. Brethes, Contribution à l'histoire du Maroc par les recherches numismatiques (Casablanca, 
1939), no. 1029. 
157 Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2057, 2058, p. 346. 
158 F. Codera, ‘Cecas arábigo-españolas’, Revista de Archivos, Bibliotecas y Museos (Madrid, 1874), p. 
343. 
159 Koran, Sūra, 2:163. 
 158 
Obverse: 
1st. Segment: wa-ilāhukum  
2nd. Segment: ilāhun wāhidun  
3rd. Segment: lā ilāha illā huwa  
4th. Segment: al-raḥmān al-raḥīm 
Reverse: 
1st. Segment: al-amīr al-ajall  
2nd. Segment: Abū ʿAbd Allāh 
3rd. Segment: Muḥammad b. 
4th. Segment: Amīr al-Muʾminīn. 
 
Figure 9: 1/2 Dinar minted in Fes160 
As in the case of dinars in the first phase, the name of the mint, if present, is stamped in 
smaller characters in either a position that is above or below the central legends. 
The dinars of this phase first appear during the period in which Abū ʿAbd Allāh 
Muḥammad was appointed the heir of Abd al-Muʾmin (1156-1163). When, instead, his 
brother Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb came to power in 1163, the legends on the dinars remained 
unchanged, except that they were coined in relation to the marginal inscription on the 
back, which holds the title al-amīr al-ajall, and replaces the name of his deposed 
brother with his own. These changes left the legend disposed as follows: 
1st. Segment: al-amīr al-ajall 
2nd. Segment: Abū Yaʿqūb 
3rd. Segment: Yusūf b. 
4th. Segment: Amir al-Muʾminīn 
During this period, of all the cities of al-Andalus only the name of Seville appears on 
the dinars. 
- Third phase: The second part of Abū Yaʿqūb Yusūf’s reign (1168-1184) 
The third phase is characterised by the investiture of Abū Yūsuf Yuʿqūb with the title 
Amir al-Muʾminīn, in 1168.161 This is reflected in the legend around the reverse of these 
coins, which are undated, where al-amīr al-ajall is replaced by amīr al-Muʾminīn. 
                                                   
 
160  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection, http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1st August, 2015). 
161 Harry W. Hazard, The Numismatic History of Late Medieval North Africa (New York, 1952), no. 492, 
p. 148. 
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Again, Seville is the only city in al-Andalus that is named on the dinars from this 
period.162 
 
Figure 10: 1/2 Dinar minted in Seville163 
- Fourth phase: The reign of Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr (1184-1199) 
The fourth phase saw the expansion of the content of the central legends, which are thus 
more extensive. Most notable of this extension is the inclusion of parts of two Kurʾanic 
verses, ‘wa-mā bikum min niʿmatin fa-min Allāh’ (Whatever you have of favour, it is 
from Allāh) 164  and, wa-mā tawfīqī illā bi-Allāh, (My success is not but through 
Allāh).165 The affiliation also becomes more widely expressed: the name of the caliph 
appears, and it is associated with the names of his father and his grandfather. 
It was during this phase that a double-sized dinar was introduced into the Almohad 
currency. The new dinar (known in Spanish sources as a “doble” has an average weight 
of 4.55 grams and a diameter of between 27 and 32 mm. The central legends of this 
‘doble dinar’ are as follows: 
Obverse:  
bism Allāh al-raḥmān al-raḥīm wa al-ḥamd li-Allāh waḥdah, la ilāha illā Allāh / Muḥammad 
rasūl Allāh / al-Mahdī imām al-ummā.  
Reverse:  
al-qāʾim bi-amr Allāh al-khalīfa Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b ʿAlī / amīr al-muʾminīn 
Abū Yaʿqūb Yusūf b. amīr al-muʾminīn. 
 
The legends on the border, or margin, continued the tradition of the previous phases but 
appear to be more compacted, especially on the face, so as to accommodate the 
Qurʾanic texts that were added. These legends are as follows: 
 
                                                   
 
162 Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2062, p. 347; For another copy, which includes Seville, see Hazard, The 
Numismatic, no. 498, p. 149. 
163  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection: http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1st August, 2015). 
164 Koran, Sūra, 14: 53. 
165 Ibid, Sūra, 11:88. 
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Obverse: 
1st. Segment: wa-ilāhukum ilāhun wāḥidun 
2nd. Segment: lā ilāha illā huwa al-raḥmān al-raḥīm 
3rd. Segment: wā-mā bikum min niʿmatin fa-min Allāh 
4th. Segment: wā-mā tawfīqī illā bi-Allāh  
Reverse: 
1st. Segment: amīr al- muʾminīn  
2nd. Segment: Abū Yusūf Yaʿqūb 
3rd. Segment: b. amīr al- muʾminīn  
4th. Segment: b. amīr al- muʾminīn 
 
As has become apparent, no mint in al-Andalus appears on dinars from this period.166 
 
 
Figure 11: Dinar minted during the period of Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr167 
Fifth phase: The reign of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Nāṣir (1199-
1213) and Abū Yusūf Yaʿqūb al-Mustanṣir (1213-1224) 
The legends on the dinars of this fifth phase are usually the same as those in the 
previous period, except for precise amendments due to the change of ruler and the 
desire to publicly display the dynastic list. 168  However, there are two significant 
changes in the legends on the margins: The first is the elimination, once again, of the 
passage from the Koran that are inscribed on the fringe of the front, which happens to 
be replaced by the name of the ruler. The second is the introduction of the proud 
expression al-Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn (Orthodox Caliphs) as an epithet for the Almohad 
Caliphs. It must be remembered that this term was formerly applied only to the first four 
caliphs of Islam, and they were all peers and members of the tribe of the Prophet. The 
overuse of the term amīr al-muʾminīn in dinars of both this and the previous phase 
seems to have had the desired effect, which occurs even in Christian sources, where the 
Almohad ruler is best known for this title, rather than by any other name. 
                                                   
 
166 An example without indication of the mint is Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2066, p. 348. 
167  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection: http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1st August, 2015). 
168 Some dinars minted during the reign of Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb al-Nāṣir recover the style of the dinars 
in the second phase, with al-Amīr al-ajall Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Amīr al-Muʾminīn, replacing the 
legend on the margin of the back. Vives presented one in the form of a "doble dinar ', no. 2070, and 
another in the form of a single dinar, no. 2071. Vives Antonio, Monedas, p. 349. 
 161 
 
Figure 12: Dinar minted during the period of Muḥammad al-Nāṣir169 
 
- Sixth phase: The reign of Abū al-ʿUlā Idrīs b. Yaʿqūb (1227-1230) 
The adjustments to the "double dinars" of this sixth phase were associated with the 
reign of Abū al-ʿUlā al-Maʾmūn (1227-1232), the last Almohad Caliph with effective 
power that was connected with al-Andalus.170 In the legends of the two known types of 
"double dinars" the tradition of expression, to make known the long list of names of 
their predecessors, and the omission of the passage from the Koran continues. One of 
the copies introduces the term al-Mujāhid al-Maʾmūn as an epithet for the Caliph Abū 
al-ʿUlā.171 The expression Ibn al-khalīfatayn appears on both coins and differs only in 
respect of their distribution of the legend.172 
 
Figure 13: Dinar minted during the period of Abū al-ʿUlā Idrīs b. Yaʿqūb173 
                                                   
 
169  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection: http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1st August, 2015). 
170 This link is limited to the fact that he was proclaimed Caliph and loyalty (bay'a) was sworn to him in 
Seville; see Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, p. 274. 
171 Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2076, p. 351. 
172 For the second type, see Hazard, The Numismatic History, no. 512, p. 153. 
173  Coins of al-Andalus, Tonegawa collection, http://www.andalustonegawa.50g.com/almohads1.htm 
(Last accessed 1st August, 2015). 
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3.2 Silver Coins 
The Almohad dirhams more often present us with the names of cities in al-Andalus. 
These dirhams can be either circular174, with an inscribed square containing the legend, 
or square, the latter being the most common. The names of the mints in al-Andalus, 
when they appear, are recorded under the legend on the reverse side in square dirhams 
that bear the name of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin. The legends are as follows: 
 
Obverse: al-ḥamdu li-Allāh rabbu al-ʿālamīn  
Reverse: Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī amīr al-muʾminīn. 
 
These Andalusian mints which appear impressed on the silver coins are the cities of 
Granada175, Seville176, Jaén177, Malaga178 and Murcia.179 During the governments of all 
the Almohad Caliphs that followed ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, square dirhams were struck in 
which one could typically read the same Almohad legends: 
Obverse: lā ilāha illā Allāh / al-amr kulluhu li-Allāh / lā quwwata illā bi-Allāh  
Reverse: Allāh rabbunā / Muḥammad rasulunā / al-Mahdī imāmunā. 
When the name of the mint appears, it does so positioned under the legend on the back. 
A number of cities in al-Andalus are mentioned in these pieces: Valencia, Dénia, 
Granada, Seville, Jaén, Málaga, Menorca, Mallorca, Murcia, Córdoba and Jerez.180 
 
Figure 14: Two Dirhams minted during the period of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī181 
                                                   
 
174 For example, see Hazard, The Numismatic History, no. 1065, p. 264. 
175 Ibad, no. 1072, p. 265. 
176 Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2116, p. 360. 
177 Ibad, no. 2114, p. 360. 
178 Ibad, no. 2115, p. 360. 
179 Ibad, no. 2117, p. 360. 
180 See: Vives Antonio, Monedas, no. 2089-2099, pp. 356-57. 
181  Coins of the Muwahhid (Almohad) dynasty, Coins from Morocco and Al Andalus, 
http://coins.alif.fr/Muwahhid/Muwahhid.html. 
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Conclusion 
It is not clear whether the financial system of the time existed in al-Andalus before the 
Almohads, or to what extent the latter put their mark on this system. What is certain is 
that the financial institution performed efficiently and, as a result, the state never 
suffered, except for some short periods, from any serious financial crises. A hierarchy 
of financial apparatus enjoys relative autonomy, along with the constant monitoring by 
sovereigns, have created a kind of financial stability and its results were reflected in the 
economic situation in the country. However, as in any other institution, when the state 
loses its power as a result of internal political conflicts, or external defeats, the revenue 
sources are reduced and economic crises begin to emerge. Financial institutions, no 
matter how energetic and well-organised, will be unable to cut the deficit in their 
budget. Here is the role of government: either to seek the help of the sovereign, or to 
apply their own rules and resort to common methods, such as the imposition of new 
taxes, even if they are contrary to their principles. 
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4 
Judicial and Religious Institutions under  
the Almohads 
 
 
The identity of any community is reflected by its institutions, and the ability of a state to 
survive and develop rests on the stability of those institutions. Like other organisations, 
the judicial institution is a very important area of study, especially when it comes to a 
state that is built on a religious basis, promising comprehensive reforms in various 
institutions and, above all, in its judicial organisation. 
As a preliminary observation, we have two points to make: on the one hand, 
unlike the Fatimids, whose movement was based on an idea and religious structures, the 
Almohads never designated under the label waẓāʾif dīniyya (religious functions)1. It is 
certain that the Almohads did not need either fuqahāʾ, or other men of religion, to 
legitimise their actions. Furthermore, the centralisation of the Maṣmūdien state 
considerably hampered and limited the power of the judges and Faqīh-s. In addition, a 
brief overview of the primitive hierarchy shows that the charges which could be refer to 
as "religious" were ranked at the bottom of the table and sometimes, in some lists, they 
were completely ignored. On the other hand, the shortage of documents contrasts with 
the interest that Muslim writers have generally agreed upon in this area. It also contrasts 
with the concern for justice, which is based on the very project of the dynasty’s founder, 
Ibn Tūmart. This certainly makes our job quite difficult, as it requires research into 
several kinds of sources in order to provide a better understanding of the nature of the 
religious and judicial organisation of the Almohad state. However, the main types of 
these sources are twofold: firstly, official documents, which in turn can be divided into 
the letters to administrative officials, which address various issues, and the letters or the 
taqādīm of appointments of qāḍī-s. Secondly, there are the biographical dictionaries that 
are of inestimable interest in establishing an almost exhaustive list of qāḍī-s. 
                                                   
 
1 Al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā, vol. 3, p. 486. 
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Sometimes, these books present some aspects of the activities of judges, although the 
data are usually standardised, because the authors tended to reject many details. 
This chapter examines the judiciary institution in al-Andalus such as khuṭṭat al-
Qaḍāʾ, al-Ḥisbā and al-Shurṭa and shed light on the religious functions, namely the 
Imām, Khaṭīb and Muʾdhdhin. Finally, we will analyse the attempts of the sovereign to 
reform judicial law by adopting a regenerative project against the Mālikī School. It 
should be noted that this chapter will not address the doctrine of the Almohads, nor the 
caliph’s judicial privileges, as they have been studied in depth in several other studies2. 
1. Judicial Institutions 
1.1 Qāḍī al-Jamāʿa 
A typical Andalusian position, which continue to be maintained at this time, was the 
Qāḍī al-Jamāʿa, or the "judge of the community", which was established at Córdoba in 
the Umayyad period, and which stood at the top of the judicial hierarchy.3 Historians 
believe that the position was similar to the position of the qāḍī al-quḍāt, which first 
appeared in the Abbasid Caliphate and was then adopted by other eastern Islamic states, 
such as the Fatimid and Ayyubid dynasties.4 At this time, the Almohads followed their 
predecessors, the Almoravids, in maintaining the post of qāḍī al-jamāʿa, and the 
sources indicate 12 judges who occupied this position in the capital, Marrakech5. As for 
al-Andalus, we read, in Ibn al-Abbār’s al-Takmila, that the well-known Ibn Rushd was 
qāḍī al-Jamāʿa of Córdoba.6 In the same source, the author claimed that Aḥmad b. 
Mūḥammad al-Lakhmī al-Bājī was qāḍī al-Jamāʿa of Seville for a long time, and until 
                                                   
 
2 For recent and relevant studies on these subjects, see the special issue of Revue des Mondes Musulmanes 
et de la Mediterranee, nos. 91-4 (1999). Especially relevant to this thesis are Michael Brett, ‘Le Mahdī 
dans le Maghrib medieval: l’elaboration de la légitimité Almohade’, pp. 93-106; Maribel Fierro, ‘Le 
Mahdi Ibn Tumart’, pp. 107-24; Tilman Nagel, ‘Le mahdīsme d’Ibn Tumart et d’Ibn Qasi: une analyse 
phenomenologique’, pp. 125-36; and Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, ‘Imām et Mahdī: Ibn Abī Mahalli’, pp. 
157-80. There are also two excellent colloquium collections Mahdīsme: crise et changement dans 
l’histoire du Maroc (Rabat, 1994); and Los Almohades: problemas y perspectivas, vol. 2, pp. 739-1230. 
3 According to the 10th century faqīh and historian, Abī ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad al-Khashnī, the first qāḍī 
who took the title of qāḍī al-jamāʿa was Yaḥīya b. Yazīd al-Tajībī during the reign of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān I 
(731-788). Al-Khashnī, Quḍāt qurṭuba wā ʿulamāʾ Ifrīqiya, ed. A. A. al-Ḥusīnī (Cairo, 1953), p. 28; 
Hopkins, Medieval Muslim Government, p. 120. 
4 Al-Nabbāhī, Tārīkh quḍāt al-Andalus: al-Marqaba al-ʿuliyā fīman yastaḥiqu al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-futtiyā, ed, 
Lajnat Iḥiya al-ṭurāth al-ʿArabī (Beirut, 1983), p. 117; al-Maqqarī, Nafḥ al-Ṭīb, vol. 2, p. 101. 
5 Hopkins, Medieval Muslim Government, p. 131-32. 
6 Ibn Abbār, al-Takmila, vol. 2, p. 149. 
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1234.7 Some researchers, such as J. Bosch Vilà8, F. Rodríguez Mediano9 and ʿAzzāwī10 
took these references as evidence to indicate the existence of the post in al-Andalus at 
that time. Mūsā ʿIzz al-Dīn, on the other hand, argues that, in such cases, the title was 
honorary, rather than being an official mandate, given by the author to some judges as a 
form of respect, and in honour of their professional skills and status in Andalusian 
society.11 This may be true for certain reasons: first, other than the two references 
mentioned above, none of the Almohad sources and documents speak of the qāḍī al-
jamāʿa in al-Andalus, and this is particularly true of the eyewitness accounts, such as 
Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt who, for example, was in contact with the qāḍī Ibn Rushd, but who 
never refers to him as the qāḍī al-jamāʿa. 12  Secondly, the qāḍī al-jamāʿa was 
considered one of the central administrative positions because his main duties required 
him to be in the capital of the Empire, next to the caliph and under his direct 
supervision; to be a member of the special advisory board and one of tools upon whom 
the caliph relied when making political decisions or administrative reforms alongside 
judicial duties. 
Apparently, the position of the qāḍī al-jamāʿa was established very early, but did 
not have a specific title or duties. We know that the Mahdī chose Abū Ibrāhīm Ismāʿīl 
al-Khazrajī, a member of the Council of Ten, to decide disputes on his orders.13 With 
the arrival of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, another character Abū Mūsā ʿImrān b. Sulaymān al-
Kafīf, the stepfather of the caliph and a member of the Assembly of Fifty, curried out 
the same duties but, again, without a specific title as the first one.14 However, once the 
administration was equipped with new institutions, the Almohads no longer had, from 
the very beginning, access to the office, which was reserved solely for distinguished 
scholars from the Ḥaḍar ṭalabat and secretaries.15 
As with other important positions, the appointment or dismissal of the qāḍī al-
jamāʿa was exclusive the privilege of the sovereign, which usually occurred with the 
death of the caliph and the rise of a new one. Depending on professional skills, 
sometimes the judge was exercising another job along with his judicial duties, as in the 
                                                   
 
7 Ibid, vol. 2, p. 163. 
8  Bosch Vilà, ‘The Organisation and consolidation of the Islamic administration in al-Andalus’, 
Regierung und Verwaltung des vorderen Orients in islamischer Zeit (Leiden, 1979), vol. 2, p. 130. 
9 F. Rodríguez Mediano, ‘Instituciones judiciales: cadíes y otras magistraturas’, in Historia de España, 
pp. 171-186. 
10 ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 248. 
11 Mūsā, Tanẓīmāt al-Muwaḥḥidīn, p. 230. 
12 See, for example, Ibn Ṣāḥib la-Ṣalāt, al-Mann, pp. 149, 223, 226, 410, 496. 
13 Al-Baydhaq, Akhbār al-Mahdī, p. 33. 
14 Ibn Ṣāḥib la-Ṣalāt, al-Mann, p. 224; Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 175; Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, p. 80.  
15 See the table of qāḍī al-jamāʿa given by Hopkins in, Medieval Muslim Government, p. 153-55. 
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case of the famous Ibn Rushd, who exercised, on the one hand, the functions of qāḍī al-
jamāʿa and eminently religious functions in Muslim society, and he was, on the other 
hand, the official philosopher and one of the doctors of the caliph, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb.16 
The removal of a qāḍī al-jamāʿa resulted almost immediately in the impeachment of the 
other qāḍī-s within the region of Marrakech, who were appointed by him.17 Yet the 
biographical sources, like Dhayl, al-Takmila and some taqdīms, show that this function 
was hereditary and had a degree of continuity.18 
What was the role of the Qāḍī al-Jamāʿa? 
As mentioned previously, the qāḍī al-jamāʿa had a seat on the Council of the Caliph, 
which was the highest consulting authority in the Almohad Empire. During the reign of 
al-Maʾmūn, and after the catastrophe that had befallen the Sheikh-s, the qāḍī became the 
caliph's first adviser and he appeared to be a director of the basic state policy.19 
Amongst his activities, the judge presided over court proceedings, which seem to 
have been held in the Palace of the Caliph.20 It was his task to pronounce the bayʿa for 
the new Caliph, and to present delegations arriving in caliphal palace. 21  He also 
accompanied the sovereign on major military expeditions.22 Furthermore, he chaired the 
solemn prayer in the capital, managed the product of the zakat, and celebrated religious 
festivals. 23  The qāḍī would also have carried the responsibilities of Khaṭīb. Al-
Marrākushī thus praised the qāḍī al-jamāʿa of Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb, Abū Mūsā ʿIsā b. 
ʿImrān al-Tāzī, and said that he was also a good orator (Khaṭīb).24 However, the eastern 
author, al-Ṣafadī, in his description of the Board of the Caliph al-Nāṣir, made a big 
difference between the Khaṭīb who sat right next to the Caliph, and the qāḍī who sat a 
little further away.25  
As regards administrative responsibilities, the authority of the qāḍī al-jamāʿa, as 
the chief of the judicial organisation, appears to be less than had been expected. 
                                                   
 
16 See R. Arnaldez, 'Averroes', les Africains, IV (1977), p. 43-67  
17 See examples cited by Ḥ. A. Ḥasan, al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmiya, p. 155-57.  
18 ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, vol. 2, p. 248, and see the references provided. 
19 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, pp. 256, 284; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, al-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār Gharnāṭa, vol. 1, p. 419. 
20 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjab, p. 285. 
21 M. al-Zuḥaylī, tārīkh-al-qḍāʾ fī al-lslām (Damascus, 1995), p. 327. 
22 A fairly recent study of the famous Almohad qāḍī Abū al-Rabīʿ Sulaymān al-Kilāʿī states that this 
judge handled the organisation of military expeditions, choosing tactics and commanding the troops in 
combat: T. Lihī, Abū al-Rabīʿ Sulaymān b. Mūsā b. Sālim al-Kilāʿī: hayātuhu wa-āthāruhu (Casablanca, 
1994), p. 108. 
23 M. Gaudefroy Demombynes, ‘Notes sur l’histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays d’Islam’ Revue 
des études islamiques, II (1939), p. 109-147 
24 Al-Marrākushī, al-Muʿjab, p. 285. 
25 Al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi-l-wafīyāt, ed. A. al-Arnaʾūṭī (Beirut, 2000), vol. 17, p. 575. 
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Theoretically, the qāḍī al-Jamāʿa, by virtue of his office, was in charge of appointing 
the judges of the provinces, monitoring their performance and transferred or dismissed 
those who were guilty of corruption, or who had failed to perform their duty.26 In 
practice, the authority of the qāḍī al-jamāʿa was limited to in the capital and its districts, 
and thus the appointment of judges in the provinces became an exclusive privilege of 
the Almohad Caliph.27 This means that the administrative authority of the qāḍī al-
jamāʿa was similar to that of the provincial judges who, in turn, were responsible for the 
appointment of the lesser judges in their regions. Restricting the power of the judge in 
the capital seems to have been a strategy that was inherited by the Almohads from their 
predecessors, the Almoravids, who, in turn, did not invent it but maintained the sections 
of the provincial judicial institution which was created as a result of the political 
division that prevailed in al-Andalus after the disintegration of the Umayyad dynasty 
into separate emirates, into what is known as the Taifa states.28 
As might be expected, the sources do not provide much information about the 
salary of qāḍī al-jamāʿa or his financial position. However, Ibn Abī Zarʿ noted the 
words of the qāḍī al-jamāʿa of al-Manṣūr, Mūḥammad b. Ṭāhir al-Ḥasīnī ‘It reached me 
from the Amīr al-Muʾminīn al-Manṣūr since I've known him [in 587] until his death [in 
595] about nineteen thousand [dīnārs] without counting khulaʿ [presents], marākib and 
Iqṭāʿ [fiefs]’.29 
Finally, it is difficult to assess the qāḍī’s degree of autonomy over the 
administrative apparatus. This, according to H. Djait:  
‘… relied heavily on the holder's personality, but in any case, being a high official 
authority, appointed by the government, the qāḍī was related, whether he liked it 
or not, to the regime. Yet he was more than that, and could appear in moments of 
crisis or power vacuum as the leader of the Islamic community’.30 
1.2 Provincial Judges 
The sources sometimes called provincial judges quḍāt al-wilāyāt and sometimes ḥukām 
al-jihāt. They rank third in the judicial pyramid (after the Caliph and the qāḍī al-
jamāʿa) and come at the top of the legislative and administrative authority of the 
provincial judicial institution. As previously mentioned, the judges in the provinces 
                                                   
 
26 Al-Khashnī, Quḍāt qurṭuba, p. 29; M. al-Zuḥaylī, tārīkh-al-qḍāʾ fī al-lslām, p. 327. 
27 See Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, p. 132; Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān, p. 129, 231, 233; See also the taqdīm-
s in Pascal, Governing the Empire, pp. 406-97. 
28El Hour, ‘The Andalusian Qāḍī’, p. 68; Ḥ. A. Ḥasan, al-ḥaḍārah al-Islāmiya, p. 162.  
29 Ibn Abī Zarʿ, al-Dhakhīra al-Sunniyya, p. 48; Ḥarakāt, al-Maghrib ʿbra al-tārīk, vol. 1, p. 325. 
30 H. Djait, ‘La wilāya d’Ifrīqiya au IIe/VIIIe siècle (86-184H / 705-800)’, Annales ESC, XXVII (1967), p. 
103. 
 169 
were appointed and dismissed by the Caliph, and he never delegated his power to any 
member of his government, at least until the first quarter of the thirteenth century. 
However, the taqdīms, which were published by ʿAzzāwī, contain a taqdīm that shows a 
different act. Here the Caliph, perhaps al-Rashīd, did actually delegate his power, and 
thus a governor officially receives the right to make appointments to the offices of ḥāfiẓ, 
qāḍī and ʿāmil.31 It must be remembered that these taqdīm-s were issued during the 
period in which the central authority had lost its full control over the provinces, and yet 
the fact that only one taqdīm contains this delegation indicates that the Caliph had not 
authorised the governors to appoint the judges of their provinces, except within a very 
narrow range, even in the difficult conditions that were experienced by the Empire 
during the thirteenth century.  
Once the judge was chosen, a decree of appointment was issued in two forms: one 
would be sent to the chosen qāḍī and it confirmed the location of the appointment and 
the duties of the position, including the Caliph’s injunction to dispense justice according 
to the Koran and the Sunna. The second would be sent to the destination, announcing 
the appointment, the reason behind it, and the Caliph’s testimony regarding the 
qualification of the judge and his professional conduct, concludes with a clear order for 
the local government to co-operate with him and to facilitate his work. A taqdīm issued 
by the caliph al-Maʾmūn between September 1227 and November 1229, is a case in 
point: 
‘Know that your land—May God make it a plain—enjoys in our heart exclusive 
and constantly renewed attention. For your place with us, by the seniority of your 
friendship, is protected by the generous solicitude of its shepherds (al-raʿyi). This 
is why we continually distinguish you by watching over your situation, why we 
enquire ceaselessly about the state of your affairs, small and large, and why we 
propose to act on all that concerns you in a way that magnificently fulfills your 
most ambitious hopes…. We have judged it a good thing, after having asked the 
help of God on High, to name Fulan to judge your affairs related to the Law and 
to take charge of the religious aspects of your problems; he enjoys a celebrated 
rank and place of choice in our religion, and everyone agrees on his purity and 
devotion. We advised him before to fear God on High…. We have ordered him to 
base his judgments on the Book of God and the Tradition of His messenger, to 
use them as the basis of his words and actions, and to choose well his 
instrumentary witness and secondary judges (musaddidīn); indeed, they are the 
cornerstone on which he founds and authenticates his judgments. We have 
prescribed that he grant everyone their place, as long as it does not conflict with 
the Law; indeed, he must take this under consideration, see and hear only it; and 
no one should have more than another in regards to the imperatives of the law, 
there is no exception for rank in the pronouncement or execution of a sentence. 
Once our letter has been read before you, submit your decisions (aḥkām) to him, 
[come together] behind him so that he may arbitrate among you in case of 
                                                   
 
31 ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, vol.1 p. 248. 
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disagreements. Be in agreement, rather than opposition, you will find the blessing 
that offer concord and union. Know that we have chosen him for those among 
you with the most perfect valor, education, and religious practice. By our 
benevolence for you we have designated him to take charge of this responsibility 
for you and occupy this rank. Bring him support, your aid, and your assistance, if 
God on High wills it’.32  
 
Apart from their valuable information on the judicial positions, biographical 
dictionaries, as well as the taqdīm-s, highlight two important phenomena: the first is the 
large number of Andalusian judges compared with the number of judges from the 
Maghrebi side. In his article on the judicial system, El-Mostafa Benouis claimed that the 
sources mention approximately 361 judges who practised the charge during this time, of 
whom 284 were Andalusian, mostly from Córdoba, followed by Granada, Seville, 
Valencia, Murcia and Malaga, respectively.33 This phenomenon can be explained by the 
cultural superiority of al-Andalus and the centres for religious sciences and Islamic 
jurisprudence that had long been established in its cities. It is not thus surprising that the 
number of Andalusian judges who held this position in Maghrebi cities was higher than 
the presence of Maghrebi qāḍī-s in al-Andalus. In any case, one should keep in mind 
that biographical dictionaries did not count all the judges but focused on those who have 
a good reputation and were well-known at the level of the city or region. El-Mostafa 
also raises the fact that most of these books were written by the Andalusians and 
therefore the list of Andalusian judges would be more complete and detailed.34 
The second phenomenon is the frequent movement of the qāḍīs, either between 
the cities or between al-Andalus and al-Maghreb. The biographical dictionaries are full 
of examples of judges who exercised the judiciary in more than one place, and who 
moved during their professional careers from city to city, and from one region to 
another, all over the empire.35 For example, Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān 
al-Anṣārī was appointed as a judge in Seville, Mallorca, Murcia, Córdoba, Ceuta, Salé, 
and then returned to Murcia and died in Granada in 1215.36 Similarly ʿAbd Al-Minʿim 
b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, known as Ibn al-Faras, was appointed in Alcira, 
Guadix, Jaén and Córdoba and then moved to his hometown Granada with anther 
                                                   
 
32 ʿAzzāwī, Rasāʾil, vol. 1, p. 479; Buresi, Governing the Empire, pp. 406-08. 
33 E. Benouis, ‘L’Organisation du qaḍāʾ sous les Almohades’, Los Almohades: problemas y perspectivas, 
vol. 2, p. 509. 
34 Ibid, p. 511. 
35 See Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ishbīlī, Brnāmij shīūkh al-Raʿīnī, ed. I. Shabbūḥ (Damascus, 1962), pp. 132, 151, 
154; Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, pp. 18, 34, 65, 72, 139; IbnʿAbd al-Malik, al-Dhayl wa-l-takmila, vol. 5, 
pp. 388, 448, 572, 676; al-Ghubrīnī, ʿUnowān al-dirāya, pp. 120, 129, 160; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, al-Iḥāṭā fī 
akhbār Gharnāṭa, vol. 1, p. 181. 
36 Al-Nabbāhī, Tārīkh quḍāt al-Andalus, p. 112. 
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judicial duty where he died in 1201.37 The sources provide no information about the 
purpose of the active mobility within the category of judges, but it seems to have had 
positive effects in the development of the judicial system. On the one hand, the 
practising of the judiciary in different towns and cities helped the judge to improve his 
judicial skills, and gave him more experience, which qualified him to obtain a higher 
position and more responsibilities. The qāḍī often started his professional career as a 
secondary judge (musadid), who exercised his duties as a judge in small towns in order 
to acquire the necessary experience which qualified him to be promoted to judge and to 
move to a big city. On the other hand, it offered him a good opportunity to get to know 
the scholars and the fuqahāʾ of other places, and to take advantage of their knowledge, 
skills and their views in the field of the judiciary and sharīʿa law. On the part of the 
caliphate, this strategy could have been designed to reduce the influence of the judges 
on a given community. Thus, according to El-Mostafa’s statistics, two qāḍī-s out of 
three exercised their post outside their hometown.38 This strategy was also designed to 
act as a means to prevent corruption.  In fact, only one case was reported in which the 
judge was accused of bribery and even this is questionable.39 
As regards the function of the judge, the sources throw a light on many of the 
administrative and judicial affairs that were covered by the judge’s duties, not to 
mention the social and religious activities that were linked to his position as a 
representative of the religious authority and the most prominent and influential figures 
in the Muslim community. In terms of judicial and administrative affairs, Māwardī, 
followed by Nabbāhī, who served as the qāḍī of Granada during the fourteenth century, 
listed the cases that fell within the responsibility of the judge, such as, settling suits 
between litigants; guardianship over those who were insane or foolish, and imposing 
restrictions on those considered bankrupt; the supervision of wills and mortmain 
donations, and of the marrying of marriageable women who did not have a legal 
guardian and were demanded in marriage; the supervision of (public) roads and 
buildings within his zone of jurisdiction. The qāḍī was also responsible for the 
application of the ḥudūd (prescribed penalties) to those deserving such punishments, as 
long as proof had been established, either by confession or by the testimony of others.40 
However, the judges in the regions did not have a free hand to judge in certain cases 
                                                   
 
37 Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, p. 195; Ibn al-Abbār, al-Takmila, vol. 3, p. 127. 
38 E. Benouis, ‘L’Organisation du qaḍāʾ’, p. 516. 
39 This was the case of Ibn Jaʿfir Ibn Abī Ghālib, qāḍī of Málaga. Ibn Saʿīd, Ikhtiṣār al-Qidḥ, p. 123. 
40 See Māwardī, al-aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, pp. 119-21, English trans, pp. 106-08; Al-Nabbāhī, Tārīkh quḍāt 
al-Andalus, pp. 5-6. 
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until they had received approval from al-Ḥaḍrah (the capital). These were matters such 
as those related to blood money for head fractures, blood money for the body organs, a 
penalty for theft, manumission and slavery. Furthermore, they were prevented from 
implementing the death penalty on anyone, whether from among the Almohads or from 
outside the empire. In his letter to the provincial governments, the Caliph ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin stated that these cases fell within the jurisdiction of the sovereign and the 
judges were mandated to transfer them to the capital, with all the related documents and 
records, including witness statements and testimony, the arguments of the plaintiffs, and 
the confessions or the arguments of the accused.41 However, this authority appears to 
have exceptionally been given to some of the provincial judges. Al-Manṣūr thus 
delegated the qāḍī of Granada, Ibn al-Faras, to judge in cases involving bloodshed.42 
Within his administrative responsibilities, the judge was in charge of appointing 
the judge of small towns, or, as the sources called them, Musaddidūn, whose duty seems 
to have been limited to addressing minor cases43. Yet, the caliph, and sometimes certain 
wālī-s, could use their authority to appoint such qāḍī-s within the scope of his province, 
especially if the residents of the city requested them to do so44. The wālī of Seville, for 
example, appointed ʿAlī b. Aḥmed b. ʿAlī as a judge of Jerez de la Frontera at the 
behest of its population.45 The qāḍī also appointed the staff in his office, such as the 
judge’s deputies (nāib al-qāḍī), secretaries (kuttāb) and notaries (muwaththiqun). 
However, instrumental witnesses, or shuhūd, were the qāḍī’s most important staff 
members. Indeed, the taqādīm spoke frequently about the importance of the witnesses 
and of their great role in helping the judge to make his decisions and to authenticate his 
judgments. He was therefore strongly advised to select them carefully and personally, 
and to regularly examine their behaviour and reliability. For example, in the taqdīm No. 
52, the Caliph al-Maʾmūn advised the qāḍī, Abū Muḥammad, who was appointed as 
Judge of Jerez,  
‘To accept as witnesses only those who are known for their sense of justice and 
honesty, famous for their vigilance and sagacity, as well as for their purity and 
virtue, for testimony is the judge's pillar and support (by which he issues or 
receives... that he refuses) and it is the source of what he binds or unbinds in his 
                                                   
 
41 Ibn Ṣāḥib al-Ṣalāt, al-Mann, pp. 304-05; Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Nuẓm al-Jumān, pp. 159-61. 
42 Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, p. 19. 
43 The wālī could sometimes use his authority to appoint judges in the small towns that fell within the 
scope of his province, especially if he were asked by the residents of the city to do so. The wālī of Seville, 
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44 Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, pp. 18, 22, 130, 184, IbnʿAbd al-Malik, al-Dhayl wa-l-takmila, vol. 5, pp. 
61, 168, 280. 
45 Ibn al-Zubayr, Ṣilat al-Ṣila, p. 277-78. 
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judgments. Thus, to that must he dedicate all his efforts and recognise or refuse 
[witnesses] as he should’.46  
As noted by Cahen, the term shāhid refers to two categories: witnesses for the material 
facts, who change from case to case, and who cannot therefore be subject to prior 
designation, and the other category are those who are "instrumental witnesses'', who 
demonstrated through their participation the regularity of judicial acts, and who could 
technically form a list from which the quḍāt can recruit their normal auxiliaries. 47 Ẓāfir 
Al Qāsimī simply named the first category "witnesses of litigants", and the second 
"witnesses of the judge".48 The number of witnesses was not limited and depended on 
the type of case and the reliability of the witnesses, and the more the number increased, 
the more content the judge would be with his decision. Ibn Khaldūn claimed that 
witnesses (most likely the witnesses of litigants) had their own premises in every city, 
where people who had transactions to make could engage them to function as witnesses 
and to register the (testimony) in writing, although there no sign that this was recorded 
in the case of al-Andalus.49 
In addition to judicial affairs, the judge enjoyed a central position in the Muslim 
community for being both anʿālim (sharīʿa scholar), who participated in the transfer of 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and the prophetic tradition, and as a man of political 
influence, who had a close link with the authority of the empire. This distinctive 
character of the judge in the community gave him different social-religious and political 
responsibilities. For example, the judge gave a sermon and led the prayer at major 
events, such as religious celebrations.50 He also oversaw the collection and distribution 
of Zakāt al-Fiṭr among the poor.51 Ibn Abī Zarʿ went even further, by making the judge 
of Seville, Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Ṣaqr, the administrator for the collection of kharāj,52 
though this could be an exceptional case because there is evidence that provincial 
treasuries came under the responsibility of an independent office that was led by an 
ʿāmil. The qāḍī also often appeared in the sources by acting as the representative and 
spokesperson for the community. We see, for example, Abū Bakr al-Ghāfiqī and Ibn al-
Jadd, the Judges of Seville and Córdoba53, respectively, heading a delegation to meet 
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the Caliph ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in Gibraltar in 1160, in order to renew the bayʿa on behalf 
of the people of Seville and Córdoba. Similarly, during the Almohad campaign in 
Ifrīqiya, the entire population of Gabès, with its qāḍī at its head, came out of the city to 
greet the Almohad army and to declare their submission.54 
This mixture of power and social status raises a question about the wealth of the 
judge and the amount of his income. In theory, fuqahāʾ pointed out that the qāḍī should 
not be poor, in order not to be tempted to accept any benefits (rashwa), and to keep his 
financial independence vis-à-vis political power. In reality, only a few of the 
biographies mention qāḍī-s having sufficient wealth, which most likely did not come 
only from their wages, but also from family inheritances, the Caliph's award (aʿṭīyāt) 
and previous administrative activities, or activities that were outside the judiciary, such 
as teaching and writing. Among the few who had great wealth there are the faqīh 
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Yaḥīya b. al-Jad55, the faqīh ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad b. Abī 
al-Qāsim56, and the faqīh Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. ʿAbd Allāh.57 Certainly, judges in 
different categories were paid a salary in exchange for their activity in the judicial 
institution. Muḥammad Zuḥaylī assumed that the salary of judges in al-Andalus was 
higher than their counterparts in al-Maghrib, due to the contrast in the civilizations and 
the standards of living between the two areas. 58  The sources do not provide any 
information about the amount of such salaries. They do, however, mention to cases in 
which the judge was living in austerity, such as the faqīh Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh 
b. Ḥajjāj who never spent his salary for his personal needs but distributed to the poor59, 
or in others where possible judges showed their rejection of the post. The qādī ʿAbd al-
ʿAzīz al-Bāghāʾī, for example, refused to take the office and, at the insistence of the 
qādī al-jamāʿā, Abū Yūsuf Ḥajjāj, that he accept the offer, he responded by saying ‘By 
God, were I to be split with a saw from head to heels I would not accept this office for 
you’, so he was excused.60 This reluctance to accept the qāḍīship is found in al-Andalus 
from earliest times and drew the attention of the biographers of judges, such as Abū 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammed al-Khashnī (ob. 972) and Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī al-Nabbāhī (ob. 
1391), who devoted a chapter in their biographical dictionaries to those who were 
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offered the position of judge and refused it. The most common reason for this reluctance 
is the fear of the warning statements contained in the Koran and the hadith regarding the 
judiciary. For example, we read in the Koran that: ‘whoever does not judge by what 
Allāh has revealed, such are the defiantly disobedient’61; also, in the hadith, the Prophet 
said:  
'Judges are of three types, one of whom will go to Paradise and two to Hell. The 
one who will go to Paradise is a man who knows what is right and gives judgment 
accordingly; but a man who knows what is right and acts tyrannically in his 
judgment will go to Hell; and a man who gives judgment for people when he is 
ignorant will go to Hell'.62  
However, the interest of such sources in such cases cannot be considered as evidence of 
this being prevalent behaviour among judges. In fact, in addition to the example 
mentioned above, only two cases were recorded in which the judge declined to accept 
the post, one of which was for a political reason.63 This also applies to judges who 
refused to take a salary, or who insisted on being paid for only the days when they were 
exercising their judicial duties.64 
As they were also appointed by official decrees, what was the relationship 
between the governors and the Almohad qāḍī-s? This question is difficult to ascertain, 
the few cases available show the two officials next to each other during religious 
festivals, or when the Caliph was passing in the area. However, this attitude does not 
exclude plots and underhand intrigues. Moreover, this hidden confrontation may also 
make us consider the independence of the two charges, and this is not often easy to 
distinguish. 
1.3 The Subordinate Judges 
In medieval Islamic law, judicial power was exercised by virtue of a delegation of 
authority. This, for the same reason, could define the objective and territorial 
jurisdiction of the magistrate invested. Under this principle, the Mālikī doctrine allowed 
the appointment of substitutes who were delegated with all or part of the jurisdiction of 
the qāḍī, in order to assist him in the exercise of his powers. 
The first in the list of those assistants comes the nāʾb (deputy) who intervened 
during times of the absence or the illness of the judge.65 Sometimes the qāḍī delegated 
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some of his powers to his nāʾib who could be a simple faqīh66 or a secondary judge of 
any small town, to take on this task. The faqīh Sulaymān b. ʿAmīthil b. Yaḥya, for 
example, had exercised the qaḍāʾ in several towns in the province of Malaga before 
being appointed as deputy to the qāḍī of Malaga.67 
Among the assistants of every Judge there was mushāwar or muftī. The first of the 
two terms68 comes from the verb Shawara, "to advise" and refers to the assistants of the 
judge from whom the latter sought advice on specific issues. The muftī, for his part, was 
in charge of issuing legal opinions when a problematic issue arose.69 At this time, both 
terms refer to the advisor to the judge, and in fact are often used interchangeably to refer 
to the same people. Ibn ʿAbdūn also informs us that the judge should have two fuqahāʾ 
as assistants, and that the total number shall not exceed four, two in the court of the qāḍī 
and two in the mosque.70However, in the time of the Almoravids, this number is not 
confirmed. 
Another faqīh with judicial role was called Ḥakam or Ṣāḥib al-Aḥkām, and his 
mission was initially to monitor compliance with the judgments of the qāḍī, but he also 
acquired powers to issue sentences in some cases by the judge’s delegated power. The 
missions of the Ḥakam are well explained by Ibn ʿAbdūn, who says the qāḍī must 
‘designate a secondary judge [Ḥakam], who is both a man of science, of goodness and 
fortune, to judge the minor matters of the poorer classes, but without intervention in 
monitoring the use of funds [of the pious foundations], in proceedings relating to 
orphans and as well as anything regarding the business of government or state 
officials’. 71  A little later he adds that the fundamental mission of the judge is to 
reconcile the parties, and to be assigned a salary from the state treasury.72 
Other specific tribunals in certain cases are, for example, the qāḍī of khuṭṭat ʿaqd 
al-manākiḥ or of khuṭṭat al-mawārīth. The first was specialised in issues arising from 
marriage contracts. Among this quḍāt there are Mukhlid b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān 
who was appointed in Córdoba73, Qāṣid b. ʿAlī b. Yaʿmur in Ceuta74, and Muḥammad 
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b. Muḥammad al-Marādī in Murcia75. The qāḍī of khuṭṭat al-mawārīth was dealing with 
issues related to inheritance. However, at the time of the Almohads, this office seems to 
have disappeared, and thus only few who have been mentioned by the sources and they 
had either changed their post afterwards 76  or were also carrying the duties of 
muḥtasib.77 
In addition to these specialized fuqahāʾ, each qāḍī was surrounded by a group of 
administrative and legal officials such as kuttāb and muwaththiqūn. The duty of the first 
was to write and record verdicts for the right of the litigants.78 The muwaththiqūn, for 
his part, was a specialist in writing contracts and covenants.79 Of course, the work in 
both offices requires legal knowledge and skills and therefore most of them were 
fuqahāʾ and some of them became judges in the future.80 
Certainly, bibliographical dictionaries are the primary sources for information 
about the holders of these offices. However, the information they give remains limited, 
and gives a view that is frozen in time, and they do not allow us to provide a complete 
picture of the situation in the period under study. 
1.4 The ḥisba 
The ḥisba, or the office of market supervisor (muḥtasib), is a religious position that had 
been known in the Muslim West, specifically in Spain, since the Umayyad period. 
Based on the Koranic verse al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahī ʿan al-munkar (to command to 
do good and to forbid to do evil), the office was established to supervise economic and 
commercial practices in order to keep everything in order according to Sharia law. 
However, Buresi alludes to the fact that the muḥtasib did not have an important role in 
the era of the Almohads, if compared to their role during the era of their predecessors, 
the Umayyads and the Almoravids. 81  He argues that the Almohad authority was 
constantly enjoining local governments to carry out the religious obligation: "enjoining 
what is right and forbidding what is wrong". The ḥisba, which was the reserve of the 
muḥtasib, thus ‘became an obligation for all the officials of the Almohad state’. Buresi 
based his argument on the fact that all the discovered works in this field were written 
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before the Almohads came to power, e.g., treatises of Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-
Rʾūf (1033)82, Ibn ʿAbdūn83, and Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Ṣaqaṭī (at the end of eleventh 
century). In contrast, there is no reference to the ḥisba in the Almohad taqdīm-s. 
However, the absence of the muḥtasib from the taqdīm-s, which were basically 
addressed to the governors and judges of the provinces, does not necessarily mean that 
the position had ceased to exist. Many of the fuqahāʾ who were appointed to the 
position of muḥtasib in the era of the Almohads are mentioned in biographical 
dictionaries, even more than those who held the position during the time of the 
Almoravids. Among those muḥtasib-s there are Sulaymān b. Yaḥya b. Sulaymān al-
Qīsī, who held the position several times in Seville84, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd 
Allāh in Valencia85, Muḥammad b. al-Maʿz al-Yafrnī in Palma de Mallorca86, and 
Muḥammad b. Ghalbūn in Murcia.87 The mḥtasib was found even in the capital of the 
empire and his status gave him a seat among the high administrative and political 
officials in the headquarters of the Caliphate on the day when the caliph practised the 
qaḍaʾ al-maẓālim88. In his article: ‘ḥisba in al-Andalus’, Muḥammad Maʿmūrī goes 
even further and states that the ḥisba institution in the era of the Almohads was more 
organised than it had been during the time of their predecessors, the Almoravids.89 The 
latter, according to him, did not dominate fraud cases in the markets, especially in the 
time of ʿAlī Ibn Yūsuf (1106-17), not to mention the professional incompetence and 
unethical behaviour of some muḥtasibs, which was observed by some historians. One of 
these cases was reported by the Cordovan popular poet (zajjāl), Ibn Quzmān (1067-
1159), who complained poetically that the muḥtasib of his days used to indulge in wine 
and prostitutes, and he blamed the qāḍī for appointing them. He said:90 
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Syyidī laysh jaʿalta hādhā Muḥasiba wa-yaḥkum fī amr ahl al-adaba 
Wa-huwa zānī zanīm kathīr al-zinā 
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Such behaviour shows a manifestation of the neglect that was suffered by the institution 
during this period, which probably was a reason that led some fuqahāʾ of that time to 
write treatises about the importance of the ḥisba and the duties of the muḥtasib. Al-
Ṣaqaṭī, for example, wrote his treatise, at a time when he was no longer muḥtasib, at the 
suggestion of his friends, who incited him to write a kind of manual to restrain the 
permanent violation of the regulations relating to the ḥisba. The author said:91  
‘I learned about fraudsters among the merchants and artisans who are in the 
markets, their deception on measurements and weight, the means they employ to 
depreciate goods, the tricks which are customary in their transactions, their 
hypocrisy in how they present and do business, the frequent incompetence of the 
judges responsible for that office who have neither detailed nor general 
knowledge about halal or haram’. 
To conclude on this point, one should distinguish between the obligations of 
‘commanding right and forbidding wrong’, as a means for social and moral reform that 
encouraged people to help in preventing reprehensible acts92, and the ḥisba as an 
institution of market inspector. The attention of the Caliphs towards the Koranic 
obligation does not thus mean that they neglected the role of the ḥisba institution, but, to 
the contrary, it might have been a motivation for the regional governments to pay more 
attention to the institution, in order to achieve the Caliph's desire. Signs of this attention 
was reflected on the Andalusian society and was observed by Ibn Saʿīd (1213 -1286), 
who stated that the regulations of the ḥisba were deliberated on  and learned by the 
people of al-Andalus, similarly to the way in which Fiqh law is studied.93 Apparently, 
the statement of Ibn Saʿīd refers to the ḥisba treatises, which seem to have been widely 
available for everyone, especially to merchants, and it was used as a guide to their rights 
and obligations. 
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Generally, despite the originality of the term muḥtasib, the most common title 
used for the official, in both al-Andalus and al-Maghreb, was ṣāḥib al-sūq.94 The term 
appeared in al-Andalus from the time of the Umayyed dynasty, and it is most likely a 
transposition of the term ʿāmil al-sūq, which was used in the Mashriq for the same 
official.95 Clearly, this title was derived from the nature of the muḥtasib’s work, which 
was done mostly in the sūq area (the marketplace), where the commercial, industrial, 
and most of the religious and literary activities took place. The same also applies to the 
ḥisba institute itself, which became known as khuṭṭat al-sūq or wilayāt al-sūq.96 
Several treatises were written by the Andalusian fuqahaʾ providing a great deal 
of information about the muḥtasib, his qualifications and skills. They also focus on the 
practical aspects of the burden of the muḥtasib, offering long taxonomies of their 
activities and all of the things that fall under their responsibility. Generally, the 
information given by the works which were issued in the West, about the muḥtasib and 
his qualifications, does not differ much from those written in the Islamic East. The 
muḥatsib was invested by the governor or qāḍī, and his skills did not go beyond the 
limits of the city.97 Theoretically, besides his moral qualities and his legal knowledge 
(the muḥtasib was often, at the same time, a faqīh), which was generally required of 
him, he also needed professional experience (as a merchant, for example). Ibn ʿAbdūn 
stresses that muḥtasib must be an Andalusian because he would know the habits and 
behaviour of the people of the country more than others.98 This may be the case during 
the Almohad period because all the muhtasib-s mentioned in the dictionaries were 
Andalusian. The responsibility of the muḥtasib was comprehensive, covering all the 
social, religious, and economic activities that took place in the market. Generally, the 
duties of the organisation are all related to the control of the public’s behaviour and the 
tracking of irregularities, whether these were moral, religious or economic. For 
example, within the purview of the muḥtasib or ṣāḥib al-sūq was the monitoring of the 
fulfilment of prayers for traders and artisans, the correct use of mosques, morality and 
public order in the streets, squares and baths; monitoring the cleanliness and 
maintenance of streets and pavements. 99  However, the main responsibilities of the 
muḥtasib are to control weights and measures, as well as to examine prices and quality. 
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Such monitoring was also exerted on all of the corps of the most diverse traders and 
artisans.100 Al-Ṣaqaṭī listed six of these trade guilds: flour makers and bakers, butchers, 
perfumers and pharmacists, slave traders, artisans (such as tailor, pigment providers, 
blacksmiths and carpenters) and the suppliers of manufactured products.101 Each group 
had a representative member, called an Amīn, whose appointment was proposed by his 
guild and approved by the muḥtasib. The role of the amīn is quite simple: it is he who 
was an expert in the corporative disputes that might arise between artisans and 
customers. He was also the one who conveyed the wishes of his corporation to the 
muḥtasib in respect of the establishment of the fixing of prices.102 Apparently, they were 
also required to inform the Caliph about market conditions in their areas. The Caliph al-
Manṣūr, for instance, arranged a meeting with them twice a month, in order to ask them 
about market conditions and the prices of goods and commodities.103 
1.5 The Shurṭa or Almohad Police 
There is limited information about this position during the Almohad period. In the 
majority of cases, Ibn ʿIdharī's work is the only source. 
In a murder case dating back to the period of the second Caliph, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb, we 
find that the brother of the victim asked the Caliph to send ṭalaba for the arrest of the 
murderer.104 Was the Almohad shurṭa, in its early stages, then a matter for ṭalaba? 
There can be neither a denial nor a confirmation of this. However, it was not until the 
reign of al-Manṣūr that the sources talk about the Shurṭa itself. The author of al-Muʿjib 
was the first to mention the shurṭa in the time of al-Manṣūr, claiming that the vizier Abū 
Yaḥīya also held this position. In this case, and even in other cases of this period, the 
role played by the shurṭa is the same as that of al-Muḥtasib. 105 After a silence that 
enveloped the reign of the six successive caliphs, the Almohad shurṭī appears 
significantly during the reign of al-Rashīd. As many as six individuals, followed one 
another in this post, and appear in the list of shurṭa provided by Ibn ʿIdhārī106, who adds 
later another police chief in the capital, Marrakech. What can one deduce? 
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The first observation that can be drawn is that the position was eminently 
political, the Aṣḥāb al-Shurṭa overshadowed judges who do not even appear in this list 
of Ibn ʿIdhārī in relation to al-Rashīd's government. 107  In addition, all of these 
characters were from the Almohad’s original tribes (here are the Kūmīyya, Hantāta and 
Haskūra) and this confirms the words of Ibn Khaldūn, who notes that this very 
important burden in Almohad state was only assigned to the true Almohads.108 Finally, 
the presence of Aṣḥāb al-shurṭa in the entourage of Caliph al-Rashīd is explained by the 
importance of the advice that they could provide in the field of security. Indeed, the 
reign of the Caliph was marked by numerous upheavals and conflicts that threatened 
order constantly. 
If, at first, the Vizier was in charge of the police (as was the case of Abū Yaḥīya, 
the Vizier of al-Manṣūr), at the time of al-Rashīd the post was given to personalities of 
lesser importance than the Vizier, but it still had weight in Almohad society. The first in 
the list of al-Bayān, Abū Mūsā Ibn ʿAṭṭiyā, has thus replaced the Vizier during his 
absence from the capital, before accessing the post of ṣāḥib al-shurṭa. Ibn Khaldūn 
wrote: 
‘In the Almohad dynasty in the Maghrib, (the office) enjoyed a certain reputation, 
even though it did not have general (jurisdiction). It was entrusted only to 
important Almohad personalities. It did not have authority over government 
dignitaries.’109 
Are we able to determine the role of the Almohad shurṭī? Basically, his main duty 
was to implement the orders of the Caliph or the wālī. For example, according to 
Ibn al-Abbār in the Tuḥfat, al-Manṣūr had ordered the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa of Seville to 
arrest and apply a thousand lashes to the qāḍī of Málaga, Abū al-Rabīʿ al-ʿAbdarī, 
on suspicion of treason and of having released the famous rebel, Ibn al-Jazīrī.110 
During his anti-corruption programme, al-Manṣūr had also put anti-sumptuary 
measures in place. He allegedly ordered the shurṭa of Seville to terminate the 
activity of musicians and female singers and to take action against promiscuous 
people.111 As has been said previously, this role was normally the responsibility of 
al-Muḥtasib. 
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Among the few details left by Ibn ʿIdhārī, the primary activity of the shurṭa of 
al-Rashīd was repression. There were heavy blows against the dignitaries of the 
state. For example, the shurṭī Ibn Aslmāt, often called al-Ḥakīm, was commissioned 
by the sovereign to arrest the son of the Vizier, Ibn Yūnis, and to confiscate his 
property. Another ṣāḥib al-shurṭa, Abū Muḥammad Maksen, was given the mission 
to arrest, for the first time, the famous Sheikh Muʿāwiyya al-Haskūrī, and on the 
second occasion, a conceited Arab leader, Masʿūd b. Ḥimīdān. The shurṭī, because 
of a lack of courage, failed to arrest the first wanted man, but the second was 
captured and executed.112 This attitude of al-Rashīd, in launching his police against 
the high dignitaries of the Almohad state, denied Ibn Khaldūn’s claims that the 
shurṭa had no influence over Almohad nobles. 
 
Basically, despite the lack of information, we note that the Almohad police 
began, under the cover of ḥisba, to then tackle the toughest duties of a political 
nature and those that were closely linked to power. Finally, with the disappearance 
of al-Rashīd, the record of the Almohad shurṭa became secret and, to my 
knowledge, no information is available for the following periods. 
 
Among the charges which were close to the shurṭa, we have the Ṣāḥib al-
Madīna (the prefect of the city). For Mūsā ʿAzz al-Dīn, the ṣāḥib al-Madīna was 
only the second name for the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa, and was just the same as the ṣāḥib al-
Layl. 113  In reality, this deduction is completely erroneous. In his treatise, Ibn 
ʿAbdūn, as well as al-Saqṭī, makes a clear difference between the shurṭa and ṣāḥib 
al-Madīna, even if their judgment on one and the other are totally divergent.114 
For the Almohad period, a single passage has been preserved. In al-Bayān, under 
the reign of the second caliph, the author stated that among the dismissed there was 
a certain Ibn ʿUmar, the ṣāḥib al-Madīna of Meknes.115 Without doubt, the role of 
the latter was important, because all those who were disgraced and who were cited 
in this passage, were officials who were placed in the Almohad administration. 
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For his part, Ibn al-Zayāt speaks repeatedly about the ḥurrās abwāb al-
Madīna (the guardians of the city gates), who had to be a subordinate of the ṣāḥib 
al-Madīna.116 These doors were closed at night and were guarded by watchmen (al-
Sāmir), who let in people after the doors were closed. 117  According to other 
indications, one might suggest that the same neighbourhoods were also closed at 
night.118 
Another indication of the author of al-Tashawwuf, a contemporary of the 
Almohads, highlights another auxiliary to the ṣāḥib al-Madīna, and these were the 
Ḥurrās al-Layl (the watchmen). These, according to our texts, had a bad reputation 
and were unreliable.119 
2. Religious authorities 
2.1 Imām or Ṣahib al-Ṣalāt 
In the original hierarchy, a man named Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, a 
member of the Ten, was appointed by Ibn Tūmart to say prayer as an Imam.120 From 
that moment, the post of the ṣāḥib al-ṣalāt continuously existed until the end of the 
Almohad state. 
Though, in the beginning, this responsibility was assigned to an Almohad 
grand dignitary and also to a member of the Board of al-ʿshrah, later, this duty 
became obsolete and it would be bequeathed to a simple faqīh. The head of this 
modest function was invested by the qāḍī, or sometimes by the Ahl al-Balad (local 
residents) and he would consider it a failure if he could not climb the ladder to a 
higher post. Ibn ʿAbd al-Malik draws the story of a ṣāḥib al-ṣalāt and his 
misadventures until his death.121 This case reflects the situation of this khuṭṭa in 
Almohad times. This character, an imām at a neighborhood mosque in Seville, was 
deposed by the qāḍī who also dispossessed him of the house that he had built with 
his own money, just next to the mosque. The unfortunate Ṣāḥib al-salāt, left for the 
capital, where he won a favoured senior office in the Almohad headquarters and he 
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subsequently managed to return to his property, as well as to the imām’s post. Soon 
afterwards he also became a notary and continued to hold the two posts until his 
death in 1206. Another fortunate person was the ṣāḥib al-ṣalāt of Ceuta. The latter 
monopolised the Imāma, al-khuṭba, and the responsibility for the keys of the citadel 
(amānat Mafātīḥ al-Qaṣba wa-l-Bilād wa-l-Baḥar wa-l-Majāz) for another forty 
years.122 There are many more examples of the holders of that office, but, basically, 
the function had no reputation and its holder, in order to improve his living 
standards, had to have a second job. 
2.2 The Preacher or al-Khaṭīb 
In each mosque there was a khaṭīb who was appointed by the qāḍī of the city. His 
situation differed from that of the ṣāḥib ṣalāt, described above. In the capital, 
Marrakech, this position was eminently political, he was the preacher of the Capital 
(khaṭib al-Ḥaḍrah), also known as the khaṭib al-Khilāfa, who was a great Almohad 
dignitary, or the head of the ṭalabat al-Ḥaḍar. 
If researchers knew and appreciated the long chapter that al-Marrākushī reserved 
for the Almohad khuṭba (speech) on Friday, 123  they would relish the information 
provided in a very long passage from the author of Janī Zahrat al-As, on the preachers 
of the al-Qarawiyyīn mosque from the time of the Almohad Caliph, Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb 
until the advent of the Marinid dynasty.124 
The passage in question, begins with an Almohad custom. Indeed, they were 
replacing the khaṭib-s of the great mosques, who did not speak, in addition to Arabic, 
the Berber language, or who did not know the credo of the Mahdī. At first, the khatib of 
the Qarawiyyīn invested by the Almohad authority held the two charges: the imāma and 
khuṭba; but, little by little, the two khuṭṭa-s were been separated. Nevertheless, the 
authority remained in the hands of the Imam, and not those of the khaṭīb. In addition, at 
the end of the dynasty, the sovereign lost all control of both the Imām and the khaṭīb 
who were now invested by the Almohad Sheikh-s. 
Ultimately, the Almohad preachers were one of the main pillars of Almohad 
propaganda. They were present throughout the country through the efforts invested by 
the state in the construction of mosques, following an ancient tradition that was 
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attributed to the Mahdī who, on his return from the Eastern path, took the initiative to 
build or renovate mosques wherever he stopped. 
2.3 Al-Muʾadhdhin or Muezzin 
The author of Kitāb al-Ansāb is the only writer to integrate muʾadhdhin-s into the 
hierarchy of Ibn Tūmart in the fifteenth rightful place, alongside the jund.125 Nothing in 
this source nor in any of the others, can help to clarify this position, except that later, the 
Caliph al-Nāṣir had prevented the muezzins, such as the ṭalabat al-Ḥaḍar, to bear arms. 
The origin of the muʾadhdhinun is very diverse; either they are from the Almohad 
tribes, or they are chosen from among the townspeople. We do not know what the 
criteria for recruitment were. However, the presence of the Kūmiyya tribe in the list that 
was provided by the Kitāb al-Ansāb proves that such information does not relate to the 
period of Ibn Tūmart, but to that of his successors. The muʾadhdhinun from the 
townspeople were divided into two groups, those who were travelling with the 
sovereign, and those who did not leave the capital. This confirms that the author was 
only referring to the muʾadhdhin-s of Marrakech and this class of muezzins was not 
extended to all of the Almohad cities.  
However, al-Marrākushī has left other details of the situation in the provinces. In 
fact, the holders of that function were grouped into a kind of corporation that was 
headed by one of their own, who was called the Raʾīs. He held the honour of 
announcing the khuṭba and the Friday prayer, and it was incumbent upon him to hold 
the stick which the preacher uses as a support on Friday. In addition, al-Marrākushī 
added: ‘the adhān [The call to prayer] is shouted by three gifted muʾadhdhinun who 
have beautiful voices of different timbres, and who are chosen after extensive 
research’.126 The number of muʾadhdhinun was thus quite high and, after a rigorous 
selection, only three were deemed to have deserved the job. 
Curiously, the information from al-Marrākushī and the author of Kitāb al-Ansāb 
exclusively concerns the period of the Caliph al-Nāṣir, which suggests that this ṭabaqa 
(category) experienced a change that our authors considered worth writing about during 
the reign of the Caliph. 
Even in the area of the call to prayer, the sources attribute to al-Mahdī some new 
practices that involve the use of Berber formulas that were attached to the ādhān, like 
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tasallayt, Nardi, and the cry of the muʾadhdhin at daybreak Aṣbaḥa wa-li-Llāhi al-
Ḥamd (‘It's sunrise’ and ‘praise be to God’).127 
3. The Mālikī School and the Almohad Reform Project 
This issue began with the account of al-Marrākushī regarding the events that took place 
in Fez during the reign of Al-Manṣūr. The author, who was an eyewitness, stated:  
‘During his time [al-Manṣūr] the science of furūʿ collapsed; the jurists were afraid 
of the ruler; he had the books of the prevailing school or the Mālikites burnt, after 
he had extracted the Koranic and traditional passages contained in them and 
quoted in them’  
Al-Marrākushī continued his testimony: 
‘I myself was a witness when whole loads of these books were gathered in Fez 
and given over to the flames. Under threat of heavy punishment, this ruler 
charged the people to refrain from preoccupation with the science of raʾy’.128 
This is the only clear record of the event in all of the sources, although some historians, 
speaking about certain Mālikī books, mention that they were burnt during the period129, 
which confirms al-Marrakech’s statement. These sources mention also something that 
has been considered a consequence of this event. According to them, three of the 
leading Mālikī scholars were arrested and examined, namely the faqīh Abī al-Ḥusīn b. 
Zarqūn (d. 1224)130, Abī Bakr b. ʿAlī (d. 1199)131 and Abī Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Kabīr 
(d. 1220)132, each of whom were originally from Seville, the place where the decision 
was made. However, based on this small number of fuqahāʾ who were arrested, it is 
clear that the process was not directed against all of the Mālikī scholars and the sources, 
which are mostly post-Almohad, may exaggerate the extent of the phenomenon. So 
what was the purpose of this procedure? For al-Marrākushī, al-Manṣūr wished to 
eradicate the Mālikī School altogether from al-Maghreb, and to lead people towards the 
ẓāhir in the Koran and in traditions.133 
To achieve this goal, Al-Manṣūr, al-Marrākushī goes on:  
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‘… commissioned some of his court scholars to edit a collection of laws on prayer 
and related matters, similar to Ibn Tūmart’s collection of traditions on ritual 
cleanliness... the ruler, then, dictated this work personally to his subjects and 
obliged them to study it... those who memorised it by heart could expect a 
valuable reward, in terms of clothing and other valuables, from the ruler’.134 
Despite al-Marrākushī’s explicit statement, disagreement among historians has 
continued: on whether these actions were intended to lead the people towards the Ẓāhirī 
School135, or whether they were simply attempts to urge scholars to diligence in issuing 
the fatwa dependence on the Koran and the Hadith, without regard for the views of 
former scholars. If so, was this action a coup against the Almohad ideology by al-
Manṣūr, or had the implementation of the deferred project existed since the time of Ibn 
Tūmart. 
Al-Marrākushī, after his testimony, adds that it was only in the days of al-Manṣūr 
that ‘all emerged that had remained hidden during his father's and grandfather's 
time’. 136  This is confirmed by number of sources. The author and scholar of the 
thirteenth century, Moḥammad b. Aḥmed b. ʿAlīsh, stated, that:  
‘ʿAbd al-Muʾmin met a number of Mālikī leaders, and his Vizier, Abū Jaʿfar b. 
ʿAṭīyya, on behalf of him blamed them of adhering to the books of furūʿ, 
especially “Mudūnat Ibn Saḥnūn”, which was used as the main source of their 
fatwa, without attention to the texts of the Koran and the Sunnah’. The author 
continues ‘The faqīh Abū ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Zarqūn, trying to defend their attitude, 
stand up and explan to the caliph that all what in this book [Mudunat Ibn Saḥnūn] 
is based on the Koran, the tradition and the Ijmāʿ (the consensus of the ʿulamāʾ), 
but it has been summed up by scholars to make it easier for learners and 
students’.137  
According to the author, no further action was taken by the Caliph on this subject after 
this event.138 Yet, Ibn Abī Zarʿ claimed that, in 1155, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin ordered the 
books of the furūʿ to be burned and to lead people to the tradition of the Prophet.139 This 
is the only claim that attributed the burning of books to a caliph other than al-Manṣūr, 
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and for a number of researchers, this was most likely a conflation of the author, and, 
even if we believe his account, the decision certainly did not come into force.140 
However, the threat of the implementation of the action reappeared again in the 
era of the second Caliph, Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf141. A passage from al-Marrākushī, told by 
Abū Bakr b. al-Jadd (d. 1190), illustrates this: 
‘When I had my first audience with the Commander of the Believers, Abū 
Yaʿqūb, I found in front of him the book of Ibn Yūnus. "O Abū Bakr" he said to 
me, "I am looking here at these divergent opinions which developed later in God's 
religion. You find four, five, and more different interpretations for one and the 
same question. Where, now, is the truth, and which of the divergent opinions 
must the worshippers follow?" Now, I began to explain. But he interrupted me, 
saying: "O Abū Bakr, there is only this here - and he pointed to a copy of the 
Koran - or this here - pointing to Abū Dāwūd's Sunan on his right - or the 
sword’142 
It is not known that subsequent caliphs pursued a different policy towards the Mālikī 
School. However, the repetition of this orientation from the first three Almohad caliphs 
confirms that this was the strategy of the caliphate, and not merely an individual 
tendency. 
Ẓāhirī Doctrine or the Call for Diligence 
Historians debate whether the attitude of the Almohad Caliph is a tendency to 
conversion to Ẓāhirīsm, or just an unintended approach to it and to convergence. This 
difference seems to be due to the divergent views of the Eastern accounts against the 
silence of their counterparts in the Islamic West. In general, they are divided into two 
groups: the first believe that al-Manṣūr was inclined to the ẓāhirī doctrine, and wanted 
to publish it in the Maghreb and al-Andalus at the expense of the Mālikī School.143 
Besides al-Marrākushī, the provision of this group is based mostly on the statement of 
Ibn al-Athīr. In his speech about the Caliph al-Manṣūr, the author said: 
‘[al-Manṣūr] publicly professed to belonging to the Ẓāhrīyya and turned away 
from the Mālikī branch. Consequently, the cause of the Ẓāhirīs received a great 
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impetus during his time. In the Maghrib they were represented by many 
exponents who, with reference to Ibn Ḥazm, are called by the name Ḥazmiyya; 
however, they were merged into the Mālikī School. But in his time, they became 
independent once again and widespread.’144 
The second group believe that al-Manṣūr intended to urge scholars not to imitate the 
former fuqahāʾ, but that their judgments should be the result of their own thought, 
derived from the issues that are addressed by the Koran, Hadith, the opinions of the 
Ṣaḥāba (the companions of the Prophet) and Qiyās (analogical reasoning). Among this 
group there are Ibn Khallikān145 followed by al-Nāṣirī146, but above them all is the 
Syrian traveller, Tāj al-Dīn b. Ḥamawayh al-Dīmashqī, who visited al-Maghrib around 
1197, and stayed there until the year 1203.147 During his stay, Ibn Ḥamawayh was able 
to meet al-Manṣūr and to enjoy his hospitality. His testimony, in terms of importance, is 
thus more valuable than that of other historians, even al-Marrākushī, whose age during 
the event of the burning of the Mālikī books did not exceed the age of ten. In his 
testimony, Ibn Ḥamawayh said that ‘He [al-Manṣūr] was memorising the Quran very 
well and the matn [text] of the Hadīth as well... he also speaks in fiqh in eloquent words 
... and he himself has issued a number of fatwas based upon his knowledge’.148 A few 
pages later, the author states that ‘al-Manṣūr is inclined to the view of Ahl al Hadīth 
[People of the hadīth]’.149 The term Ahl al-Hadīth is used to refer to those who reject 
taqled (uncritical following) and who seek guidance in matters of religious faith, 
practices and Islamic law from the Koran, the authentic hadīth, the statements of the 
Companions and qīyās respectively.150 Due to their rejection of taqled, they are, in this 
case, in agreement with the ẓāhirī School. However, the main dispute between them is 
that the latter refused to accept the opining of the Companions unless they all agreed on 
one thing. 151  They also rejected qiyās in the jurisprudence. 152  This means that al-
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Manṣūr, although he rejected the mālikī view, did not aim to adopt the ẓāhirī viewpoint, 
but intended to return people to the school of the Salaf (the first three generations, 
which included Muḥammad’s contemporary companions and followers). However, 
assuming that al-Manṣūr was inclined to Ahl al-Hadīth, then who was responsible for 
the claim that he adopted the Ẓāhirī School? Ibn al-Ḥamawayh, who probably witnessed 
the conflict between al-Manṣūr and the Maliki fuqahāʾ, did not forget to mention that 
the latter attribute the ẓāhirī School to al-Manṣūr.153 However, what drove fuqahāʾ to 
make such a claim? 
Throughout the history of al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, Mālikī fuqahāʾ occupied 
the lead among the Islamic schools, which enabled them to hold the most important 
positions in Islamic governments, along with a distinct social status that qualified them 
to act as spiritual leaders and as representatives of the society on many occasions. 
Therefor, it is likely that the fuqahāʾ, for fear of losing, had to launch their propaganda 
weapons against the new orientation of the caliphate, taking advantage of what they had 
instilled in the cultural background of the society over the centuries of reverence for the 
Mālikīs, and condemnation of the ẓāhirīs. By creating such a claim, the fuqahāʾ were 
thus aiming to stir up public opinion against the Caliph's policy, and to put pressure on 
the authority to abandon its project. However, the campaign against al-Manṣūr's project 
did not only rely on this measure. Many works of jurisprudence were issued by the 
Mālikīs during this time.  They were interested in the defence of the Mālikī School and 
in clarifying the importance and strength of its scientific methodology in all of its fields, 
including ʿilm al-furūʿ. For instance, the faqīh Abū Bakr b. Abī Jamra al-Mursī (d. 
1202) wrote two books in the Malikī School and fiqh al-furūʿ namely ‘Iqlīd al-taqlīd al-
muʾaddī ila al-naẓar al-rashīd’154 and ‘Natāʾj al-Ibkār wa-manāhij al-Nuẓẓār fī mʿānī 
al-Āthār’.155 Likewise, the faqīh ʿAlī b. Aḥmad al-Ghassānī (d. 1212) wrote ‘Nahaj al-
Masālik lil-tafaqqh fī Madhhab Mālik’ which has 10 volumes, and ‘al-Tarṣīʿ fī Sharḥ 
masāʾil al-Tafrīʿ’.156 On the same subject, the faqīh Abū al-Rabīʿ b. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-
Ghirnāṭī (d. 1202) wrote ‘al-Masāʾil al-Majmūʿa ʿan al-Tahdhīb’ in 8 volumes.157 The 
famous Abū al-Walīd b. Rushd (d. 1198) also wrote, and his best-known work in this 
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field is ‘Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid’. In this work, Ibn Rushd 
promised, in more than a paragraph, that he would write a second book on the 
jurisprudence of the furūʿ of the Mālikī School.158 Furthermore, in parallel with works 
that focus on supporting the Mālikī fiqh, and attempt to revitalise its position in the 
community, there was another type of works that aimed to undermine the Almohad 
project by attacking the ẓāhirī School. Amongst these works, there are the ‘al-Muʿllī fī 
al-Rad ʿla al-Muḥallī wa-l-Mujallī’ of Ibn Zarqūn (d. 1224)159, ‘Ḥujjat al-ayyām wa-
qudwat al-anām’ of the faqīh Abū Zakariyā al-Zawawī al-Bajāʾī (d. 1214)160, and ‘al-
Nibrās fī al-rad ʿla munkar al-qiyās’ of Abī ʿAlī al-Masīlī.161 
The contradictions around the incident of the burning of the Mālikī books and al-
Manṣūr’s purpose in this procedure can be understood through the results that followed 
the incident. These are perhaps clearer than the historians’ statements, which seem, to a 
large degree, to be exaggerated. The most notable statement is that of al-Marrākushī, 
which pointed to the breadth of Ẓāhirī madhhab in the era of the Almohads. The author 
states that:  
‘…he [Ibn Ḥazm] is the most famous scholar of al-Andalus these days; and the 
most mentioned one in the Councils of the leaders, and on the tongues of scholars, 
and that is because of his dispute with madhhab Mālik in the Maghrib, and his 
leading in the knowledge of the Ẓāhir. To my knowledge, no one [ẓāhirī] was 
known before him; the number of his followers in al-Andalus today is large’.162 
This statement is greatly exaggerated, at least when it is based on the material that is 
available in the sources. On the one hand, the author gives the impression that the 
Mālikī scholars no longer had the prominence that they previously enjoyed. However, 
according to the biographical dictionaries, the scientific activity of the Mālikī scholars 
continued to flourish, and the books of Mālikī fiqh, especially fiqh al-furūʿ, were still 
produced and studied, even after the burning incident. 163 On the other hand, and 
according to the same sources, there does not appear to be any significant increase in the 
number of Ẓāhirī scholars during the Almohad period, compared to the preceding one, 
the Almoravid period.164 In her study of the Ẓāhirīs at the time of the Almohads, 
Camilla Adang was able to prepare a list of all the scholars during the period who had 
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been mentioned in the biographical dictionaries. According to her, only sixteen Ẓāhirīs 
were active during this period. Of course, there may well have been other Ẓāhirīs who 
were neglected from these mentions, because they were less important, but this must 
have been the case for the Mālikī scholars, who did not make it into these dictionaries 
either. Camilla, however, noticed that most of the Ẓāhirī who were mentioned were 
active during the period of al-Manṣūr. 165 This is, of course, due to the suitable 
atmosphere that was created by the Caliph for the Ẓāhirī Madhhib to spread. Yet, their 
number was still very limited and does not reflect the picture that was painted of them 
by al-Marrākushī. This also applies to their existence in the Almohad government. 
Among all the Ẓāhirī scholars on the list, only one Ẓāhirī assumed judicial office in the 
Almohad government throughout the period of the Almohads, namely Ibn Ḥawṭ Allāh 
al-Anṣārī (d. 1215), who was appointed as qāḍī in Seville, Murcia, Salé and Ceuta. 
In sum, certainly the Almohads, from the era of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, were planning 
to bring about reform to the jurisprudence in al-Maghrib and al-Andalus, either through 
the withdrawal of ʿlim al-furūʿ from the Mālikī School, or by entirely removing the 
Madhhib itself. However, the political circumstances in the region, along with the 
power and influence of the Mālikī prevented the implementation of their purpose. 
Conclusion 
The authority prohibited qāḍī-s from applying the death penalty and they centralised 
major legal cases. Due to these measures, the power of the qāḍī-s diminished, but they 
had independence from political power and this allowed them to continue to respect the 
established traditions. However, although the Almohad qāḍī-s were politically less 
important, they retained a great moral influence in society. It is noteworthy that letters 
of appointment, issued at the end of the Muʾminid dynasty, emphasise the vagueness of 
the boundary between the judiciary and the administrative area in the Almohad state. 
Throughout this period, cases of refusal to exercise qaḍāʾ were less numerous than in 
the Almoravid era. Almohads seem to have appointed to the posts of qāḍī respected 
scholars, who had a reputation for fairness and honesty. We know only one case in 
which a judge let himself be corrupted by bribes, and another in which the qāḍī refused 
to exercise qaḍāʾ for political reasons. Various sources give us a glimpse scarcity 
conflicts between representatives of the judiciary and political power. Indeed, the 
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Almohad state based on religious bases and restorative, needed lawyers to maintain the 
stability of society and mobilize the people for the holy war. It also notes that many 
Almohad judges and scholars engaged in it and participated voluntarily. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have tried, through examination of a wide range of sources, to offer a 
comprehensive study of the political and administrative system of al-Andalus during the 
era of the Almohads. Close study of these systems throughout this period of Almohad 
rule has revealed a number of results that increase our understanding of this sprawling 
state. First, one cannot but admire the disciplined hierarchical system that was invented 
by Ibn Tūmart, using the existing, non-official institutions of the Berber tribes. Tribes 
were placed in different layers with different tasks and this formed the basis for the 
political institutions of the future state: an advisory body that was selected from all the 
tribes, that represented the ruling authority; and which was a mobilising institute used to 
spread the principles of the Almohads and thus to gain more followers; and, finally, a 
military organisation that was composed of all of the tribes. Credit can also be given to 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin, who was the only one in Ibn Tūmart’s system who had no tribe, and 
yet he managed, through his cunning, to become the leader of a huge empire and to later 
limit the power to his descendants. 
 Under ‘Abd al-Muʾmin, the hierarchical system underwent major change. 
Almohad councils were expanded to include other tribes, but their powers were 
confined, little by little, to an advisory role after he first denied them any hope of access 
to the throne, through establishing hereditary rule, and, second, access to power and 
privileges, through the appointment of his sons to head the provinces of the country. 
The ṭalaba, on the other hand, who played a major propaganda role, were moved to 
performing military functions, and a new category of ḥuffāẓ and ṭalaba of ḥaḍar were 
created. These were selected carefully from among the Almohads and Andalusians, to 
carry out administrative and political responsibilities throughout the Empire.  
Political and administrative systems in al-Andalus also underwent change, even 
though the caliph maintained the existing structures. Governors who were of Andalusi 
origins were replaced, and the office gradually became, with rare exceptions, reserved 
for sayyid-s. Jurists (fuqahāʾ) who had acted as civil governors in the era of the 
Almoravids lost their power and they were replaced by sheikh-s who became the right 
hand of the wālī. Financial institutions which were usually under the control of the 
governor seem to have enjoyed a certain autonomy and reported directly to Marrakech. 
Apart from this institution, authority in the provinces did not change much. The wālī 
was the head of the government and oversaw the rulers of the cities within the scope of 
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his province. However, the Caliph still monitored his overall conduct, and the wālī had 
to refer to Marrakech in all his decisions. All the governors and major financial 
officials, whose appointment was released from the Ḥaḍar, were also held accountable 
and could be dismissed by order of the caliph. As for the appointees, Andalusians were 
well represented in the Iberian government. With the exception of the post of governor 
and head of the financial institutions, who were required to be Almohads, the 
Andalusians had access to all administrative positions. Indeed, some offices maintained 
the original tradition and they remained the exclusive privilege of the Andalusians, such 
as the post of kātib and mushrif. 
This pattern also appears in the judicial system, which was characterised, as far 
as one can tell, by integrity and enjoyed a good reputation, so much so that only one 
case of judicial bribery was recorded. Below the judge, there was a series of assistant 
judges, who were appointed by him according to his needs, and each of whom dealt 
with specific issues. Constant mobility in this institution is one of the most prominent 
manifestations of this period, and was perhaps one of the factors that contributed to an 
increasing effectiveness and that limited the cases of corruption. However, like any 
other institution, the judge did not have the absolute freedom to deal with all matters 
and he had to consult Marrakech before issuing his provisions, especially in criminal 
cases. 
All of these organisations, political or judicial, in spite of the central authority, 
seem to have enjoyed a relative degree of stability, especially before the beginning of 
the thirteenth century. One might ask, then, what was the cause of the sudden collapse 
of the Almohad Empire? Researchers have put forward several hypotheses, most of 
which privilege socio-religious or economic factors. However, the Almohad crisis was 
primarily a crisis of the system that had been established by ‘Abd al-Muʾmin. The 
hereditary system was not limited to the position of the Caliph alone. All the other 
Almohad positions, sheikhs, ḥuffāẓ and wālī-s, were inherited from one reign to the 
next. As far as Iberia was concerned, it could be argued that it was this failure of 
successive caliphs to co-opt Andalusis into the highest positions of authority in the 
Almohad imperial system that undermined its effectiveness.  This policy prevented the 
emergence of new blood with the competence and capacity to assume a position of 
power. The system which may be considered one of the reasons for the state’s power 
had thus become, with the passage of time, the major factor in its weakness and 
disintegration. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 15: Majlis al-ʿAshara or The Council of Ten 
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Figure 16: The Almohad governors of the Andalusi Provinces 
Governorship	 ʿAbd al-Muʾmin Before 
the hereditary rule 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
After hereditary rule	 Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf	
wilāyit al-
gharib	
• Aḥmed b. Qusī 
• Sīdray b. Wazīr	
• Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd 
Allāh b. Abī Ḥafṣ b. 
ʿAlī 
• Sayyid Yūsuf b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin	
• Sīdray b. Wazīr 
• ʿUmar b. Tīmṣalīt 
• ʿUmar b. Saḥnūn	
Seville	 • Burrāz b. Muḥammad 
al-Mussūfī 
• Yūsuf b. Sulaymān 
• Abū Zakarīya Yaḥyā 
b. Yūmūr	
• Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī 
Ibrāhīm 
• Sayyid Abū Ibrāhīm b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusaīn 
b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Isḥāq b. Yūsuf	
Córdoba	 	
• Abū Zayd ʿAbd Allāh 
b. Yakīt	
• Sayyid Abū Saʿīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū al-Ḥusaīn ʿAlī 
b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Yaḥyā b. 
Yūsuf	
Granada	 	 	 • Sayyid Abū Saʿīd b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin 
• Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī 
Ibrāhīm 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd b. 
ʿUmar 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd b. Yūsuf	
Malaga	 	
• Sayyid Abū Saʿīd b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin	
• Sayyid Muḥammad b. 
ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū al-Ḥassan b. 
Abī Muḥammad ʿAbd 
Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin	
Murcia	 	 	 • Sayyid Yaʿqūb b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Yūsuf	
Valencia	 	 	 • Abū al-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. 
Mardānīsh	
Jaén	 	 • Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-
Kūmī	
• Muḥammad b. Ṣanādīd	
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Governorship Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr ʿAbd Allāh al-Nāṣir Abū Yaʿqūb al-Mustanṣir 
wilāyit al-
gharib 
• ʿĪsā b. Abī Ḥafṣ b. 
ʿAlī 
• Sayyid 
Muḥammad b. 
ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
• ʿAbd al-Wāḥad b. Yūsuf b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
 
Seville 
• Sayyid Abū 
Yaḥyā b. Yūsuf b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Yaʿqūb b. 
ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd 
b. Yūsuf 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr 
• Sayyid Abū Isḥāq b. Yūsuf 
• Sayyid Abū Mūsā b. ʿAbd 
al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Isḥāq b. al-
Manṣūr 
• Sayyid Ibrāhīm b. Yūsuf b. 
ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
 
• Sayyid Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm 
b. Yūsuf 
• Sayyid Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm 
b. al-Manṣūr 
• Sayyid Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-
Maʾmūn 
Córdoba 
• Sayyid 
Muḥammad b. 
Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
  
Granada • Sayyid Isḥāq b. Yūsuf 
• Sayyid Abū Ibrāhīm b. 
Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī 
Yaḥyā b. Abī Ḥafṣ 
• Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr 
Malaga  Idrīs b. al-Manṣūr  
Murcia 
• Sayyid ʿUmar b. 
Yūsuf b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr 
• Abū al-Ḥasān b. Wājāj 
• Abū ʿUmrān b. Yāsīn al-
Hintātī 
• Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr 
Valencia 
 
• Sayyid Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. 
ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• ʿUthmān b. Abī Ḥafṣ 
ʿUmar al-Hintāti 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd al-Bayāsī 
Jaén 
• Muḥammad b. 
Ṣanādīd 
• Abū Isḥāq 
Ibrāhīm b. 
Muḥammad 
• Sayyid Abū Mūsā b. Abī 
Ḥafṣ b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd b. ʿAbd 
al-Raḥmān 
• ʿUthmān b. Abī Ḥafṣ 
ʿUmar al-Hintāti 
Mallorca 
 • ʿAbd Allāh b. Ṭāʿallah al-
Kūmī 
• Sayyid Abū Zayd 
• Sayyid Abū ʿAbd Allāh b. 
Abī Ḥafṣ b. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
• Abū Yaḥyā b. ʿAlī b. Abī 
ʿUmrān al-Tīnamalī 
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Governorship	 ʿAbd al-Wāḥid al-Makhlūʿ	 ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿĀdil	 Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʾmūn	
Seville	 • Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh al-
Bayāsī	
• Sayyid Abū al-
ʿAlāʾ al-Maʾmūn	
	
Córdoba	 • Sayyid Idrīs b. al-Manṣūr	
• Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh 
al-Bayāsī, then 
attached to Seville	
• Sayyid Abū al-Rabīʿ	
Granada	 • Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-
Manṣūr	
	 	
Malaga	 • Sayyid Abū al-Ḥasan b. al-
Manṣūr	
	 	
Murcia	 • Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr	
• Sayyid ʿĪsā b. Abī 
Mūsā b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin	
	
Valencia	 • Sayyid Abū Zayd al-Bayāsī	
• Sayyid Abū Zayd 
al-Bayāsī	
	
Jaén	
• Sayyid Abū Muḥammad 
al-Bayāsī 
• Sayyid Sulaymān b. Abī 
Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-
Muʾmin	
• ʿUmar b. ʿĪsā b. 
Abī Ḥafṣ Yaḥyā	
	
Mallorca	 • Sayyid Abū Muḥammad b. 
al-Manṣūr	
	 • Abū Yaḥyā Muḥammad 
b. ʿAlī b. Abī ʿUmrān	
 
